Suchergebnisse

Disappointing' is the word Tunisian actors most frequently use to describe the European response to the Tunisian revolution so far. Drawing from extensive interviews with key Tunisian actors, this brief examines the reasons for this disappointment. Not all is bleak; some aspects of the European response have won appreciation from Tunisians. But criticism exceeds appreciation of what the EU has done so far. Not all Tunisian criticism of the EU may be entirely fair; a large share is directed mainly at individual European states. But this report offers pointers that policy-makers should heed, on where Tunisians would like to see improvement in their relations with the Union. ; peer-reviewed

The conflict in Western Sahara has been simmering since 1975 and has been on the UN Security Council agenda for over twenty years. Autonomy as a solution to the Western Saharan conflict has been floating around for decades and in 2007, Morocco officially offered the territory autonomy within the borders of the Moroccan state. This proposal is supported by key international players, including France and the US, which have long-standing ties with Morocco and perceive an independent Western Sahara as a potentially weak state. Even western states sensitive to the Western Saharan cause such as Spain have shown enthusiasm for the autonomy idea which is also in line with conflict resolution practices since the end of the cold war. The idea is staunchly opposed by Polisario, (the Western Saharan independence movement), and by its allies among African states (primarily Algeria) and within Western civil society. This opposition to autonomy is founded on the principle of the right to self-determination for the Western Saharan population. ; peer-reviewed

https://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/opinion/democratic-values-and-cosy-relationships-in-north-africa/ ; The EU has done little in the past to further democracy in North Africa, writes Anna Khakee of Madrid-based think-tank FRIDE in an exclusive commentary for EurActiv. If Europe wants to avoid future embarrassment, it has to give up the close ties some of its politicians have had with the North African elite, she argues. ; non peer-reviewed

This report is FRIDE's contribution to a project entitled 'Assessing Democracy Assistance' that is being carried out by the World Movement for Democracy. The project aims to gather views on how democracy support can be improved and its impact enhanced. Other case studies and a synthesis report can be found at www.fride.org. ; peer-reviewed

It is widely agreed that, at present, states and societies face a number of complex (and partly new) threats and challenges, including pandemics, terrorist attacks, transnational organised crime, sudden and large scale population flows, as well as natural catastrophes resulting from global warming. Political leaders often do not know how to tackle such multi-faceted and unfamiliar challenges, in particular if they emerge suddenly and take on large proportions. As a consequence, the reflex of resorting to emergency powers – i.e. to grant the government extraordinary powers beyond its normal constitutional role – can be strong in such situations. Declaring a state of exception does, however, come at a cost. In the past, emergency powers have virtually always implied limits on individual human rights and, while intended to secure the survival of the state, such extensive executive powers have not always secured the survival of democracy. In other words, the risk of an undermining of the state's constitutional order, and in particular the role of parliament, the judiciary and other oversight bodies, always looms. ; peer-reviewed

In recent years, both the EU and its member states have paid allegiance to the goal of democracy and good governance in Nigeria. Like elsewhere in Africa, this pursuit - last reiterated at the recent EU-Africa summit of December 2007 - has met with limited success, as the recent, fundamentally flawed Nigerian presidential, parliamentary and state elections testify. This study examines how European democracy promotion has played out in Nigeria. In practice, to what extent has democracy been important for EU-Nigeria relations? How have EU countries and institutions worked on the ground to promote good governance? How is European democracy promotion perceived in Nigeria? After the debacle of the Nigerian elections of April-May 2007, in which the EU had invested heavily,where do EU-Nigeria relations stand? What, if any, has been the value added by EU monitoring of these elections? ; peer-reviewed

