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The ideas of the democratic (separate) peace originally exposed during the
Enlightenment period have been further explained during the 1980s, by
entitling this issue within the academic discourse and setting up its
theoretical foundations. The fruitfulness of quantitative empirical
researches of the democratic peace theory had as its consequence many papers
which were dedicated to these topics. Most of them have been taking into
consideration very wide time framework of investigation which implied the
usage of an uneven methodological data processing from different periods and
have led to bad validity of the final results. This has become very
significant when the authors were presenting diametrically different results
using the completely same methodology. The interpretation of both results and
basic theoretical foundations on which the theory is based on, also represent
significant problem without achieved consensus within the academic community.
This paper aims at empirically research the explanatory potential of the
democratic peace theory in contemporary system of the international
relations. By combining the data on conflict intensity taken from the
Heidelberg Peace Research Institute (HIIK), and the data on the democratic
level of states by Polity4 datasets, the authors tried to investigate the
main hypothesis of the theory - whether the democratic states are less war
prone in their interdependent relations? The research was conducted on 1985
registered conflicts within the 5 years term from 2010 to 2014. According to
the extensive interpretations of the results, the starting hypothesis has
been confirmed, but when it comes to the restrictive interpretation, the
claims of the theory, that democracies are less war prone, have been
rebutted.

The work of Immanuel Kant has been foundational in modern democratic peace theory. His essay Toward Perpetual Peace gives three prescriptions for attaining peace between democracies: republican institutions, a pacific union between states, and an ethos of universal hospitality. Contemporary democratic peace theory, however, has warped the Kantian framework from which it draws inspiration: the third prescription has been gradually substituted for commerce and trade. I argue that this change in emphasis produces tensions between Perpetual Peace and the body of democratic peace theory literature it spawned. Moreover, I contend that a look back at Kant's essay sheds light on why this transformation occurred. Finally, I use this new look back at Perpetual Peace to reformulate the relationship between peace, democracy, and commerce so as to offer a new perspective on the democratic peace theory/capitalist peace theory debate.

In the twenty first century, the idea of democracy has transcended its original conception of domestic governance to actively influence international relations. The nature of state—democratic or nondemocratic—has come to determine hierarchy, alliances, and status in international relations. It tends to bestow a degree of moral superiority to democratic states in dealings of international relations. This moral superiority in its most aggressive form, in the past two decades, has led to wars in the name of democracy. It has been used to justify military intervention in nondemocratic states by democratic nations. The use of force to bring about desired consequences has become the norm in inter-state relations. The focus is not on the action, but on its intent. This article studies the use of force and war by Western democratic countries to establish democracies through military intervention in other parts of the world. The article analyzes the widespread impact of foreign policies of the stronger nation-states and seeks to understand if the desired results are achieved or not. Beginning with the democratic peace theory that is held in high opinion by democracies of today, the article moves toward Immanuel Kant and his idea of perpetual peace. The democratic peace theory finds its base in Kant's perpetual peace and finds an echo in Western democracies' foreign policies. The article then sees how this theory is used to justify war, through the case study of Afghanistan, and what is the intention behind the wars. The article concludes that the desired aim of "positive peace" cannot be achieved via violent means. In the process of establishing peaceful and healthy democracy, Kant's categorical imperatives are crucial.

This essay discusses the democratic peace theory from the prespective of both its proponents and opponents. The puzzle of the democratic peace theory has long been debated methodologically and empirically. Both have a strong argument to support their views, however. This essay highlights the debate by focusing on three problems of the democratic peace theory. First, the differences of the definitions of democracy, war, and peace that demonstrates the lack of robustness in the democratic peace theory. Second, democracy by force has often failed to establish peace whether international or domestic peace and therefore the promotion of democarcy around the world have been seen as a justification of democratic intervention to other sovereign states. Third, the democratic peace theory does not always apply in new emerging democratic countries. As a result, it raises a question whether the democratic peace theory or an ideology.

