Suchergebnisse

In the current debate regarding the Afghan mandates, foreign secretary Steinmeier declared that the strategy for Afghanistan consists of three elements that complement each other: 1) civil reconstruction; 2) military presence ensuring security; & 3) fight against terrorism. Surveys reveal that two of these aspects meet with disapproval by the German population. Only the reconstruction process by the international community meets with approval. After the US disaster in Iraq, further German participation in the US-led "war against terror" needs a critical review, especially, as six years after the attacks in New York & Washington, the legitimation under international law is still based on the right of self-defense. Discussions about the extensions of the mandates are significant but do not release us from the necessity of a discussion about our overall strategy for Afghanistan. E. Sanchez

Conceptualization of a new eastern policy has not been fixed by either the administration or the opposition, but at its core must offer a strategic conceptualization of the role of Russia in Europe & a deepening of the friendship between them, as the relationship of Russia to Germany & the EU is crucial for the stability of Europe. Continuity currently dominants the relationship, with no open or confrontational issues, an acceptance of Russia's role in the world, value of Russia's territorial integrity, & a policy of Russian engagement wherever possible in western discourse. Russia has had to accept substantial changes in their role with the expansion of NATO & a loss of status. Yet the price of this competition of systems is high, & instability exists within the framework of stability. Fundamental dangers result also from the imperial policies of the US. A strengthening of equitable partners through the UN & international law offers an alternative to a unipolar or bipolar world. Disarmament dialogues with Russia could be a step toward demonstrating that Europe has chosen a different path than the US. L. Reed

Anders als die Bundesregierung es anzustreben scheint, ist eine Reform des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts (SWP) nötig. Die Schuldenabbauregel zwingt hochverschuldete Euroländer zu einem zu schnellen und zu wachstumsschädlichen Schuldenabbau. Nur auf die Flexibilität des Pakts zu setzen, würde Ausnahmetatbestände zu stark überdehnen. Zudem würde der Europäischen Kommission die ihr angedachte Rolle als Hüterin der Verträge unmöglich gemacht. 'Brüssel' würde dadurch weiter geschwächt. Folgende Reformschritte werden empfohlen: Der Schwellenwert von 60 Prozent des BIP für den öffentlichen Schuldenstand ist beizubehalten, aber die Schuldenabbauregel sollte bei unabweisbarem Bedarf über den Horizont von 20 Jahren hinaus gestreckt werden können. Das Drei-Prozent-Defizitkriterium gilt es aufgrund seiner Signalwirkung ebenfalls zu bewahren. Dagegen sollte die Zielgröße des strukturellen Defizits aufgrund von Messproblemen durch eine neue mittelfristig orientierte Ausgabenregel (weitgehend) ersetzt werden. (Grün) goldene Regeln, also Ausnahmen von den Defizitregeln besonders für grüne Investitionen, sind aus verschiedenen Gründen kritisch zu sehen. Geldbußen bei Verstößen sollten erhalten bleiben, aber noch stärker durch mildere und leichter anwendbare Sanktionen ergänzt werden. [.] ; Contrary to what the German government seems to be aiming for, a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is necessary. The debt reduction rule forces highly indebted euro countries to reduce their debt too quickly and too damagingly for growth. Relying only on the flexibility of the pact would overextend exception options of the SGP. Moreover, it would make it impossible for the European Commission to play its intended role as guardian of the treaties. 'Brussels' would thus be further weakened. The following reform steps are recommended: The 60 per cent of GDP threshold for government debt should be maintained, but it should be possible to stretch the debt reduction rule beyond the 20-year horizon if there is an unavoidable need. The 3-per-cent deficit criterion should also be retained because of its signalling effect. By contrast, the structural deficit target should be (largely) replaced by a new medium-term expenditure rule due to measurement problems. Green-golden rules, i.e. exemptions from the deficit rules especially for green investments, should be viewed critically for various reasons. Fines for violations should be retained, but should be supplemented by milder and more easily applicable sanctions to a larger extent as currently. [.]