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For decades, governments have sought to deter migration by investing in the development of migrant-sending communities, despite macroeconomic data that shows that development can increase emigration. However, emerging research suggests that well-designed aid can promote rootedness in home communities. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has increasingly attempted to use development to deter migration from the Northern Triangle states of Central America. Is this policy sound?This paper argues that development should not be instrumentalized to discourage people from migrating. It examines migration and development policies from the lens of Catholic social teaching, which recognizes the need for states to respect the agency of individuals. This is particularly important when it comes to complex and consequential decisions like whether to migrate. The Catholic Church recognizes both a right to migrate, when necessary, and the responsibility of states, particularly wealthy nations, to help people realize the right not to migrate; that is, to thrive in their home communities. The paper argues for US government assistance to alleviate poverty and invest in human capital in Central America, but independently of efforts to deter migration. Prioritizing aid to potential migrants risks reducing its effectiveness. The United States should instead pursue a whole-of-government strategy that emphasizes the right relationships with aid recipients, and that prioritizes and empowers the poor and marginalized. The paper is strongly influenced by the author's 15 years of work for Catholic agencies on migration and development, more than one-half of those with Catholic Relief Services.

A growing body of literature has argued that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration can be, in practice, unclear. This literature points out that each individual migrant may have mixed motives for migrating, including both forced and voluntary reasons. Few studies, however, have actually set out to analyze mixed-motive migration.This paper examines the mixed-motive migration of unaccompanied minors from Central America's Northern Triangle states (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), using data from a small 2016 survey carried out in 10 shelters for unaccompanied child migrants run by a Mexican government child welfare agency. Using this survey, the paper identifies the immigrating minor's motives, which are oftentimes mixed, and details differences by nationality, gender, and age groups. Some of the key findings include:• Around one-third of the child migrants surveyed had mixed motives, including both forced and voluntary reasons for migrating.• Violence appears most often as a reason for migrating among minors with mixed motives, as opposed to the search for better opportunities, which appears more often as an exclusive motive.• Significant differences between the three nationalities are observed. Relatively few Guatemalan minors indicated violence as a motive, and few displayed mixed motives, as opposed to Hondurans, and especially Salvadorans.• The minors fleeing violence, searching for better opportunities, and indicating both motives at the same time were largely mature male adolescents.• The minors mentioning family reunification as their sole motive were predominantly girls and young children.The results indicate that binary formulations regarding forced and voluntary migration are often inadequate. This has important implications, briefly addressed in the conclusions. These implications include:• the need for migration scholars to consider forced reasons for migrating in the context of mixed-motive migration;• the fact that mixed motives call into question the established, clear-cut categories that determine whether someone is worthy of humanitarian protection or not;• the need to have in-depth, attentive, and individual asylum screening because motives may be interconnected and entangled, and because forced reasons may be hidden behind voluntary motives; and• the need for a more flexible policy approach, so that immigration systems may be more inclusive of migrants with mixed motives.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that the number of requests for international refugee or asylum protection increased fivefold from 2010 to 2015. In the United States these requests are mainly filed by citizens from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—the countries collectively referred to as the Northern Triangle of Central America (TNCA). These applicants flee their countries of origin to escape threats to their lives and personal safety from gang violence, organized crime, and even police and military agents. Though the violence cannot be classified as a "war," the daily life of many Central Americans is currently marked by human tragedies comparable to those experienced during the regional armed conflicts of past decades.

The past half decade of massive refugee outflows from the Northern Triangle of Central America –that is, from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras– emerge from a number of perverse and mutually reinforcing historical processes: the deeply flawed implementation of equally flawed peace accords that ended the region's civil wars in the 1990s; the pursuit of neoliberal privatization and «market-friendly» economic policies that undercut advance toward sustainable social peace, including trade agreements that inflicted great damage to peasant agricultura; the pursuit of foreign investment in extractive sectors that displaced rural and indigenous peoples, and the policies of the major international institutions, and of the United States government in particular, which deepened all of these perverse trends that left people without livelihoods. The gang and criminal violence linked to the narcotics trade are manifestations of these underlying processes that expel people from the region in waves of forced «survival migration». ; Durante la última media década se han producido salidas masivas de refu­giados procedentes del Triángulo Norte de América Central, es decir, de El Salvador, Guatemala y Honduras. Dichas salidas surgen de una serie de procesos históricos perver­sos, que se refuerzan mutuamente: la implementación profundamente defectuosa de acuerdos de paz igualmente defectuosos que puso fin a las guerras civiles de la región en la década de 1990; la búsqueda de la privatización neoliberal y las políticas económicas «amigables al mercado» que socavan el avance hacia una paz social sostenible; los acuer­dos comerciales que infligieron un gran daño a la agricultura campesina; la búsqueda de inversión extranjera en sectores extractivos que desplazaron a pueblos rurales e indígenas y las políticas de las principales instituciones internacionales y del gobierno de Esta­dos Unidos en particular, que profundizaron todas estas tendencias perversas que dejaron a la gente sin medios de vida. Las bandas criminales y la violencia vinculadas al narcotráfico son manifestaciones de estos procesos subyacentes que expulsan a las per­sonas de la región en oleadas de «migración de supervivencia» forzada.

