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The origins and immediate vitality of the left/right divide which emerged in French revolutionary politics from 1789 can only be understood against the background of a much older classification dynamic based on the primacy of the right hand, first described by Robert Hertz in 1909. This dynamic infused political thinking first in Versailles and since 1815 in democracies throughout the world. In the process, the classical left/right polarity acquired a new dimension: the complementary notions of 'accepting' and 'questioning' the existing social order. An essential feature of both the age-old classical polarity and the ensuing political polarity is that they are intimately bound up with local and evolving social contexts: there is no single content-based definition of left and right. As long as the majority of us are predisposed to use our right hand when acting in the world, 'left versus right' will remain the most important political antithesis in western-type democracies.

The origins and immediate vitality of the left/right divide which emerged in French revolutionary politics from 1789 can only be understood against the background of a much older classification dynamic based on the primacy of the right hand, first described by Robert Hertz in 1909. This dynamic infused political thinking first in Versailles and since 1815 in democracies throughout the world. In the process, the classical left/right polarity acquired a new dimension: the complementary notions of 'accepting' and 'questioning' the existing social order. An essential feature of both the age-old classical polarity and the ensuing political polarity is that they are intimately bound up with local and evolving social contexts: there is no single content-based definition of left and right. As long as the majority of us are predisposed to use our right hand when acting in the world, 'left versus right' will remain the most important political antithesis in western-type democracies. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Foreign policy elites have been shaken by the unexpected rise of powerful social movements in the Arab world, coupled with the Tea Party "insurgency" in the US. It is possible this will be a re-run of the 1950s when domestic McCarthyism drove an aggressive military policy into quagmire in Korea and Vietnam, or a progressive populism may awaken and develop into a powerful force. Adapted from the source document.

Matt Yglesias and Bryan Caplan offer contrasting theories. But neither fully works.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- References -- About the Author -- Chapter 1 -- Introduction: Two Dogs, No Fights -- Dogs-and-Bubbles -- Chapter 2 -- Projections: The Shadow of Left and Right -- Origins -- Reference -- Chapter 3 -- Understandings: A Vote against Pythagoras -- Chapter 4 -- Goods: Life, Love, Play, Freedom and Much More -- Claimed Relationships amongst the Human Goods -- Chapter 5 -- Likes: The Little Art of the Cheeseburger -- References -- Chapter 6 -- Ethics: The Golden Rule and the Gold That Rules -- Ethical Egoism -- Deontology -- The Golden Rule -- Contractarianism -- Ethic of Care -- The Spanning Theories -- Chapter 7 -- Timing: Worry about That Later -- Chapter 8 -- Capitals: Profane Cows and Sacred Cows -- Chapter 9 -- Language: Like Lambs to the Slaughter -- Chapter 10 -- Limits: The Known Limitations of Markets -- Chapter 11 -- Regulations: One Plus One Plus One Equals Three -- Social Regulations -- Chapter 12 -- Strategies: Two Sides, Nine Arenas -- Right-Strategy -- Left Strategy -- Reference -- Chapter 13 -- Games: Don't Even Think about It -- Ranking the Outcomes -- References -- Chapter 14 -- Trust: The King Is in the Shopping Mall -- Chapter 15 -- Dynamics: The Quiet Evolution of Death -- The Evolution of Death -- Governments and Corporations -- Chapter 16 -- Intentions: The Road to Hell and the Canal in Panama -- Sustained Dual-Objectives -- References -- Chapter 17 -- Passions: The Soul, the Psyche and the Will to Power -- Dynamics -- References -- Chapter 18 -- Hopes: Burned Wings and Freedom Songs -- References -- Chapter 19 -- Scopes: My Brothers and I -- Scope of Justice -- Identities -- Veil of Ignorance -- National vs. Global -- References -- Chapter 20 -- Loci: Don't Project Those Voices -- Projections -- Environmental and Social Justice -- Reference -- Chapter 21

A robust empirical literature suggests that the development of one's political ideology is the product of an "elective affinity" between the discursive, socially constructed elements of ideological belief systems and the psychological constraints, motives, and interests of those who are drawn to those belief systems. However, most studies which support this elective affinity theory have been conducted in the West. In the present study, we tested the theory in China to see whether elective affinities between psychological traits and political ideology are more likely to be universal. Across a nationally representative sample (N = 509), we found initial support for the characterization of the left‐right divide in China, albeit in reverse. Namely, the "liberal Right in China mostly evinces traits of the psychological Left in the West (e.g., lower intolerance of ambiguity), while the "conservative Left" mostly evinces traits of the psychological right in the West (e.g., higher system justification). Epistemic motives were most reliably related to political ideology, while existential and relational motives were more mixed; economic and political aspects of ideology were more closely linked to psychological traits than social/cultural aspects. The present findings provide an extension of existing theory and opportunities for further development.

