Suchergebnisse

International audience ; This paper provides new evidence on why municipalities are often reluctant to integrate. Exploiting a French reform that made intermunicipal cooperation mandatory, I find that urban municipalities forced to integrate experienced a large increase in construction, consistent with NIMBYism explaining their resistance, while rural municipalities ended up with fewer local public services. I do not find the same effects for municipalities that had voluntarily integrated prior to the law, while both types of municipality enjoyed similar benefits in terms of public transport and fiscal revenues. These findings support the fact that municipalities resisted to avoid the local costs of integration.

At first, this work evaluates the effects policy consequences on the national distribution of the agricultural production. Then, it shows that zoning reduce urban zones and promote agricultural development in rural zone detrimental to " deep rural " agricultural development. ; L'objet de cet article est d'évaluer les effets des politiques de zonage sur la répartition de la production agricole sur un territoire national. Nous soutenons que le zonage réduit la taille des zones urbaines et favorise le développement agricole du rural périurbain au détriment du développement agricole du rural profond.

At first, this work evaluates the effects policy consequences on the national distribution of the agricultural production. Then, it shows that zoning reduce urban zones and promote agricultural development in rural zone detrimental to " deep rural " agricultural development. ; L'objet de cet article est d'évaluer les effets des politiques de zonage sur la répartition de la production agricole sur un territoire national. Nous soutenons que le zonage réduit la taille des zones urbaines et favorise le développement agricole du rural périurbain au détriment du développement agricole du rural profond.

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

International audience ; The objective of this article1 is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of Technoparks (TP) in developing and emerging economies using the example of Tunisia. This article is based on a thorough desk review and informal interviews with TP entrepreneurs and managers in Tunisia. Setting up "ex-nihilo" ten TPs in Tunisia in the mid-1990s was a political decision. Having signed the Treaty of Marrakesh to enter in a Free Trade Zone with Arab Countries in 1989, and being the first Mediterranean country to enter in a free trade area with the EU in 1995, Tunisia needed to boost its productivity and competitiveness both within the EU and with other Arab states. As a response Technoparks started burgeoning in an attempt to address new economic challenges such as demand for highly skilled labour, jobs for youth, economic diversification, capturing the dividend of new technologies, and boosting regional development. In 1997, Tunisia set up El Ghazela --a competitive Technopark in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Six other TPs followed suit in various priority areas like biotechnology, energy, and agri-business which are still in progress. Tunisia's eleventh development plan programmed for an additional three TPs in the south and in the west of the country. Of the ten TPs only El-Ghazala is effective. A key success factor was the interaction between government, higher education institutions and multinationals as well as the diaspora which played a crucial role in attracting multinationals. They also effectively linked Tunisian start-up companies to the international value chain of production. El-Ghazala had access to a critical mass of highly skilled researchers and a local labour market. The other TPs failed to put in place some of these necessary prerequisites. This article shows that setting up ten TPs in a small developing country like Tunisia was quite unrealistic. A better strategy would have been to concentrate on three or four specific centres of excellence such as ...

This paper analyzes the factors that explain supply and demand of local public transportation. Together with variables related to economics and mobility, we consider variables reflecting institutional characteristics and geographical patterns. Being a political capital increases supply and demand of local public transportation, inequality is associated with higher supply, and contracting out reduces supply. Furthermore, our regional analysis allows us capturing the effect of geographical characteristics and different traditions of government intervention. In all, we provide first evidence on the role played by institutional and regional characteristics useful to achieve a better understanding of local public transportation supply and demand.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