This paper applies the foundations of economic growth theory to identify key macroeconomic determinants leading the economic growth in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. These three countries are known as the Central America's Northern Triangle. The motivation relies on the context of the implementation of the Plan for the Alliance of the Prosperity of the Northern Triangle due to the migratory crisis of child unaccompanied by parents that were found illegally in the board of the United States. The main findings suggest that population is the main driver of economic growth. This means that loss of human capital represents a huge loss of potential increase in economic growth. In addition, capital formation, openness of the economy, government expenditure and domestic savings were found as significant and huge determinants on economic growth.

"Concentrating on economic incentives, climate extremes, and fear of violence factors, this book presents a complete picture of what happens to migrants from the time they leave to the time they arrive in the United States-as well as the difficulties encountered by those deported back to their countries of origin"--

The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented increase in migrant families from the Northern Triangle, the region of Central America comprised of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The mass influx in family migration has important consequences for destination countries like the United States and Mexico as well as the countries which they leave behind. This study aims to answer the question of how family migration patterns in the Northern Triangle of Central America have changed in the past decade and why. I outline the migration decisions of families through a qualitative and quantitative lens. I use newspapers and NGO reports to outline the plethora of factors which inhibit economic, social, and political progress in the region. Understanding the complex dynamics in the Triangle inform the logistic regression which provides data on the relationships between intentions to migrate and crime victimization, gender, household economic status, and household location. I used the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey for the years 2012 and 2018 for all three countries to determine how patterns have changed and offer possible rationale for the shifts. The results indicate that crime victimization is less related to migration intentions relative to household income, gender, and rural status. This research may change the way we view migrant families from the Northern Triangle and inform policy solutions to what is now viewed as a humanitarian crisis.

This study examines different forms of alternative governance in the absence of a strong state presence in the Northern Triangle of Central America-along part of the Guatemala-Honduras border-a region notorious for its soaring homicide rates, corruption, violence, and emigration to the United States.

El artículo sistematiza las estrategias de los EE. UU. hacia los países del Triángulo Norte, siguiendo la categorización de Destradi. Para ello, se ha analizado el contenido de los documentos estratégicos para identificar como los EE. UU. definen sus objetivos en cuanto a la cooperación regional y las medidas para conseguirlos. El texto concluye con la afirmación que la estrategia de los EE.UU. hacia la regi ón puede definirse como hegemónica, sin embargo, progresivamente se ha cambiado de dura a intermedia, a medida que los EE.UU. se hicieron más perceptivos a las necesidades de sus socios regionales.

1 page. ; The Northern Triangle of Central America has long been a major source of immigration to the United States. In April of 2019, the Trump Administration announced its intentions to freeze U.S. foreign aid to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in an overall strategy to punish the Central American nations and encourage them to employ their own immigration deterrence methods. However, concerns persisted regarding whether ending funding for humanitarian aid projects would effectively mitigate migration, when oftentimes these programs serve to lessen prominent push factors in the Northern Triangle and encourage reinvestment in local communities. After a thorough literature review of the related academic field and an examination of the root causes influencing the intense push factors in the NTCA, diverse stories from stakeholders present an overarching view of the impacts of President Trump's aid policies. Interviews with migrants and aid beneficiaries, excerpts from Central American newspapers, conversations with aid workers, and statements from U.S. politicians point to the negative repercussions of aid reduction. Human perspectives of individuals closest to the situation describe the intensification of push factors without the support of USAID funding. Overall, despite attempts to use deterrence immigration policy to reduce migration, the Trump Administration failed to acknowledge the power of regional push factors, ultimately reinforcing them by reducing the power of USAID projects to locally manage concerns.