Suchergebnisse

Al Qaeda and its affiliates will continue to attack soft economic targets, primarily in moderate Muslim states, whose secular regimes, closely allied with the United States, are Al Qaeda's real focus.

Following a brief overview of seemingly successful counterterrorist efforts against Jemaah Islamiya in Southeast Asia, twelve points are delineated to illustrate the danger in thinking that the organization has been incapacitated: (1) the psychology of terrorism; (2) patience & the importance of maintaining organizational integrity; (3) the intact motivating force of jihad; (4) the fact that most of the trained leadership remains at large; (5) the role of the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front; (6) the terrorist-transnational crime nexus that makes for certain countries of convenience for terrorists; (7) the scope of vulnerable targets available to even a diminished Jemaah Islamiya; (8) the organization's fomenting of sectarian violence throughout regions of Indonesia; (9) the decentralized, independent nature of al-Qaeda cells & operatives in Southeast Asia; (10) failure of the financial front of the war on terror; (11) Jemaah Islamiya's overseas networking with other radical Islamist groups; & (12) the lack of political will to confront the Islamists as domestic pressures play on regional politicians amid elections. Some of Jemaah Islamiya's vulnerabilities are cited in conclusion, eg, improved interstate counterterrorist cooperation. J. Zendejas

The war on terror has been well executed in Southeast Asia. The arrests of more than 160 Jemaah Islamiya-linked militants since December 2001 have disrupted the capabilities of terrorist operations. JI is less able to execute major attacks than they were a year ago. Yet there are causes for concern: first the group is rebuilding its capabilities. Second, there have been no gains in combating terrorist financing in the region, and to date no terrorist assets or funds have been seized in the region, despite evidence that Southeast Asia has only increased in financial importance to Al Qaeda. JIs financial operations are complex, ranging from legal to illegal, overt to covert. Due to the nature of their funding mechanisms and the fact that terrorism is asymmetrical warfare, combating terrorist financing will not be easy. Yet, choking the terrorist lifeblood is as important as targetting the operational cells themselves. (Contemp Southeast As/DÜI)

At the Vietnam Communist Party's Ninth Congress, General Secretary Le Kha Phieu was voted out of office, heralding an end to the era of the strongman in Vietnamese politics. Phieu made many mistakes, including being politically corrupt, campaigning openly, abusing power, and equivocating on important economic decisions. However, these alone were not enough to unseat him. Phieu's downfall must be explained by systemic changes in the Vietnamese political system, including his status as a compromise candidate with no broad base of support, and the growth of political power of provincial leaders. This article concludes by analysing newly elected leader Nong Duc Manh's ascension to office and finds that he displays none of the personal liabilities that wounded Phieu, and has taken advantage of the changed political environment to give himself a broad base of support and a mandate to lead. (Contemp Southeast Asia/D³I)