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Alliance formation is a multilateral process. The vast majority of alliance relations are created via multilateral alliances. Moreover, leaders assess the alliance as a whole, not just each prospective partner. Any alliance could have three or more members, so one must understand not just why third parties were included in multilateral alliances, but why they were excluded from bilateral alliances. Unfortunately, current research treats alliance formation as a bilateral process: it theorizes about bilateral alliances and tests hypotheses using dyadic research designs. Reconceptualizing all alliances as originating from a multilateral process reveals that a long-neglected theory, William Riker's size principle, illuminates the role of power in alliance formation. Using k-adic data to analyze multilateral processes, we find strong support for Riker's claim about minimum winning coalitions in world politics. Our argument and findings, by highlighting how a fundamental state behavior like alliance formation follows a multilateral process, suggest rethinking much of international relations research.

On 1 September 1951, representatives of Australia , New Zealand , and the United States met in San Fran cisco to sign a treaty of alliance commonly known as the Anzus pact.1 The signing ceremony had been preceded by two years of sporadic negotiations during which the Australians had pressed hard for joint military planning and discu ssion of global strategy. The Americans, however, had been determined to limit formal security arrangements to the minimum necessary to win the consent of their negotiating partners to the relatively mild peace treaty the United States intended to sign with Japan.2 The American view prevailed, and Anzus thus came into being with a council charged with considering matters related to the implementation of the treaty but with no standing military organization and no integrated military force.

This article presents a simple cooperative game theory representation of alliance formation and expansion to counter a conventional threat along the allies' borders. Mutual defense gains, derived from allying, arise from interior borders that no longer require protection. Spatial and locational attributes of the allies are crucial when identifying the gains from mutual defense and the distribution of these gains. The same number of allies can have vastly different cores depending on their spatial configurations. Extensions to the baseline case consider transaction costs, natural defenses, guerrilla warfare, and risk concerns. An application to the NATO alliance indicates that the theory has much to say about which additional Partnership for Peace countries are likely to join NATO after the three Visegrad countries.

The purpose of this study is to show an alternative model to the clash approaches developed by Huntington and called "Clash of Civilizations". But the main focus of this paper is on "Alliance of Civilizations" that is one of the major attempts of our day to bring different cultures and civilizations together and its effects toward Turkish Foreign Policy. The paper also investigates the future of Turkish Foreign Policy in terms of axis shift discussions. The study's conclusion is that Turkey uses Alliance of Civilizations project to affect his surrounding countries as a soft power tool and this initiative increases the strength and legitimacy of Turkey both in world politics and in the domestic realm.

Cairo's Muchabarat, the intelligence headquarters, appeared to be a fitting venue for a Palestinian and an Egyptian diplomatic triumph. Inside its modern facade the two major Palestinian movements, plus other political factions and some independents, signed a Unity Agreement in mid-2011 that may -- or may not -- end five years of unremitting hostility and intermittent internecine warfare. Adapted from the source document.