Suchergebnisse

Reciprocity in China's approach to international law and transboundary waters -- Sovereignty claims in the law of international watercourses -- Revisiting the substantive rules of the law of international watercourses -- The duty to cooperate in the global water conventions : rules of procedure, dispute settlement, and self-help mechanisms -- Observations and concluding remarks.

World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian "war of all against all" does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

This article critically examines reciprocity in international volunteering. It first highlights tensions and unintended consequences that can emerge when pursuing reciprocal relationships between host-country partners and international volunteers or volunteer-sending organizations. It then reconsiders how to determine equal or fair distribution of benefits between stakeholders when some benefits are material and some are intangible. It then presents a typology of different modalities of reciprocity practiced or aspired to by contemporary international volunteer organizations. The article aims to provoke more nuanced consideration of when, if or under what conditions different forms of reciprocity may be possible or even desirable.

AbstractAlthough international relations often involves a trade of favors or services, political scientists have not often used exchange theory. Social exchange is motivated by the prospect of mutual gain. The exercise of power entails exchange of needed resources for compliance with the influencer's wishes. The timing of repayment and explicitness of obligation are important dimensions of exchange that vary by issue area and relationship. In sequential exchange, the party that moves first risks being exploited and must therefore trust the other. The parties to an exchange may either leave open or specify what the other should do in return. Reciprocity refers to exchanges which are mutual and perceived by the parties as fair. It is difficult to determine whether exchanges are reciprocal without a common measure of value. Norms and customary expectations determine what is considered fair when there is no standardized measure of value. In negotiations, there are several competing principles of justice. Reciprocity requires that concessions be matched; it does not mean that their magnitude must be equal.

AbstractIn this article I criticize a prominent account for resisting the extension of egalitarian justice to global politics. For Andrea Sangiovanni it is the reciprocity requirement generated by the provision of basic public goods that grounds egalitarian justice. Such basic public goods provision is absent internationally and this entails that egalitarian justice is only appropriate between citizens of the same political community. This article highlights the problematic empirical assumptions on which Sangiovanni's work builds. It proposes a more ample class of basic public goods necessary to act on a plan of life and maintains that whatever list we adopt, in a globalized world, basic public goods provision is often dependent on the international system. It goes on to suggest that the role of equality beyond borders is an important topic not only for relations between persons at the global level but also for inter‐state interactions and that what we really should be worried about is the instrumental effects that inequality has when it comes to issues concerning poverty reduction and the shape of international regimes and institutions.