En los últimos años, la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros se han comprometido con la promoción de la democracia y del buen gobierno (good governance) en Nigeria.1 Al igual que en el resto de África, el éxito de este propósito, reiterado por última vez en la cumbre UE-África de diciembre de 2007,ha sido limitado como reflejan las últimas elecciones parlamentarias y presidenciales en Nigeria. Este estudio examina la influen- cia que las políticas de la promoción de la democracia de la UE han tenido en Nigeria, analizando las siguien- tes cuestiones: ¿hasta qué punto ha sido importante la democracia para las relaciones entre la UE y Nigeria?, ¿qué medidas han tomado las instituciones y países de la UE para promover la buena gobernabilidad?, ¿cómo se percibe en Nigeria el fomento de la democracia europea? . Asimismo, tras la debacle de las elecciones de abril/mayo de 2007 en Nigeria en las que la UE había invertido significativamente ,¿en qué situación se encuentran las relaciones UE/Nigeria?, y ¿qué ha apor- tado, si es que ha contribuido en algo, la supervisión de la UE en laselecciones? ; peer-reviewed

Following the format established in Small Arms Survey 2004, this chapter provides an annual update of the authorized trade in small arms and light weapons. It looks in detail at the major reported exporters and importers, their trading partners, and the types of small arms exchanged. As in previous years, our understanding of the trade remains partial, for several reasons. Data on exports and imports is still limited for certain countries and certain types of small arms; it is at times difficult to interpret, so that many contradictions remain; and there is a time lag in reporting (for many of the calculations in this chapter, we have had to rely on data covering 2002). The Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer, introduced in Small Arms Survey 2004, is therefore an important tool for assessing and promoting transparency. This chapter contains an update of the Barometer, taking into account the evolution of national small arms export reporting in 2004. ; peer-reviewed

International illicit arms transfers to conflict and war zones often display features characteristic of newsworthy stories. They tend to involve shady, greedy dealers and financiers with Hollywood-type lifestyles; suspicious means of transport, with airplane registrations being changed mid-flight and jets sometimes touching down on tarmac in the middle of the jungle; and disturbingly ruthless recipients. Some cases embroil politicians and other public figures. No wonder, then, that the media are particularly eager to cover this aspect of the small arms problem. Given the intense political debates about whether to supply arms and ammunition to areas of conflict, researchers and analysts also devote substantial attention to this issue. The dynamics at work here are complex: states are pitted against religious and human rights groups; exporter states confront states that refuse to authorize particular deals; peace activists denounce gun manufacturers; and so on. Many NGOs, some intergovernmental organizations, and cer- tain governments have reported on transfers of arms—including small arms and light weapons — to various conflict zones, some of them under arms embargo. These reports provide invaluable insight into individual transfers of weapons as well as transfer patterns to particular conflict zones. Much of the writing concentrates on large international transfers to conflict regions—such as those involving many hundreds of weapons or millions of rounds of ammunition. ; peer-reviewed

In late 2003, human rights organizations brought a case against the British government's arms sales (including small arms sales) to Indonesia. They argued that these exports violated the UK export criteria, as there was a 'patent' risk that the weapons would be used for internal repression (Norton-Taylor and Agionby, 2003). This incident illustrates that much controversy still surrounds the issue of arms sales to countries where serious human rights violations take place, something that this chapter also shows. Previous editions of the Small Arms Survey tried to identify main exporters and importers of small arms,1 to examine the level of transparency in the small arms trade,2 and to explore the links between legal and illicit arms transfers. This chapter continues to follow developments in the small arms and light weapons trade and state transparency. However, it does so in a slightly different way than in previous years. For the first time, it contains extensive listings of both main importers and exporters, with their most important trading partners and principal categories of weapons traded. The section on main exporters also systematically compares data from different sources (customs data and national reports on exports of military goods). The comparison shows that we are still far from a clear and coherent picture of the authorized trade in small arms. This is an important reason for introducing a second novelty: the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer. The barometer assesses the transparency of the main exporting states on a 20-point scale. It will be a recurrent feature of the Small Arms Survey. In subsequent editions, it should thus be possible to assess to what extent individual states are becoming more or less transparent over time, and hence whether we are moving towards a clearer picture of the authorized trade. As noted in previous editions of the Small Arms Survey, a good understanding of the legal (or authorized) trade is crucial for understanding the illicit market. ; peer-reviewed

If a single question has been at the center of the political economy of transition, it is this: How does democracy affect the chances of successful market reforms? In recent years, this question has been given a more specific bent. Why does it seem that, contrary to early - far from fanciful - predictions by a number of distinguished scholars, democracy and progress of economic reforms go together in Central and Eastern European countries? ; peer-reviewed