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In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

El 3 de desembre de 2009, els Estudis de Dret i Ciència Política de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), juntament amb l'Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3), van organitzar la jornada "Usos i abusos del peer-to-peer", que va tenir lloc a la seu central de la UOC a Barcelona. La jornada la van coordinar els professors d'aquests Estudis integrants del grup de recerca Interdret de l'IN3. ; On 3 December 2009, UOC's Law and Political Science Department, in collaboration with the Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3), organised the workshop 'Use and abuse of peer-to-peer filesharing', at the main offices of the UOC in Barcelona. The workshop was coordinated by the lecturers of this department, members of the Interdret research group at the IN3. ; El pasado 3 de diciembre de 2009, los Estudios de Derecho y Ciencia Política de la UOC junto con el Internet Interdisciplinary Institute (IN3), organizaron la Jornada "Usos y abusos del peer-to-peer", que tuvo lugar en la sede central de la UOC en Barcelona. La jornada fue coordinada por los profesores de estos estudios, integrantes del grupo de investigación Interdret del IN3.

Cover -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. The Peer-to-Peer Economy -- A. The Scale of the Peer-to-Peer Economy -- B. Some Theory and Empirics on the Peer-to-Peer Economy -- Shrinking Transaction Costs -- A Short Primer on Two-sided Markets -- Some Empirical Results from the Literature -- III. Key Tax-Relevant Features of the Peer-to-Peer Economy -- A. Growth and Classification of P2P Activities -- B. Low Incomes, Low Rents -- C. Correcting for Externalities -- D. P2P Platforms as Data Recorders -- IV. How Should We Tax the Peer-to-Peer Economy? -- A. A Neutral or Targeted Treatment of P2P Businesses -- B. Tax Thresholds -- C. Cross-Border Taxation of P2P Services -- D. Treatment of Capital and Labor -- E. A Presumptive Tax System for the P2P Economy -- F. Exploiting Technology to Improve Tax Administration -- V. Conclusions -- Box 1. The Peer-to-Peer Economy in Developing Economies -- Box 2. Current Tax Treatment of P2P Businesses.