Suchergebnisse

In the first part of the paper, the author talks about the unilateral declaration of the Macedonian Orthodox Church as autocephalous at the third Macedonian Church-People's Assembly on July 18, 1967, and the church St. Kliment in Ohrid vand the denial of the autocephaly of the MPC by its mother, the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the second part of the paper, the author talks about the donation of autocephaly by the Holy Council of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese. The decision on autocephaly of the MPC-OA was ceremoniously and administratively confirmed at the Holy Liturgy in the Cathedral Church in Belgrade on June 5, 2022, by the awarding of the Tomos on AutocephalyMacedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese from the hands of His Holiness. Serbian Patriarch Porfirije (Perić) to the head of the MPC-OA Archbishop Stefan (Veljanovsko) of Ohrid and Macedonia. The author of the paper argues the point of view that the recognition of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church - Ohrid Archdiocese is historically and canonically valid and that it is significant both for Orthodoxy in the Balkans and beyond, as well as for the collective national Macedonian identity and the further affirmation of North Macedonia as a sovereign state with international legal subjectivity.

AbstractIn January 2019, the Ukrainian Orthodoxy received what is known as the tomos from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which established the independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Christians of Ukraine caused a deep crisis in the Orthodoxy and a conflict between Constantinople and Moscow. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) condemned the Ecumenical Patriarch's action and accused the Patriarchate of Constantinople of encroaching on the 'canonical territory' of the ROC. The author examines the foundations of this formation of a new Orthodox Church, the religious and political factors influencing the process of its establishment, and the reaction of the Russian Orthodox Church leadership and Russian politicians. He also reflects on the consequences for relations within Orthodoxy, for ecumenical dialogue, and for contacts between Ukraine and Russia.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the religious tide in Russia has been quick to rise. During the Soviet era, religion – particularly Orthodox Christianity and Islam – was considered to be one of the 'enemies of the people'. Since the late 1990s however, Russian politicians at all levels of the power structure have associated themselves either with the Orthodox, or on some occasions with the Muslim, clergy. The present state of affairs in the relations between religion and the state are well illustrated by the cordial liaison of the late Patriarch Aleksii II with President Vladimir Putin and the equally warm involvement of President Dmitry Medvedev, and his wife Svetlana Medvedeva, with the new Patriarch Kirill, who was elected in January 2009. Some have even argued that 'today' (in 2004) the Church and state are so extensively intertwined that one can no longer consider Russia to be a secular state. Polls seem to support the claim. While in 1990 only 24 per cent of Russians identified themselves as Orthodox, in the sense that they felt themselves to be Russians as well, in 2008 the number was 73 per cent. However, less than 10 per cent, and in Moscow perhaps only 2 per cent do actually live out their religiosity.Why did Russia turn towards religion? Is religion chosen in an attempt to legitimise power, or in order to consolidate political rule after atheist-communist failure? My guess is that the answer to both is affirmative. Moreover, whatever the personal convictions of individual Russians, including politicians, religious, mainly Orthodox Christian, rhetoric and rituals are used to make a definitive break with the communist past and to create, or re-create, a Greater Russia (see Simons 2009). In such an ideological climate, atheism has little chance of thriving, whereas there is a sort of 'social demand' for its critique.I therefore focus on what the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has had to say about atheism and how her statements can be related to a break with the past and the construction of a new Russia. Or, in my opinion, actually deleting the Soviet period from the history of Russia as an error and seeing present-day Russia as a direct continuation of the pre-Soviet imperial state.

