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Origins and causes of red tape and differences in "rule density" in public and private organizations.

The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 put government on an equal footing in tort law with private individuals. It also provides a very broadly defined immunity for any public function of a discretionary nature. While economists argue that immunity does not minimize social costs, this analysis outlines a theoretically optimal mix of liability and immunity. Discretionary governmental policy must be immune as it establishes principles of government conduct. Tort liability then insures cost‐minimizing policy execution. This theory of state behavior links a number of leading/controversial immunity cases that otherwise exhibit no consistent thought.

Several attempts have been made recently to explain the formation of coalitions, especially government coalitions. Most of these theories assume that each of the actors involved (political parties in the case of government coalitions) uses only one criterion — such as the 'size' of the coalition or its 'ideological diversity' — in choosing between alternative coalitions. The criterion yields for each actor a preference ranking of all the possible coalitions. It is then assumed that the coalitions which are most likely to form are those which are 'in equilibrium' or 'undominated', a coalition T being undominated if there is no other coalition which is preferred by all its members to T.

This comprehensive analysis of functional theory and its applications in the analysis of states, governments, and institutions draws from an interdisciplinary orientation and creates a central premise of how systems seek the maintenance of stable states and how patterned orientations enable them to perform their functions.