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This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. In such economies, property rights systems may preserve the interests of an influential minority, who can control key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasing property rights protection increases income inequality; (b) this effect is larger in low-democracy environments; (c) some countries have developed political institutions capable of counterbalancing this effect. Adapted from the source document.

This paper studies the distributive impact of institutional change in developing countries. In such economies, property rights systems may preserve the interests of an influential minority, who can control key-markets, access to assets and investment opportunities, especially if they enjoy disproportionate political power. We test this hypothesis using cross-section and panel data methods on a sample of low- and middle-income economies from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Results suggest that: (a) increasing property rights protection increases income inequality; (b) this effect is larger in low-democracy environments; (c) some countries have developed political institutions capable of counterbalancing this effect. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Cover -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Methodology -- 2.1 Empirical Model -- 2.2 Data and Baseline Specification -- 2.3 Inference, Identification and Computation of Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers -- 3 Results -- 3.1 Impulse Responses Conditional on the Shadow Rate -- 3.2 Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers Conditional on Shadow Rate Levels -- 3.3 Average Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers in Normal Times and the ELB -- 3.4 Correlations of the Multiplier with the Shadow Rate and the Business Cycle -- 4 Robustness Checks -- 5 Conclusions -- Appendix -- A Data -- A.1 Endogenous Variables -- A.2 Exogenous Variables -- A.3 Informational Dataset -- A.4 Business Cycle Indicator -- B Additional Robustness Checks -- List of Tables -- 1 Sign Restrictions for Identifying the Government Spending Shock -- 2 Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers Conditional on Two Levels of the Shadow Rate Representative of Normal Times and the ELB -- 3 Average Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers in Normal Times and at the ELB -- 4 Conditional Correlations of Cumulated Multipliers with the Lagged Shadow Rate and the Lagged Business Cycle -- 5 Robustness Checks on the Average Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers in Normal Times and at the ELB -- 6 Robustness Checks on the Distributions of Di˙erences between Average Cumulated Government Spending Multipliers between Normal Times and the ELB -- 7 Robustness Checks on Conditional Correlations of Cumulated Multipliers with the Lagged Shadow Rate and the Lagged Business Cycle -- B.1 Conditional Correlations of Cumulated Multipliers with the Contemporaneous Shadow Rate and the Contemporaneous Business Cycle -- B.2 Robustness Checks on Conditional Correlations of Cumulated Multipliers with the Contemporaneous Shadow Rate and the Contemporaneous Business Cycle -- List of Figures.

Relying on social preference theory and on poverty trap literature, this article suggests a richer and more nuanced role of the third sector as an institution complementary to the state and to the market in an economy's development process. Social preferences are considered as the micro—fundaments of the third sector in that this promotes activities, laws, and organizational forms coherent with those preferences. The third sector contributes to overcoming poverty traps not only by spreading behavior based on altruism and solidarity but also by promoting investments in welfare services and human capital and by favoring the access of all the agents to the various markets.