Suchergebnisse

Durch das gesamte Werk von R. Dahrendorf zieht sich als roter Faden nicht nur eine innere Aufsässigkeit, zu der er sich in seiner Autobiografie bekannt hat, sondern auch ein fast sozialromantisches Eintreten für die Entrechteten, das gelegentlich fast Assoziationen an Robin Hood weckte. Umverteilen war seine Sache zwar nicht, aber gesellschaftliche Selbstverständlichkeiten in Frage zu stellen, hat ihn immer wieder gereizt. Es gab einen marxianischen Zug an ihm, der ihn Entfremdung - komme sie nun als Bürokratie oder eingefahrene Konvention - geißeln und bekämpfen ließ. Nirgends wurde das deutlicher als in seiner "Skizze einer Rede an junge Menschen", in der er dazu aufforderte, sich vom Karrieredenken und der Gier nach Statussymbolen zu befreien und statt dessen nach Tätigkeiten zu trachten, die Spaß und Vergnügen bereiten und einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Welt leisten. Weil er kritische Reflexion und das Infragestellen von Selbstverständlichkeiten liebte, sah er sich gerne in der Rolle des Hofnarren, nicht nur in der Politik, sondern auch auf wissenschaftlichen Tagungen. Wer Dahrendorf verstehen will, muss ohne den Begriff des Sozialliberalen auskommen, kann aber auf den des Hofnarren, der mit Spaß und Vergnügen unbequeme Wahrheiten ausspricht und höfisches Treiben in Frage stellt, kaum verzichten. Eine Arbeitsteilung, in der Ökonomen in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft die Rolle der Höflinge übernehmen, während Soziologen in der Rolle des Hofnarren oder auch der des Kindes agieren, das im Märchen "Des Kaisers neue Kleider" als einziger die Wahrheit "er hat doch gar nichts an" ausspricht, könnte sich für die Sozialwissenschaften durchaus als fruchtbar erweisen. (ICF2)

"Die Industriegesellschaft war eine patriarchalisch geprägte Männergesellschaft, die Frauen den Zugang zu privilegierten Positionen versperrte. Post-industrielle Dienstleistungsgesellschaften werden hingegen zunehmend zu Frauengesellschaften, in denen geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede an Bedeutung verlieren. Seit den 1960er Jahren haben sich die Geschlechterverhältnisse stärker verändert als in den 100 Jahren zuvor. Diese stille Revolution findet in aktuellen Gleichheitsdiskursen zu wenig Berücksichtigung. Ungleichheitsforscher und Gleichstellungsbeauftragte sollten ihr Augenmerk stärker auf die zentralen Herausforderungen unserer Tage richten: das Fortdauern von Klassenunterschieden sowie die prekäre Integration von Migrantenkindern im Bildungswesen." (Autorenreferat)

This paper examines to what extent the classification of the American welfare state as "residual" squares with the empirical facts. Section I describes key features of American social policy developments. The U.S. system is clearly dominated by public provisions for welfare among which social insurance programs, especially Social Security and Medicare, represent the lion's share, and public pensions are more universal, redistributive, and generous than in some European countries. Noteworthy differences remain with respect to the stronger reliance on private provisions in pensions and health, the emphasis on work-conditioned benefits and a greater importance of selective schemes. The terms "work-conditioned welfare" or "corporate citizenship" adequately capture these key features by highlighting that employers are gatekeepers of social entitlements. Section II examines if key features of the American welfare state have recently become more prominent in Europe. A slight approximation to the American model is found with respect to a growing importance of private expenditure for pensions and health, but not with respect to a greater selectivity of benefits. On the level of policy discourse, the idée directrice of European social policies is changing from social protection to activation, as three traditionally American elements have come to prominence: an emphasis on individual responsibility, on the private supply of services and more consumer choice, and on the activation of people at working age. Yet there is no general convergence towards the American model, because the United States is approximating Europe with respect to health insurance while public attitudes are shifting in favour of extended state responsibilities. Hence there is a complex pattern of specific policy learning rather than convergence towards one model of social policy. In sum, similarities between social policies in Europe and America are found to be more noteworthy than the term "residual welfare state" for the U.S. suggests.

