Suchergebnisse

Legislatures are widely recognized as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies, but how support for legislatures and evaluations of their members's activities influence support for national political regimes and communities is imperfectly understood. This article investigates the question with the use of data from a 1979 national survey of the Canadian public. Analyses of a model of support demonstrate that feelings about parliament and assessments of MPs' performance have significant effects on levels of support for the national political community and regime. Other important variables include cost-benefit evaluations of the personal impact of governmental activity, more general evaluations of governmental performance, and subcultural variations in political socialization.

This paper presents a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, a fixed public budget must be financed with a wage tax and a head-tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralisation equilibria. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. Inefficiency may be higher under utilitarian governments or majoritarian ones. If local governments are utilitarian, the more productive jurisdiction is better off at the first best than with tax competition, while the other is worst off. If they are majoritarian, both jurisdictions will under some conditions prefer the tax decentralisation to the first best.

This paper presents a spatial model of a city with two unequally productive jurisdictions. City residents bear a commuting cost to work in either of the two jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction, a fixed public budget must be financed with a wage tax and a head-tax. We compare the first best optimum to tax decentralisation equilibria. From the total welfare viewpoint, tax competition is always inefficient. Inefficiency may be higher under utilitarian governments or majoritarian ones. If local governments are utilitarian, the more productive jurisdiction is better off at the first best than with tax competition, while the other is worst off. If they are majoritarian, both jurisdictions will under some conditions prefer the tax decentralisation to the first best.