Suchergebnisse

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax. Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum.

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy.The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax.Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement.Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum.

Long-range policy planning for international scientific & technological affairs has been hindered by a variety of problems. One is the overall crisis-response nature of foreign policy making, & another is the difficulty of developing technical information needed for sound forecasts. Within the US Dept of State, the record of attempts to establish systematic planning amply demonstrates the problems. Nevertheless, a number of key conclusions can be drawn from the few successful experiments in policy planning: an effective planning staff should combine the skills of both foreign policy specialists & scientists; planners should be closely familiar with, but not involved in, operations; the planning role requires consistent support from senior officials; & the power to influence budgets significantly strengthens the planning function. HA.