Search results

What motivates national judges to be either active in the preliminary reference procedure by expressing opinions in the requests they send to the Court of Justice or passive by not voicing their views? This Article sheds light on how national judges perceive the possibility of framing the cases they refer to the Court, for instance, by expressing an opinion in defence of the challenged national law. Based on interviews with Swedish judges, this Article shows that the respondents express opinions to provide the Court with information and to influence the development of EU law. The Article also uncovers what motivates national judges not to express opinions. These three previously untheorised motivations are: 1) protecting one's reputation, 2) respecting the division of competences between the Court and national courts and 3) upholding the impartiality of the courts. Furthermore, the findings indicate that high court judges in particular are opposed to the inclusion of opinions in a request. In contrast, most of the interviewed lower court judges view the inclusion of opinions in the requests as practically mandatory. This Article proposes that this difference in attitudes towards opinions between high and low court judges originate from variations in professional norms regarding what constitutes appropriate behaviour.

1. Integration Through Courts: Article 177 As a Pre-Federal Device -- 2. Gender Equality: A Fundamental Dialogue -- 3. Transfers of Undertakings -- 4. Lessons From Some Secondary Areas of Dialogue -- 5. The Complexities of Living With an Interpretation Prerogative-Some Observations on an Imperfect Dialogue.

Judicial independence did not only become more visible in the recent case law of the Court of justice but has also been analysed as a systemic parameter of the Union. This article discusses a sample of three cases, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Achmea, and L.M., to assess the notion of judicial independence as applying regarding the national judges in the judicial system of the Union. Judicial independence, as a notion of EU law, is primarily a constitutional requirement presumably deferent to Member States' standards and pursuing the proper functioning of the Union's judicial system, namely its effectiveness. However, the recent case law testifies the emergence of a common EU standard of judicial independence, which does not only apply as a minimum standard throughout the Union but also affects the national legal orders. Ultimately, the analyses of the paper point out a curious harmony regarding judicial independence between the principles of effectiveness of Union law and of effective judicial protection under that law without clarifying their articulation.

Although there has been much discussion of the scope of the concept of human trafficking in international literature, the part played by national courts in interpreting definitions based on the international definition of human trafficking in the UN Trafficking Protocol has received little attention. When a judge interprets an offence, he or she clarifies or adds new meaning to it. The space for this is even greater when the underlying definition is broadly formulated, as in the case of the international definition of human trafficking. This article demonstrates that, although this international definition establishes the outer parameters within which conduct must be made a criminal offence, domestic courts still have room to flesh out the definition in national contexts. The role of national judges needs more consideration in today's discourse on the legal definition of human trafficking.

__Abstract__ The notion and theory of legal pluralism have been witnessing an increasing interest on part of scholars. The theory that originates from the legal anthropological studies and is one of the major topical streams in the realm of socio-legal studies slowly but steady started to become a point of departure for other disciplines. Unavoidably it has also gained attention from the scholars in the realm of the law of the European Union. It is the aim of the present article to illustrate the legal reality in which the law of the Union and the national laws coexist and intertwine with each other and, subsequently, to provide some insight on the manner national judges personally construct their own understanding of this complex legal architecture and the problems they come across in that respect. In that sense, the present article not only illustrates the new, pluralistic legal environment that came into being with the founding of the Communities, later the European Union, but also adds another dimension to this by presenting selected, empirical data on how national judges in several Member States of the EU individually perceive, adapt to, experience and make sense of this reality of overlapping and intertwining legal orders. Thus, the principal aim of this article is to illustrate how the pluralistic legal system works in the mind of a national judge and to capture the more day-to-day legal reality by showing how the law works on the ground through the lived experiences of national judges.

The Judge plays a decisive role in promoting respect for human rights. His activity is governed by the fundamental principles of the "rule of law" concept. The principle of separation of powers is a principle that any democracy, that wants to be real, must necessarily take it into consideration and implement it. Delimitation of powers is, broadly speaking, a different jurisdiction to establish institutional authority, and to exclude other forms of mutual intrusion than those permitted by law. At European level, the criteria and conditions of the judicial domain, and the judges, receive a broader notion, more complex. The structure of today's European Union is based solely on the rules of law. Rule of law is ensured through creation of Community law that is independent and uniform for all Member States. To ensure judicial protection of individual rights conferred by Community law, transparency is indispensable to national procedural law. Therefore, the national legislation must be put in harmony with European law and the national legislator is obliged to respect the decisions of the EUCJ, which decided that, in principle, the conditions imposed by national law will not have to render virtually the rights conferred by Community law. Any judge, seized within its jurisdiction, is required to apply the provisions of Community law and protect rights which are conferred to individuals, leaving all provisions inapplicable, possibly contrary, the national law, either before or after the Community rule. European law clearly reinforces cultural and legal national judge. Community law isn't a foreign law, it is an outside law. This law is proper to each of our States as its national law, but it also has this feature to be at the same time a common value for all.