Suchergebnisse

The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (TI), has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption. Despite recent critiques of the CPI, it remains highly influential on research into the causes of corruption and is also extensively used to galvanise support for measures to fight corruption. In this article we explore the CPI in more depth in order to highlight how the index has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. The argument is developed in four sections: in the first, we focus on Transparency International's definition of corruption, highlighting some conceptual difficulties with the approach adopted and its relationship to the promotion of 'good governance' as the principal means of combating corruption. In the second section, we outline some methodological difficulties in the design of the Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the CPI has been much criticised, we demonstrate in the third section that the index continues to exercise great influence both in academic research and in the politics of anti-corruption efforts, particularly as exercised by Transparency International itself. In the final section we argue that the CPI contributes to the risk of creating a 'corruption trap' in countries where corruption is deeply embedded, as development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid.

Existing case studies of control of political corruption often lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. To remedy this, we apply principal-agent theory qualitatively to study the United Kingdom, with a particular emphasis given to an in-depth study of control measures employed to Parliament, the Executive and political parties. We give a detailed account of the approach undertaken to control political corruption in these risk areas for corruption, and discuss its implications and why some types of measures prevail over others.

Sweden's management of the coronavirus pandemic, beginning in early 2020, has been much discussed because it deviated from other countries' equivalents. Set in the context of scholarly debate about the balance between politicians and experts in political decision-making, we argue that a necessary condition for this case of Swedish exceptionalism was the manner of policy-making adopted by the Swedish authorities. In this article, we describe this policy-making procedure, which involved a radical form of delegation by elected politicians to appointed experts, and seek to explain how it came about. We focus on the 1st year of the pandemic, and use media reports and other public documents, including parts of a public inquiry, as our empirical material.

Sweden's management of the coronavirus pandemic, beginning in early 2020, hasbeen much discussed because it deviated from other countries' equivalents. Set inthe context of scholarly debate about the balance between politicians and experts inpolitical decision-making, we argue that a necessary condition for this case of Swedishexceptionalism was the manner of policy-making adopted by the Swedish authorities. Inthis article, we describe this policy-making procedure, which involved a radical form ofdelegation by elected politicians to appointed experts, and seek to explain how it cameabout. We focus on the 1st year of the pandemic, and use media reports and other publicdocuments, including parts of a public inquiry, as our empirical material.

Sweden's management of the coronavirus pandemic, beginning in early 2020, has been much discussed because it deviated from other countries' equivalents. Set in the context of scholarly debate about the balance between politicians and experts in political decision-making, we argue that a necessary condition for this case of Swedish exceptionalism was the manner of policy-making adopted by the Swedish authorities. In this article, we describe this policy-making procedure, which involved a radical form of delegation by elected politicians to appointed experts, and seek to explain how it came about. We focus on the 1st year of the pandemic, and use media reports and other public documents, including parts of a public inquiry, as our empirical material.

Energy efficiency investments in existing buildings are an effective way of reducing the environmental impact of the building stock. Even though policies in the European Union and elsewhere promote a unilateral focus on operational energy reduction, scientific studies highlight the importance of applying a life cycle perspective to energy refurbishment. However, life cycle assessment is often perceived as being complicated and the results difficult to interpret by the construction sector. There is also a lack of guidelines regarding the sustainable ratio between the embodied and accumulated operational impact. The scope of this study is to introduce a life cycle assessment method for building refurbishment that utilizes familiar economic performance tools, namely return on investment and annual yield. The aim is to use the introduced method to analyze a case building with a sustainability profile. The building was refurbished in order to reduce its operational energy use. The introduced method is compatible with a theory of minimum sustainable environmental performance that may be developed through backcasting from defined energy and GHG emissions objectives. The proposed approach will hopefully allow development of sustainable refurbishment objectives that can support the choice of refurbishment investments.

This book explains why it is important to identify legally accepted corruption and provides a series of examples of corruption using this perspective. It argues that political corruption is the exclusion of those who are affected by a particular policy and that democratic inclusion and engagement are central to public integrity.