Suchergebnisse

I want to consider the European Commission's proposed multilateral investment court as an international claims tribunal. The commission is not promoting its investment court as a claims tribunal, but that is essentially what it is. The commission seeks to establish a mechanism to allow foreign investors to submit future disputes under international law to binding dispute resolution before a standing tribunal. The proposed court differs from most claims tribunals, as it is intended to be multilateral and to apply to future disputes. But that is what makes the proposal so interesting and potentially useful.

In March 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) ruled in Achmea that investor-state dispute resolution provisions in intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are incompatible with EU law and ipso facto invalid. In January 2019, EU Member States issued Declarations on the Legal Consequences of the Judgment in Achmea undertaking to take steps formally to terminate intra-EU BITs. However, at present, there is no consensus among them on the implications of Achmea on the Energy Charter Treaty, the multilateral energy treaty to which the EU and its Member States are all parties.00Many EU law scholars consider the Achmea judgment as the death knell to intra-EU investment treaty arbitrations. Some have even predicted the end of Investor-State Dispute Settlement itself. Investment treaty and public international law scholars and legal practitioners, however, have a different view of the schism now growing between EU and international law.00'The Future of Investment Treaty Arbitration in the EU' examines the current and the proposed new framework for investment protection in the EU and internationally, with a particular focus on investment treaty arbitration and energy-related investments

Any future Multilateral Investment Court's independence and impartiality must be guaranteed. If it does not live up to the standards of independence expected of a modern international court, there is little point in contemplating this reform as it is unlikely to remedy the criticisms leveled at the investment arbitration regime.

Ein neuer Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) soll die Antwort auf die in den vergangenen Jahren vor allem im Zusammenhang mit CETA und TTIP geäußerte Kritik am internationalen Investitionsschutzrecht im Allgemeinen und an der ad hoc Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit zwischen Investoren und Staaten im Besonderen geben. "Eckpunkte" eines solchen ständigen Gerichtshofs sind dessen streng rechtsstaatliche Ausgestaltung, wozu höchste Anforderungen an das richterliche Ernennungsverfahren ebenso zählen wie an die persönliche Integrität, Unabhängigkeit und Qualifikation der Richterinnen und Richter. Auch eine mögliche Kostenreduktion für alle Beteiligten sowie Transparenzgesichtspunkte, Aspekte der Einheitlichkeit der Rechtsprechung sowie eine effektive Vollstreckbarkeit von Entscheidungen finden Beachtung. Die vorliegende "MIC-Machbarkeitsstudie" soll zu einer breiteren Diskussion der Ausgestaltungsmöglichkeiten eines solchen neuen internationalen Spezialgerichtshofes für Investitionsschutzangelegenheiten beitragen.

Das aktuelle globale Investitionsschutzsystem ist ökonomisch notwendig, aber reformbedürftig. Ein Hauptkritikpunkt am jetzigen Zustand ist die Verfahrensführung durch ad-hoc-Schiedsgerichte, deren Neutralität und Sachkompetenz angezweifelt wird. Deshalb wird u.a. von der Europäischen Union die Etablierung eines ständigen Multilateralen Investitionsgerichts angestrebt. Der Beitrag analysiert zentrale regulatorische Optionen für den Auswahlprozess und die Ausgestaltung der Amtsführung der Richter eines künftigen Multilateralen ­Investitionsgerichts. ; The current global system of investment protection is economically necessary but in need of reform. A major critique of the present system is the conduct of proceedings by ad hoc arbitral tribunals, whose neutrality and competence are contested. This is why the European Union, among others, is advocating the establishment of a standing Multilateral Investment Court. This contribution analyses core regulatory options with respect to the selection and rules of conduct for judges of a future Multilateral Investment Court.

Critical of the MAI which is being negotiated between members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to protect foreign investors against national legislation that might restrict their profits; focus on adverse effects for developing countries.