The rational allocation of transportation resources involves both the evaluation of the effectiveness of programs designed to improve transportation systems, as well as the formulation of policies representing a balance of competing public interests in those systems. Such interests often include: curbing automobile emissions, expanding highway infrastructure, providing affordable transit services for inner-city residents, and extending commuter rail services to sprawling suburban areas. Designing policies that cost-effectively further each these objectives can attenuate the degree of inherent tradeoffs between them and expand the frontier of achievable policy goals. This dissertation presents a set of essays addressing two such aspects of transportation policy decisions: 1) an evaluation of programs aimed at increasing transportation safety and public health, and 2) an examination of the processes through which competing public interests and agendas are mobilized in the legislative arena by transportation agencies.Chapter One: Graduated driver license programs (GDL), which progressively move teens through three stages of licensing while limiting driving to lower risk conditions, have become an increasingly popular approach in the past decade to address the high rate of teen driving related fatality and injury crashes. Teens are 2 to 6 times as likely as adults, per mile driven, to die in motor vehicle accident, and teen crashes tend to involve more fatalities per crash than for any other age group. Driving at night past 9pm or with young passengers under the age of 20 are significant risk factors for teen crashes.This research uses a panel data set of teen driver involved fatal vehicle crashes among 16 to 17 year old drivers in 742 counties and 137 commuting zones straddling state borders for the years 1996 to 2009. I use a cross-state policy discontinuity design with an ordinary least squares fixed-effects regression model to identify the effects of graduated driver license laws on teen driver error related fatal crashes and associated fatality counts. Additionally, I analyze the impacts on crash characteristics most likely associated with teen driving mistakes, such as presence of young occupants and those occurring at night or involving alcohol. By taking into account local heterogeneities, the policy-discontinuity design provides more credible identification than previous studies. Importantly, the findings indicate much larger GDL effects than in the extant literature. I find that the strongest GDL programs, as rated by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, reduce teen driving related fatal crash rates by 25 to 34 percent and teen driving error related fatal crash rates by 34 to 45 percent. The most effective components of the GDL were early nighttime driving curfews beginning between 6pm to 10pm at night. Passenger restrictions had statistically significant effects only when controlling for the number of licensed teens on the road. For example, the zero to one passenger limit reduced quarterly county-level young teen driver involved fatal crash rates per 100,000 by -6.388 points, relative to a mean rate of 9.5 in state-periods without restrictions. These passenger limits were also highly effective at reducing nighttime crashes among teens, with a reduction in these crash rates of -5.909. Finally, the extended practice period during which newly licensed teens are only allowed to drive under adult supervision were effective in reducing fatal crashes per unit population but only were statistically significant for nighttime crashes that occur after 9pm when controlling for the number of licensed teen drivers. Chapter Two: Government transportation agencies spend considerable amounts of money attempting to influence state and federal legislation, through their own legislative staff, and the efforts of appointed officials and hired lobbyists. Almost none of the literature to date has examined how transportation agencies use their funding and political influence to shape state and federal policy. By looking at what topics agencies choose to lobby on, or not to lobby on, we can better understand how transportation agencies attempt to shape the transportation legislation, and how potential biases in their agendas are mobilized. This analysis includes four agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area Metropolitan region: the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), a regional Metropolitan Transportation Planning Organization, the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART), the region's commuter rail operator, Alameda-Contra Costa Transit (AC Transit), a local bus agency serving two counties in the East Bay, and the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority (VTA), a bus and light-rail transit operator in the southern portion of the region. Collectively, these four agencies account for approximately 80 percent of the total spending on lobbying activities by San Francisco Bay Area transportation agencies.This research draws on government reports filed by the agencies, in-house agency legislative agenda records, and interviews with legislative and agency staff. Descriptive statistics and a probit analysis of lobbying data are applied to compare the substance of each agency's lobbying activities to the set of pressing transportation issues the agencies themselves have identified in their planning documents, and the set of transportation issues and needs identified by other key stakeholders including business groups, social justice advocates, and environmentalists. All of the transportation agencies lobbied heavily for finance bills that increase revenue and flexibility in fund use as well as funding redistribution. Equity related bills that address transportation for low-income populations have a significantly higher marginal probability of gaining both MTC and AC Transit support, relative to bills that do not address these issues. Overall, VTA was less likely to support highway bills but did not have biases toward any other particular bill issues. BART overwhelming supported bills promoting smart growth principles and transit oriented development, two strategies believed to increase transit ridership. Both the Santa Clara VTA and BART were strategic in the bills they chose to support, having a greater likelihood of supporting bills authored by transportation committee chairs, perhaps in an effort to both build political capital and to expend resources on bills with a greater chance of passage. MTC was more likely to take a supporting position on social equity related bills; however, the degree of effort in that support is unknown. Notably, MTC was not statistically more likely to support bills specific to expanding public transit, a mode important to low income groups, relative to other bill categories.

This study uses secondary figures, i.e. reports from the Directorate General of Fiscal balance and the Supreme Audit Agency on the implementation of the District Government and the Government of the Majene Regency in 2018 and 2019. The results of this study show that (1) the financial performance of the Regional Government of Majene Regency, as shown in the Regional Budget for 2019 by the analysis of variances, is well established. (2) the 2019 ABPD level of efficiency and efficiency is less efficient in the Majene Regency. It can be said that Majene Regency's level of financial achievement is less efficient. On efficiency, the level of achievement of Majene Regency's regional financial performance is beneficial. (3) the independence story remains shallow in 2018 and 2019.This study uses secondary figures, i.e. reports from the Directorate General of Fiscal balance and the Supreme Audit Agency on the implementation of the District Government and the Government of the Majene Regency in 2018 and 2019. The results of this study show that (1) the financial performance of the Regional Government of Majene Regency, as shown in the Regional Budget for 2019 by the analysis of variances, is well established. (2) the 2019 ABPD level of efficiency and efficiency is less efficient in the Majene Regency. It can be said that Majene Regency's level of financial achievement is less efficient. On efficiency, the level of achievement of Majene Regency's regional financial performance is beneficial. (3) the independence story remains shallow in 2018 and 2019.

This paper investigates the impact of tax base mobility on local taxation. We first develop a theoretical model in order to examine the connection between local business property taxation and tax base mobility within a metropolitan area. We find that decreasing capital intensity in the tax base increases the business property tax rates unambiguously. We then test this result using a French reform, which changes the composition of the main local business tax base in 2010. Estimations using Difference-inDifferences show that the reduction in the mobility of the tax base indeed results in higher business property tax rates. Housing tax rates were not affected by the reform.