INTRODUCTION — COHERENCE OF THE PUBLIC POLICIES: PRIVATIZATION, REGIONALIZATION, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
In: Resilient States from a Comparative Regional Perspective; Advanced Research on Asian Economy and Economies of Other Continents, S. 61-65
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In: Resilient States from a Comparative Regional Perspective; Advanced Research on Asian Economy and Economies of Other Continents, S. 61-65
In: East Asia: an international quarterly, Band 32, Heft 3, S. 223-237
ISSN: 1874-6284
In: International affairs, Band 81, Heft 1, S. 163-174
ISSN: 0020-5850
World Affairs Online
In: Central Asia and the Caucasus: journal of social and political studies, Heft 3/45, S. 76-88
ISSN: 1404-6091
World Affairs Online
In: Kopra , S & Kauppila , L 2021 , ' Responsible International Citizenship and China's Participation in Arctic Regionalization ' , Arctic yearbook , vol. 2021 .
This paper analyses the normative underpinnings of China's participation in processes of Arctic regionalization. Building on Gareth Evans' concept of responsible international citizenship, it argues that China's Arctic engagement is chiefly motivated by the government's efforts to promote the wellbeing of Chinese citizens – a state of affairs that the current regime equals with the ideal of social stability. As a responsible international citizen, China should, however, advance this "enlightened self-interest" vis-á-vis other members of the Arctic international society, that is, either internalize the established practices that organize the Arctic region or mold them in peaceful ways. In the empirical parts of the paper, we first identify three concrete aims that drive forward China's participation in Arctic regionalization – creating wealth through more "green" growth, mitigating the effects of climate change on China, and promoting a unifying ideology. We then suggest that China has not directly violated any of the key organizing principles of the Arctic international society, but it has found distinct ways to act out these concrete goals and advance the wellbeing of its citizens. Such means include somewhat challenging the dominant interpretation of these norms and refraining from advocating stricter environmental standards.
BASE
Central Asia is currently a hot item on the global agenda. It is not every decade that the world finds itself embracing a new region with the alluring appeal of mass hydrocarbon production and export, large investments, and promising cooperation in the military sphere. What is more, other phenomena adding to Central Asia's renown are intensifying the glow of the geopolitical theme. They include the local governments' opposition to the extremist movements, the West's accusations of authoritarianism and violations of democratic rights and freedoms, the Islamic renaissance, the Color Revolutions, and so on. In addition, it is obvious that the West is keeping a sharp eye on the region's republics, which is shown by its immediate reaction to the events going on in Central Asia, whereby this attention continues to increase all the time. Emissaries not only from Western, but also from many other large countries are actively working in the region. There must obviously be extremely good reasons why even the most distant centers of power are showing such an intense interest in Central Asia. And the answers lie deeper than they appear to at first glance. The domestic sociopolitical evolution of the Central Asian states is of little interest to most foreign observers. As paradoxical as it may seem, the problem of drug trafficking, which is pertinent to the Central Asian Region (CAR) and urgent for the whole world, is being studied even less. In this case, the priority topics for political analysis—apart from big business issues (read: the production of natural resources)—are the Big Game being waged among the leading present-day nations over the region, Russia's strategy in Central Asia, and the spread of China's influence there, which are all closely associated with CAR. In short, we are talking about geopolitical rivalry in the region. It is clear to many that oil and gas cannot be the only reason for this excitement. For as long as hydrocarbons are being produced and are in demand, they will always reach their consumer, whereby these resources will be transported via profitable, and not politically advantageous, routes—this is a law of economics, the violation of which is fraught with serious consequences, primarily for the exporter state. It stands to reason that it is not Kazakhstan that needs new pipelines, but other states that need guaranteed oil deliveries. The Central Asian Region was and largely remains dependent on Russia—essentially 100% of the strategic hydrocarbon resources produced here are transported through the Russian Federation. Only Kazakhstan, which is also linked to Moscow by a pipeline system, retains relative independence over its energy policy. It is likely that the development of the southern and trans-Caspian vectors of energy resource deliveries from Central Asia may indeed prove more profitable compared with the existing ones. However, this will not happen in the foreseeable future while chaos reigns in Afghanistan, Pakistan is being shaken from the inside, and the Caucasus is under permanent threat due to the absence of a normal dialog between Iran and the West. What is more, the current level of scientific developments will not permit putting the Caspian ecosystem at risk. Even if they are implemented soon, the numerous new transportation projects—those already carried out and only just being developed (West Kazakhstan-China, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Turkmenistan-China, Uzbekistan-China, Nabucco)—will nevertheless be incapable of radically changing the situation in the mid term with respect to energy deliveries from the region. In all likelihood, the insistent attempts to diversify energy export from Central Asia are simply aimed at undermining Russia's domination in the region. Possible annual deliveries of energy resources in amounts of up to several tens of thousands of tons or millions of cubic meters bypassing the Russian Federation may be detrimental not so much to Russia's economic, as to its strategic interests. On the whole, the questions relating to the production and transportation of energy resources are only partially raising the veil to reveal what is hidden behind the geopolitical game in Central Asia, what its rules are, and what prize the winner will receive. In our opinion, raising of the problem of international regionalization could provide a more in-depth explanation of the current situation in Central Asia.
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In: Međunarodni problemi: Meždunarodnye problemy, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 249
ISSN: 0025-8555
In: International affairs, Band 81, Heft 1, S. 163-174
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: International negotiation: a journal of theory and practice, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 201-224
ISSN: 1571-8069
Abstract
The political regulation of the economy takes place on domestic, regional and international levels. Often, states are members of regional and international organizations (ROs and IOs) with competencies in the economic realm. This study explores the effects of such overlaps in membership and policy focus, and examines negotiations in economic Ios. It studies the phenomenon of states being drivers of regionalization of international negotiations. This analysis reveals that states make a conscious choice to influence regionalization of international economic policies. States with strong export sectors and strong economies are more inclined to act on behalf of their RO in international economic negotiations. Apart from incentives, capacities also matter. States need to have domestic and diplomatic capacities to become active in Ios in the first place.
In: Texas international law journal, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 729-762
ISSN: 0163-7479
In: Whitehall paper 53
In: Introduction to Latin America: Twenty-First Century Challenges, S. 93-107