Starting with Hobbes
In: Hobbes studies, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 189-192
ISSN: 1875-0257
39 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Hobbes studies, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 189-192
ISSN: 1875-0257
In: Hobbes studies, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 80-104
ISSN: 1875-0257
In: Journal of peace research, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 213-227
ISSN: 1460-3578
Threats and coercion occur in conflict situations. Sometimes mere force and violence are applied. But people also make offers in order to exercise their power. Coercion is characterized as such rational social interaction and exercise of power that the weaker party is threatened by the stronger party. The weaker party will suffer a loss whatever it does, and the stronger party will gain from such action Two different interpretations of coercion are possible: descriptive and normative. In many cases, both interpretations apply to a given case, as Robert Nozick has shown The problem is that this creates a harmful ambiguity in the sense that one and the same case may involve both an offer and a threat. This is impossible. The weaker party is either threatened or is presented with an offer. It is actually very difficult to distinguish analytically between threats and offers, although morally the difference is all important. This paper presents a theory of how such a distinction can be made and analyzes a number of detailed examples as test cases. It is argued that the victim of coercion has a choice between two disequilibrium situations. Offers are different in this respect. Coercion is compared with exploitation. Some coercion is morally justifiable. This feature is also difficult to understand because coercion is always a prima facie evil strategy. The final result is that in many cases a concept like coercion cannot be applied in any value-free manner. This suggestion has deep methodological consequences for social science. Some social science concepts have value elements in their deep structure.
In: Journal of peace research, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 213
ISSN: 0022-3433
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 2, Heft 3, S. 407-434
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 2, Heft 4, S. 557-598
In: Politiikka: Valtiotieteellisen Yhdistyksen julkaisu, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 129
ISSN: 0032-3365
In: Inquiry: an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 467-475
ISSN: 1502-3923
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 117-134
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: HELIYON-D-22-23368
SSRN
In: Power, Freedom, and Voting, S. 405-419
George Berkeley (1685-1753) is, Other John Locke and David Hume, one of the three major figures in the British empiricist school of philosophy. He has been the centre of much attention recently and his philosophical profile has gradually changed. In the 20th century he was almost exclusively known for his denial of the existence of matter (as this term was defined in those days), but today it is no longer reasonable to confine an account of Berkeley to the challenging philosophical inventions
In: Acta philosophica Fennica 65
In: History of European ideas, Band 43, Heft 6, S. 598-613
ISSN: 0191-6599
In: History of European ideas, S. 1-16
ISSN: 0191-6599