Radicalism has been relatively weak in America, so strong is the American consensus. In the past, most radical movements were leftist or liberal. Today, right-wing radical ism is strong. Its intellectual and political roots are found in leftist movements such as populism and the protofascism of the 1930's as well as pre-World War II isolationism. McCarthy was a link between these movements and the present radical right. The major tenet of contemporary right-wing extremism is an anticommunism which stresses the domestic aspect of the Communist threat. Because of belief in the absolute nature of the struggle against communism and a conspiracy theory of his tory inherited from leftist and isolationist movements of the past, the radical right has little faith in traditional constitu tional and political processes and stresses clandestine and mass- action methods for fighting communism. In economics, the radical right favors a return to nineteenth-century laissez-faire liberalism; in social life, it favors greater conformity to tradi tional norms. The future of right-wing radicalism depends primarily on the course of international events but also, in part, on the nature and strength of contemporary left-wing radical movements.

Few notions are as universal as the idea of a left-right divide in politics. Despite its death being frequently foretold, the left-right metaphor remains the most common lens through which to interpret political life locally, nationally and globally. Left and Right in Global Politics argues that the left-right divide connects these different levels into a world political debate. Interpreting the left-right dichotomy as an enduring debate about equality, Noël and Thérien analyse opinion polls and social discourses to demonstrate how this debate shapes both individual and collective views of public affairs. Setting their findings in a historical perspective, they then show that for more than two centuries the conflict between progressives and conservatives has structured both domestic and international politics. They conclude by discussing the implications of their argument for the analysis of world politics, and contend that the left-right opposition is here to stay

AbstractThe deepening distrust in democracy has grown out of a decade of low growth and cuts to public spending, which in turn has consolidated wage decline while also fuelling a wider sense of economic insecurity. As poverty and inequality intensify, social mobility is in reverse and the social contract is under growing strain. Support for populists has recently receded, but the inability of democratic systems to address deep-seated problems sows the seeds for future populist revolts. Both left- and right-wing governments have responded to increasing anger and alienation with policies that exacerbate existing inequalities of income and wealth, combined with disparities of decision-making power and social status. These are ethical as much as economic questions and they demand a much more robust response than technocratic administration. Otherwise, ethical social democracy and communitarian conservatism will fail to defeat the authoritarianism of both radical-right national populists and the tech-utopianism of far-left populists.

This is the first book to document the extent of political cults on both the right and left and explain their significance for mainstream political organizations. The authors outline the defining characteristics of cults in general, and analyze the degree to which a variety of well-known movements fall within the spectrum of cultic organizations. The book covers such individuals and groups as Lyndon LaRouche, Fred Newman, Ted Grant, Marlene Dixon, the Christian Identity movement, Posse Commitatus, Aryan Nation, militias, and the Freemen. It explores the ideological underpinnings that predispos

Abstract.This article examines the influence of ideology in Canadian politics. The core theory is that political opinions are bound together into ideological clusters by underlying influences that affect simultaneously the opinions of individuals about more than one issue. The central hypothesis is that ideological disagreement between the left and the right is asymmetrical, that is, that leftists and rightists bundle in different ways their opinions about issues. The analysis draws on evidence from Benoit and Laver's survey of experts (2006) about the policy positions of political parties, the Comparative Manifesto Research Project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006), and Cross and Young's survey of Canadian political party members (2002). The results of the analysis indicate, first, that Canada's left/right ideological divide is wide by cross-national standards, and, second, that leftists and rightists organize their opinions about the world in different ways.Résumé.Cet article examine l'influence des idéologies dans l'environnement politique canadien. La théorie centrale stipule que les opinions politiques sur diverses questions sont structurées en groupes idéologiques consolidés par des influences sous-jacentes qui affectent simultanément les opinions des individus. L'hypothèse principale découlant de cette théorie est que la structure du désaccord idéologique entre la gauche et la droite est asymétrique; plus précisément, que les individus situés à la gauche et à la droite du spectre politique canadien organisent de manière différente leurs opinions politiques. L'analyse s'appuie tout d'abord sur les données d'un sondage auprès d'experts politiques réalisé par Benoit et Laver (2006) et portant sur les positions politiques des partis. Elle utilise également les données duComparative Manifesto Research Project(Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006) et celles d'un sondage d'opinion de Cross et Young (2002) effectué auprès des membres de partis politiques canadiens. Les résultats de cette étude démontrent, en premier lieu, qu'il existe un clivage important entre la droite et la gauche au Canada même lorsqu'il est observé dans une perspective comparative, et en second lieu, que les individus se situant à la gauche et à la droite du spectre politique ont tendance à organiser de manière différente leurs opinions sur le monde.