When analyzing the relations of the Fanar - Patriarchy of Constantinople - towards the Serbian Orthodox Church, we have different periods. These are: periods of cooperation and periods of confrontation which were initiated by the Fanar. In this paper, we will talk about the period of confrontation. After the fall of the medieval Serbian state under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox found itself under the rule of the Muslims. Their position worsened with the abolition of the Patriarchate of Peć in 1766. It happened due to several things. The main reason cited is the mistrust of the Porte towards the Serbian Church and the work of the Fanariot Greeks who wanted to subjugate the Patriarchate of Peć to the Greek Church. The very act of abolition was preceded by attempts at Hellenization. It was not seen only in Serbia, but also in Bulgaria, where many learned Bulgarians considered themselves Greeks. Simultaneously with the arrival of Greek bishops at the head of the Serbian dioceses, the merciless plundering of the Serbian people began. It was one of the main reasons for the Islamization of not only the Serbs, but other peoples as well. The second period is contemporary. In it Fanar(iots) disputes the autocephaly of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as the territories under its jurisdiction. That is why they renamed it to the "Church of Serbia." Thereby taking away all dioceses outside the territory of the present-day state of Serbia from the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Of the three major branches of Christianity, Orthodoxy is the least known and most misunderstood. The Historical Dictionary of the Orthodox Church provides students, researchers, and specialists with a desk encyclopedia of the theology and theologians, saints, sinners, places and events of the Eastern Church. Two millennia of the religion are surveyed in over five hundred concise entries, concentrating primarily on the last 150 years. Includes an overview of the early Church through the Byzantine and Russian Empires, into the present multinational Orthodox presence in the ecumenical movement. Many of the general entries cannot be found elsewhere in English, and the comprehensive compilation of biographies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Orthodox theologians (American, Russian, Greek, and many other nationalities) is published here for the first time. Includes a detailed 4000-year chronology, illustrations, extensive bibliography, and an appendix listing the current canonical patriarchs and autocephalous churches.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the religious tide in Russia has been quick to rise. During the Soviet era, religion – particularly Orthodox Christianity and Islam – was considered to be one of the 'enemies of the people'. Since the late 1990s however, Russian politicians at all levels of the power structure have associated themselves either with the Orthodox, or on some occasions with the Muslim, clergy. The present state of affairs in the relations between religion and the state are well illustrated by the cordial liaison of the late Patriarch Aleksii II with President Vladimir Putin and the equally warm involvement of President Dmitry Medvedev, and his wife Svetlana Medvedeva, with the new Patriarch Kirill, who was elected in January 2009. Some have even argued that 'today' (in 2004) the Church and state are so extensively intertwined that one can no longer consider Russia to be a secular state. Polls seem to support the claim. While in 1990 only 24 per cent of Russians identified themselves as Orthodox, in the sense that they felt themselves to be Russians as well, in 2008 the number was 73 per cent. However, less than 10 per cent, and in Moscow perhaps only 2 per cent do actually live out their religiosity.Why did Russia turn towards religion? Is religion chosen in an attempt to legitimise power, or in order to consolidate political rule after atheist-communist failure? My guess is that the answer to both is affirmative. Moreover, whatever the personal convictions of individual Russians, including politicians, religious, mainly Orthodox Christian, rhetoric and rituals are used to make a definitive break with the communist past and to create, or re-create, a Greater Russia (see Simons 2009). In such an ideological climate, atheism has little chance of thriving, whereas there is a sort of 'social demand' for its critique.I therefore focus on what the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has had to say about atheism and how her statements can be related to a break with the past and the construction of a new Russia. Or, in my opinion, actually deleting the Soviet period from the history of Russia as an error and seeing present-day Russia as a direct continuation of the pre-Soviet imperial state.

The author discusses the place of the Georgian Orthodox Church and its role in the public and political developments in independent Georgia; he traces the changes in the Georgians' religious feelings during the transition period and assesses the responses of the religious communities to the challenges of globalization. Prof. Piralishvili concludes that today, for most of the Georgian Orthodox population, traditional religious values remain the best tool for preserving the nation's identity while political instability adds weight and influence to the religious institutions.

The official support of Russia's war against Ukraine by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church has silenced most of the voices of existing dissent. However, before February 2022, there were different reactions from the church to various waves of protest. While the church leadership spoke of a "crisis of the young generation", individual clergy members showed understanding for the outrage over the state repressions and the lack of prospects perceived by the youth. Under the current circumstances, there is little room for anti-war action by Orthodox clergy and laity, but some are seizing the opportunities left to them.

This dissertation is an examination of records relating to the Romanian Orthodox Church during the Second World War. Using primarily resources from The Romanian National Archives in Bucharest, the research focuses primarily on the decisions made by the Church's leaders in the Holy Synod. The Romanian government leading up to the war was a dictatorship led by a king and had a close relationship with the Church.During the war the Church remained close to the central government under Marshall Ion Antonescu, who was an ally to Germany's Hitler. Publicly the Church was one of Antonescu's greatest supporters. The Church's leaders rationalized supporting the Romanian government before and during Antonescu's regime using popular notions of Romanian nationalism. Antonescu reciprocated the Church's support with laws and policies that favored the Romanian Orthodox Church legally and financially above otherconfessions. One of these policies was to put restrictions on certain minority religious groups and outlawing them. Their resources were confiscated and often gifted to local Orthodox parishes. Another important law prohibited Jews from becoming Christians. The Orthodox Church's implementation of this law demonstrates that the Church supported the Romanian government's anti-Jewish philosophy and policies. The actions of other Christians who ignored the prohibition are used as contrasting examples to the Orthodox Church's policy.While the Church did not participate with the Romanian government and military in perpetrating the Holocaust, the Church's strong presence in Transnistria indicates that the Church's clergy had direct knowledge of the violence there. The failure to take action in this area represents a moral failure by an institution that touted itself as Romania's moral compass. Based on the Church's wartime actions it was complicit in the Antonescu regime's crimes. Following the Antonescu regime's collapse in August 1944 the Romanian Orthodox Church quickly reversed its stance on many of its wartime policies.

Auf der Basis neuerer Dokumente aus dem KGB-Archiv haben russische Bürgerrechtsaktivisten die subversive Tätigkeit von KGB-Agenten im heiligen Synod der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche aufgehellt. Der Autor beschreibt die Reaktionen der Kirchenführung auf die Enthüllungen und prognostiziert ein Erstarken der "Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche im Ausland" und der "Ukrainischen Autokephalen Kirche" im Gefolge dieses Skandals. (BIOst-Srt)