PurposeDespite the burgeoning literature dealing with the democratic peace theory, there seems to be surprisingly little research done in actually analyzing how and why democracies cause peace. There is even less research done in empirically analyzing the "how" part of the normative aspects of the democratic peace theory. The purpose of this paper is to explain the theoretical assumptions and how interpersonal trust is linked to a country's preferences to go to war. In addition, a direct comparison is made between democratic and non‐democratic states to ascertain more clearly the effect of trust on decisions to go to war.Design/methodology/approachThis study quantitatively examines the period from 1980 to 2001 and considers 62 democratic countries and 30 non‐democratic countries in their choices to engage in conflict.FindingsThe research project finds that interpersonal trust is strongly correlated with states' decisions to go to war.Originality/valueThis is the first time that a study has examined the role of interpersonal trust on a state's decision to go to war, as no scholarly work has been done in applying the study of interpersonal trust to studying the theory of democratic peace.

Today, the United States faces a myriad of foreign policy challenges, including rogue states, poverty, climate change, environmental degradation, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism. In this paper, I analyze three different academic theories that might help guide the U.S. towards an effective foreign policy strategy that will produce lasting peace in the world. Democratic Peace Theory is the theory that asserts that no two democracies engage in war against each other. Nuclear Proliferation Theory holds that countries that are armed with nuclear weapons hesitate to use them against each other. And what I have termed "Multinational Corporation Involvement Theory," states that corporations involved in host countries can promote peace and encourage economic stability within those countries. Ultimately, I find that none of the theories would be beneficial for U.S. foreign policy. Rather, I suggest that countries should promote stability in the international arena, making it easier to collaborate with one another and tackle the world's issues as a community.

This article argues that the democratic peace theorists have overlooked the defining development that underlies that peace of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the industrial-technological revolution. Not only did that revolution make democracy on a country scale possible; it also made all the countries that experienced the revolution - democratic and nondemocratic - far less belligerent in comparison with preindustrial times. The democratic peace did not exist among premodern democratic and republican city-states, not because they were not democratic or liberal enough but because they were premodern. Other factors that have emanated from the modern transformation and may generate greater aversion to war apply mostly to liberal democratic countries while being only variably connected to their regime. Such factors include the staggering rise in the standard of living; the decrease in hardship, pain, and death; the dominance of metropolitan life and the service economy; the spread of the consumer and entertainment society; sexual promiscuity; women's franchise; and the shrinking ratio of young males in the population. (World Politics / SWP)

This article argues that the democratic peace theorists have overlooked the defining development that underlies that peace of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the industrial-technological revolution. Not only did that revolution make democracy on a country scale possible; it also madeallthe countries that experienced the revolution—democratic and nondemocratic—far less belligerent in comparison with preindustrial times. The democratic peace did not exist among premodern democratic and republican city-states, not because they were not democratic or liberal enough but because they were premodern. Other factors that have emanated from the modern transformation and may generate greater aversion to war apply mostly to liberal democratic countries while being only variably connected to their regime. Such factors include the staggering rise in the standard of living; the decrease in hardship, pain, and death; the dominance of metropolitan life and the service economy; the spread of the consumer and entertainment society; sexual promiscuity; women's franchise; and the shrinking ratio of young males in the population.

We theorize that three distinct structures of democratic constraint explain why more democratic dyads do not engage in military conflict with each other. We build on earlier theories that focused on electoral and horizontal accountability. We add a new dimension—the social accountability provided by an active civil society. Using several new measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set, we stringently test these explanations. We find social accountability to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of nonbelligerence in dyads, that horizontal accountability is still important, but that the independent role of electoral accountability has been somewhat overstated. However, we do find that social and electoral accountability work strongly together, to make for an even greater effect. The finding is robust to a range of specifications and in the face of controls for contending theories that challenge the democratic peace (e.g., the capitalist and territorial peace theories).