Suchergebnisse

Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies favorable to industry. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination, Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies favorable to industry. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905

Rick McKinney's "Federal Administrative Law: A Brief Overview" is a succinct and helpful place to find information about rulemaking, common administrative law statutes, and the major administrative agencies. But what about those unsung heroes, the minor regulatory agencies whose necessity—and sometimes purpose—are lost to history? We propose this addendum to Rick's article to give a couple of these minor agencies their due.

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self‐regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non‐enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self‐regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.

Prior to Confederation, food control legislation in Canada consisted of only a few simple laws governing the quality, grading, packing and inspection of certain staple foods. The Inland Revenue Act of 1875 provided the first real control in Canada over adulteration of liquor, foods and drugs. Since then, food legislation has evolved in scope and complexity as the industries involved have developed, as consumers have become better informed, and as scientific advances have provided a sound basis for regulations. Present regulations under the Food and Drugs Act are intended to give consumers broad protection against health hazards and fraud in the production, manufacture, labelling, packaging, advertising, and sale of foods. This principle is well illustrated by present requirements for the control of pesticide residues, chemical additives, and the addition of vitamins to foods. In today's era of rapid technological change, application of current scientific knowledge to the food industry obviously involves the possibility of hazards to health. Regulatory agencies with responsibility for food safety must, therefore, fully utilize scientific knowledge in order to reduce the risks involved to a minimum.

Transference to administrative agencies of powers traditionally associated with legislatures and with courts has destroyed old categories of political science, and necessitates a reappraisal of the structure of American governments. The story of the growth of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers has been told too well to require extensive treatment here. With the development of the social service state, the legislatures, we are informed, have been illequipped to legislate in detailed fashion because of the quantity and the technicality of governmental activities and because of the need for flexibility and adaptability in the conduct of those activities. Two other reasons for delegation of legislative power may be advanced. The legislature may wish to devolve the responsibility of self-government on a particular industry or vocational group. Or again, it may desire to wash its hands of a particularly trying problem of public policy, and this it can do by turning the problem over to an administrative agency.

Many large corporations now claim to be socially responsible. Outlines their arguments to justify such a statement and argues that they cannot be left to regulate themselves because of the contradictions between profits and social goals. (SJK)