Suchergebnisse

Examining the legal effects of EU concluded treaties, this book provides an analysis of this increasingly important and rapidly growing area of EU law. The EU has concluded more than 1,000 treaties including recently its first human rights treaty (the UN Rights of Persons with Disability Convention). These agreements are regularly invoked in litigation in the Courts of the member states and before the EU courts in Luxembourg but their ramifications for the EU legal order and that of the member states remains underexplored. Through analysis of over 300 cases, the book finds evidence of a twin-track approach whereby the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) adopts a maximalist approach to Treaty enforcement, where EU agreements are invoked in challenges to member state level action whilst largely insulating EU action from meaningful review vis-à-vis agreements. The book also reveals novel findings regarding the use of EU agreements in EU level litigation including: the types and which specific EU agreements (including the types of provisions) have arisen in litigation; the nature of the proceedings (preliminary rulings or direct actions) and the number of occasions in which they have been addressed in challenges to member state or EU action and the outcomes; who has been litigating (individuals, institutions, or member states) and which domestic courts have been referring questions to the CJEU. The significance of the judicial developments in this area are situated within the context of the domestic constitutional ramifications for member state legal orders thus revealing a neglected dimension in the constitutionalization debates, which traditionally emphasized the ramifications of internal EU law for the domestic constitutional order without expressly accommodating the constitutional significance of this external category of EU law nor the different challenges that this poses domestically.

AbstractRecognition in contemporary international law is generally seen as a declaratory act. This is indeed the only plausible explanation in situations where a new State emerges consensually and in the absence of territorial illegality. Unilateral secession and territorial illegality, however, create different legal circumstances in which the applicable rules of international law imply and even presuppose that (collective) recognition could have constitutive effects. This article therefore suggests that the interpretation of the legal nature of recognition and non-recognition should not start on the premise that recognition always merely acknowledges the fact of the emergence of a new State. This is not to say that States cannot exist without being recognized. Rather, the legal effects of recognition may depend on the mode of a certain (attempt at) State creation.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations and its judgments are usually considered highly persuasive as to propositions of international law. Thus, when the ICJ formulates a rule of international law giving binding force to a unilateral declaration of a state's future intentions, statesmen may be expected to refer to that formulation for guidance whenever they consider the possibility of issuing a declaration of future policy. Moreover, the ability of the ICJ to support its formulation of a rule of international law in terms of the international legal order and legal logic affects the perceptions of statesmen as to the probity of the Court, as well as the willingness of states to refer real cases to it. The Judgment of the ICJ in the Nuclear Tests cases raised both these issues in a particularly pointed way.

Abstract
This article challenges the traditional view that informal sponsalia (as described in D. 23,1) were legally unenforceable in classical Roman law. After a close examination of the contents and structure of D. 23,1 and related Digest texts, it offers a new interpretation of a crucial passage from Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 4.4), which has traditionally been read as showing that Roman sponsalia were unenforceable. The article then concludes with a consideration of the literary evidence offered by Varro, Plautus and Ovid.

AbstractThis article challenges the traditional view that informal sponsalia (as described in D. 23,1) were legally unenforceable in classical Roman law. After a close examination of the contents and structure of D. 23,1 and related Digest texts, it offers a new interpretation of a crucial passage from Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae 4.4), which has traditionally been read as showing that Roman sponsalia were unenforceable. The article then concludes with a consideration of the literary evidence offered by Varro, Plautus and Ovid.