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"May 4, 2004." ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; Shipping list no.: 2004-0184-P. ; Caption title. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cover title. ; "B-252236"--P. 1. ; "GAO/GGD-93-64." ; "March 1993." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The Internal Revenue Service now stands at the precipice of an uncertain future. With considerable justification, the IRS considers itself as being among the most successful revenue collection organizations in the world.[1] Whether that characterization will remain accurate in the future will depend on how the IRS deals, and is allowed to deal, with intersecting trends threatening to cripple the ability of the IRS to perform its core mission of revenue collection. Part I of this article describes this intersection, which has reached crisis proportions.[2] The workload of the IRS—both in revenue collection and especially in adventitious missions Congress has chosen to assign to the IRS—has burgeoned in recent decades. At the same time, the resources allocated to the IRS by successive Congresses and Administrations—never fully adequate—have declined in inflation-adjusted terms and, in recent years, even in nominal terms. Part I also notes the most visible manifestations of the intersection of these trends: decreases in key IRS activities and results almost across the board, with consequent substantial losses to the federal fisc. Two obvious and "easy" possible fixes immediately leap to mind: (1) the IRS should become more efficient and/or (2) Congress should appropriate more money for the IRS. Both of these approaches have roles to play. However, Part II explains why neither alone nor the two together can be fully satisfactory. Theoretically, there are a number of different ways to relax the anaconda grip of the IRS's workload and budget squeeze. Some would require legislation. Others could be implemented without statutory change. Part III sketches some of the alternatives. It also notes precedents for some of them as well as obstacles to and potential disadvantages of their adoption. Part IV examines reasons why desirable reforms have not yet been implemented. There are plenty of plausible ideas. Our failure to implement the best ideas results in part from intellectual failures (clinging to policy preferences and ways of thinking that make little sense in the current environment) but in larger part from political and bureaucratic realities. Reforms advantageous to the country would forfeit privileges and opportunities cherished by key congressional and executive actors. While it would be naive to discuss tax administration without awareness of the hampering realities, it would be unduly pessimistic to quit the field in despair. Constellations in the political firmament are in constant motion. Changes not currently feasible may become feasible later. Recent history has shown that long-blocked changes can suddenly become politically viable. That being so, how should the tax community proceed? I suggest two principles. First, tax administrators, practitioners, and scholars should continue to think and talk about the merits of ideas unhampered by the thought that they might not be feasible. In public policy generally, and in tax policy in particular, realities are temporary, not perpetual. We should build the intellectual case for good ideas in preparation for the time when changing political or economic dynamics redefine the boundaries of feasibility. Second, bad ideas as well as good ones can suddenly emerge as serious candidates for adoption. The tax community must be alert to these threats and respond to them rapidly and energetically. If accepted as an excuse for inertia, the notion that it would never be adopted may be the precursor to a professional lifetime of regret when the terrible idea, unopposed, actually wins adoption.

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent ; - Aquest article oferix proves empíriques d'Espanya d'una connexió entre l'administració fiscal i el poder polític. En primer lloc, l'administració regional fiscal no és immune a la situació pressupostària de govern regional, i tendeix a exercir un major (o menor) l'esforç en la col·lecció fiscal el major (o més baix) el dèficit (esperat) públic. Al mateix temps, el sistema de subvencions incondicionals de la capa central de govern provoca " un efecte d'ingrés " que el desànim es disminuïx segons la força parlamentària de l'encarregat.

Effective tax systems are a critical building block for increased domestic resources in developing countries, essential for sustainable development and for promoting self-reliance, good governance, growth and stability. This report begins with an overview of the current tax capacity building landscape, highlighting key initiatives and recent developments that have emerged in response to developing country needs. It then examines how tax administrations, as well as international and regional organisations, are supporting and delivering capacity building assistance to developing countries, and it offers guidance both in relation to G20 priorities and more generally. The report is based on a mapping exercise and a survey of members of the OECD's Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), drawing on the insights and expertise of a nine-country task team led by the FTA commissioners of Canada and China and supported by the FTA Secretariat

"GAO/GGD-93-91BR." ; "B-252525"--P. [1]. ; "April 1993." ; Cover title. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The article stands for the theoretical underpinning of economic grounds of tax system and its building on the basis of social- and business-oriented socioeconomic features. Authors proved the need for tax process management that represent the features of government-society-taxpayer relations with taxpayer's leading role as macroeconomic tool for economic regulation process as well as providing the sustainable and balanced economic growth and innovative modernization of Russian economy. ; peer-reviewed

Cover -- Table of Contents -- ACRONYMS -- PREFACE -- SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS -- I. REVIEW OF DECENTRALIZATION IN MALI -- A. Institutional Anchoring of Decentralization in Mali -- B. Tight Control over Local Governments' Freedom of Administration -- C. Insufficient Decentralized Resources -- II. APPROPRIATE SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION -- A. Local Government Financial Needs to Fulfill Their Responsibilities -- B. Revenues Available in the Regions -- C. Threshold for Triggering a Development Dynamic -- III. APPROPRIATE APPROACH AND LEVELS OF FINANCIAL DECENTRALIZATION -- A. Protecting the Stability of the Macro fiscal Framework -- B. Optimizing Own Resources -- C. Ensuring a Just and Transparent Allocation of Transfers to Local Governments -- D. Regionalization: A Priority -- E. Conclusions and Recommendations -- IV. BEST FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION APPROACH FOR ENSURING LOCAL GOOD GOVERNANCE -- A. Review of Local Governance in Mali and its Risks -- B. Necessary Consolidation of the Local Civil Service -- C. Establish a Framework Favorable to Good Fiscal and Financial Governance -- D. Introducing an Accountability Framework -- E. Conclusions and Recommendations -- BOXES -- 1. The Legal Framework for Decentralization -- 2. Regionalization: a New Phase in Decentralization in Mali -- 3. Approach Based on Responsibilities - Limitations and Caveats -- 4. Revenue-Based Approach - Limitations and Caveat -- 5. Decentralization Threshold - Limitations and Caveat -- 6. Assumptions Underlying the Calculation of the Cost of Financial Decentralization -- 7. Areas for Improvement of Local Taxation -- 8. Optimization of Own Resources Will Not Cover Needs -- 9. ANICT Mechanism for the Allocation of Capital Grants -- 10. Levels of Decentralization in the WAEMU Countries -- 11. Central Government-Region Value-for-Performance Contracts -- CHARTS.

"Overview of property tax systems across Africa. Reviews of salient features for 29 countries and four regions (Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone, North African countries). Chapters offer in-depth discussion of key policy issues (tax base, exemptions and other relief, and tax rate), administrative issues (valuation and assessment, billing, collection, enforcement), and the future of the property tax in Africa"--Provided by publisher