Suchergebnisse

Does the political regime of a country influence its involvement in international trade? A theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies is developed, and the predictions of the model are tested empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for 1962–2000. In contrast to the existing literature, data on the regime type of individual countries are used rather than information about the congruence of the regime type of pairs of trading countries. In line with the model, autocracies are found to import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular setup or estimation technique.

Women's suffrage was a major event in the history of democratization in Western Europe and elsewhere. Public choice theory predicts that the demand for publicly funded social spending is systematically higher where women have and use the right to vote. Using historical data from six Western European countries for the period 1869-1960, we provide evidence that social spending out of GDP increased by 0.6-1.2% in the short-run as a consequence of women's suffrage, while the long-run effect is three to eight times larger. We also explore a number of other public finance implications of the gender gap. Adapted from the source document.

This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.

The paper analyzes whether the political regime of a country influences its involvement in international trade. Firstly, we develop a theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies. Secondly, we test the predictions of the model empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for the years 1962 to 2000. In contrast to the existing literature, we use data on individual importing and exporting countries, rather than a dyadic set-up. In line with the model, we find that autocracies import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique.

The paper analyzes whether the political regime of a country influences its involvement in international trade. Firstly, we develop a theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies. Secondly, we test the predictions of the model empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for the years 1962 to 2000. In contrast to the existing literature, we use data on individual importing and exporting countries, rather than a dyadic set-up. In line with the model, we find that autocracies import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique.

We develop a theory of second best policy myopia. Policy myopia arises when rational voters allow politicians to bias public investments towards short-term investments. We demonstrate that policy myopia is not an inevitable implication of the fact that voters cannot observe immediately how much their politicians invested in certain types of public goods; rather it is the interaction between observation lags, economic growth and binding revenue constraints that forces rational voters to accept a short-term bias. We argue that growth in government eventually leads to policy myopia. [Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V.]