Turkey's position relative to Europe is analyzed from three different perspectives, i.e (i) the semi-official perspective of the Copenhagen criteria, the Maastricht criteria and the Lisbon strategy, (ii) the perspective of comparative surveys, and (iii) the perspective of key European worries regarding future strains on cohesion funds and the complex relationship of the Turkish population to European values. It is shown that Turkey's standing in international comparisons of good governance has been improving in recent years and that the country is on a path of convergence with the Maastricht criteria. Turkey falls considerably short, however, of the employment and education goals of the Lisbon agenda. Comparative surveys show the Turkish population to have not only a low standard of living, but also a very low level of satisfaction with life and with public services, to have comparatively little trust in other people and a low level of civic engagement, and to nourish traditional attitudes concerning religious beliefs, women's rights and gender roles. Since Turkey's admission to the EU would enlarge the EU population by 15 %, but economic output by less than 3 %, Turkey's accession would severely strain EU cohesion funds. Despite these reservations, Turkey's admission to the Union is here advocated for three reasons: (1) Risks of a fundamentalist backlash against Europe would considerably increase if the long-standing accession promise were not kept. (2) Given that the country is entering a very favourable demographic phase for about 2-3 decades, there is considerable economic opportunity with a vast growth potential. (3) Since the recent Eastern enlargements have already decided the debate between federalists and inter-governmentalists in favour of the latter, Europe has more to gain than to lose from Turkey's membership which would strengthen the country's ties to the West, and provide a chance of proving to the world that the motto of the European Union 'united in diversity' is a better model for the future of international relations than the scenario of a 'clash of civilizations'.

The notion of a European social model assumes that European societies have certain features in common that distinguish them from the United States. Analysing longitudinal data on the dimensions of state, economy and society three findings stand out: (1) for most indicators the range of variation within the European Union is bigger than the gap between Europe and the United States; (2) counter to the idea of policy convergence, differences in the developmental trajectories of countries with different institutional arrangements persist; (3) despite having extended welfare states similar to those of Continental European countries, Scandinavian nations have performed as well as the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of employment and growth dynamics. Hence there are not only different social models in Europe but also different pathways to success.

International audience ; The notion of a European social model assumes that European societies have certain features in common that distinguish them from the United States. Analysing longitudinal data on the dimensions of state, economy and society three findings stand out: (1) for most indicators the range of variation within the European Union is bigger than the gap between Europe and the United States; (2) counter to the idea of policy convergence, differences in the developmental trajectories of countries with different institutional arrangements persist; (3) despite having extended welfare states similar to those of Continental European countries, Scandinavian nations have performed as well as the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of employment and growth dynamics. Hence there are not only different social models in Europe but also different pathways to success.

"Der Autor thematisiert in seinem Beitrag zehn häufig gestellte Fragen zum EU-Beitritt der Türkei. Sein vor allem auf Umfragedaten gestützter Befund ist, dass sich die türkische Bevölkerung in vielerlei Hinsicht von den Europäern unterscheidet, wogegen in der Türkei die Unterschiede zwischen urban-gebildeten Schichten und der Landbevölkerung sowie jüngeren und älteren Menschen bemerkenswert gering sind. Der EU-Beitritt der Türkei würde also zweifellos zu einer noch wesentlich größeren ökonomischen und kulturellen Heterogenisierung Europas führen. Andererseits steht die türkische Bevölkerung in ihrem Bekenntnis zu demokratischen Freiheitsrechten den Europäern kaum nach, und sie befürwortet den Beitritt ihres Landes mit großer Mehrheit. Da sich am Beispiel der Westintegration der. Bundesrepublik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg gezeigt hat, wie rasch sich Verhaltensmuster und Wertorientierungen unter dem Druck außenpolitischer Verflechtungen und Verpflichtungen ändern können, plädiert der Verfasser für eine Einbeziehung der Türkei in die Europäische Union, die eine Stärkung bürgerlicher Freiheiten und pro-westlicher Strömungen im Lande nach sich zöge und insofern auch zur weiteren Verbreitung und Konsolidierung westlicher Freiheitswerte beitragen würde." (Autorenreferat)

The notion of a European social model assumes that European societies have certain features in common that distinguish them from the United States. Analysing longitudinal data on the dimensions of state, economy and society three findings stand out: (1) for most indicators the range of variation within the European Union is bigger than the gap between Europe and the United States; (2) counter to the idea of policy convergence, differences in the developmental trajectories of countries with different institutional arrangements persist; (3) despite having extended welfare states similar to those of Continental European countries, Scandinavian nations have performed as well as the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of employment and growth dynamics. Hence there are not only different social models in Europe but also different pathways to success.

In the middle of the life-cycle unmarried persons have much higher death rates than married ones. The differential is significantly greater for men than for women. A comparative historical data collection shows that this pattern of gendered inequality persisted from the 1920s over the 1970s to the 1990s. Comparing the gender-specific death rates within a given marital status, the highest gender gaps in mortality are reached in case of divorce or bereavement, where the male death rate is usually more than three times higher than the female one. The gendered reaction to the loss of the spouse calls for a sociological explanation. Abstracting from selection effects, a wide range of hypotheses is considered ranging from feminist sociology to socio-biologist ideas. The central hypothesis advanced here is that men die overproportionately in case of divorce or bereavement, because they are more dependent upon the sexual & emotional attachment to their spouse, whereas women more frequently have emotionally rewarding contacts to other persons outside the conjugal relationship. 1 Appendix, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.