The new president of the Philippines, Benigno Aquino III, has to deal with the legacy of his predecessor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Her 10-year rule had the contradictory effect of stabilizing the economy but also bringing out the worst of a political process driven by patronage and anchored on the power and violence of political dynasties and warlords.
In August 2009, the death of the popular former President Corazon Aquino forced President Gloria Arroyo and her allies to backtrack on plans to alter the political system. But it also signified the end of mass mobilization politics and the further entrenchment of an electoral politics that has placed in bolder terms the "guns, goons, gold" mentality of those seeking or defending their political dominance.
This article re-examines the relationship between military intervention on the one hand, and civilian supremacy over the military and the enduring popularity and potency of suffrage and legislative politics, on the other. It shows how these two enduring features of Philippine politics have proven to be quite effective deterrents in neutralizing extremist acts like the coup. As "performative acts," they help stabilize the Philippine polity by providing an alternative outlet for mass resentment or protest and help to neutralize rival radical rebellions. These also enable a weak state to reform or rejuvenate after periods of profound political crisis, albeit only partially. The coup, however, is a poor rival:its history is far shorter and littered with failures. It has since ceased to be a weapon of choice by military actors who now prefer cacique democracy as the arena in which to pursue their interests. This was evident during the term of Pres. Fidel Ramos and while the military leadership did launch a de facto coup by withdrewing its support for Pres. Joseph Estrada, it immediately reverted to the proverbial backroom deals and patronage relations with its civilian superiors under Pres. Gloria Arroyo.