When news matters: media effects on public support for European Union enlargement in 21 countries
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 50, Heft 5, S. 691-708
ISSN: 0021-9886
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In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 50, Heft 5, S. 691-708
ISSN: 0021-9886
World Affairs Online
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 3-19
ISSN: 1741-2757
Recent studies have shown that the most important factor explaining opinions on European Union issues is attitudes towards immigrants. Two arguments are given to explain this effect. We contend that these arguments are both built on the idea that people with anti-immigrant attitudes frame other Europeans as an out-group. We then test the validity of these arguments by measuring how respondents in a voter survey frame the issue of Turkish membership. We find that framing the issue in terms of out-groups indeed mediates the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on support for Turkish membership. This finding offers new insights into why levels of public support vary over different EU issues, because opposition is likely to increase when an issue is more easily framed in terms of out-groups.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 3-20
ISSN: 1465-1165
In: International journal of public opinion research, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 480-501
ISSN: 1471-6909
In: Communication research, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 582-607
ISSN: 1552-3810
We build on studies on integration and message effectiveness to test whether narrative versus statistical evidence is more effective in promoting openness to Western European norms among different subgroups of Muslim immigrants. We draw on an experiment in which Muslim immigrants living in the Netherlands ( N = 454) saw narrative or statistical messages about gender equality, sexual minority rights, and secularism in public life. We find that the Dutch-born were more receptive to a narrative, while statistical messages generated greater openness to the tested norms among those born in Muslim countries. We interpret these findings in light of different cultural orientations. The study offers a first step toward a framework for understanding evidence effectiveness in multiethnic societies.
In: Political behavior, Band 43, Heft 3, S. 1265-1287
ISSN: 1573-6687
AbstractAffective polarization is a key concern in America and other democracies. Although past evidence suggests some ways to minimize it, there are no easily applicable interventions that have been found to work in the increasingly polarized climate. This project examines whether irrelevant factors, or incidental happiness more specifically, have the power to reduce affective polarization (i.e., misattribution of affect or "carryover effect"). On the flip side, happiness can minimize systematic processing, thus enhancing beliefs in conspiracy theories and impeding individual ability to recognize deep fakes. Three preregistered survey experiments in the US, Poland, and the Netherlands (total N = 3611) induced happiness in three distinct ways. Happiness had no effects on affective polarization toward political outgroups and hostility toward various divisive social groups, and also on endorsement of conspiracy theories and beliefs that a deep fake was real. Two additional studies in the US and Poland (total N = 2220), also induced anger and anxiety, confirming that all these incidental emotions had null effects. These findings, which emerged uniformly in three different countries, among different partisan and ideological groups, and for those for whom the inductions were differently effective, underscore the stability of outgroup attitudes in contemporary America and other countries.
In: Yu , X , Wojcieszak , M , Lee , S , Casas , A , Azrout , R & Gackowski , T 2021 , ' The (Null) Effects of Happiness on Affective Polarization, Conspiracy Endorsement, and Deep Fake Recognition : Evidence from Five Survey Experiments in Three Countries ' , Political Behavior , vol. 43 , no. 3 , pp. 1265-1287 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09701-1
Affective polarization is a key concern in America and other democracies. Although past evidence suggests some ways to minimize it, there are no easily applicable interventions that have been found to work in the increasingly polarized climate. This project examines whether irrelevant factors, or incidental happiness more specifically, have the power to reduce affective polarization (i.e., misattribution of affect or "carryover effect"). On the flip side, happiness can minimize systematic processing, thus enhancing beliefs in conspiracy theories and impeding individual ability to recognize deep fakes. Three preregistered survey experiments in the US, Poland, and the Netherlands (total N = 3611) induced happiness in three distinct ways. Happiness had no effects on affective polarization toward political outgroups and hostility toward various divisive social groups, and also on endorsement of conspiracy theories and beliefs that a deep fake was real. Two additional studies in the US and Poland (total N = 2220), also induced anger and anxiety, confirming that all these incidental emotions had null effects. These findings, which emerged uniformly in three different countries, among different partisan and ideological groups, and for those for whom the inductions were differently effective, underscore the stability of outgroup attitudes in contemporary America and other countries.
BASE
In: Democratization, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 414-433
ISSN: 1743-890X
Conventional wisdom dictates that the more citizens lean towards either end of the ideological spectrum, the lower their support for democracy. The main model pitted against this "rigidity-of-the-extremes model" is the "rigidity-of-the-right model". This model assumes that rightist citizens are less supportive. This study proposes and empirically demonstrates the validity of an alternative model, which we call "the authoritarian legacy model". This model predicts that whether leftist or rightist citizens are less supportive of democracy depends on countries' experience with left- or right-authoritarianism. To evaluate its validity, we present a systematic comparative investigation of the relation between citizens' ideological and democratic beliefs, using European and World Values Survey data from 38 European countries (N = 105,495; 1994-2008). In line with this model, our analyses demonstrate that democratic support is lowest among leftist citizens in former left-authoritarian countries and among rightist citizens in former right-authoritarian countries. We find that this relation persists even among generations that grew up after authoritarian rule. These findings suggest that traditional ideological rigidity models are unsuitable for the study of citizens' democratic beliefs.
In: Democratization, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 414-433
ISSN: 1743-890X
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 44-62
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 608-629
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 608-629
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 52, Heft 5, S. 608-629
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractNews about the European Union (EU) looks different in different countries at different points in time. This study investigates explanations for cross‐national and over‐time variation in news media coverage of EU affairs drawing on large‐scale media content analyses of newspapers and television news in the EU‐15 (1999), EU‐25 (2004) and EU‐27 (2009) in relation to European Parliament (EP) elections. The analyses focus in particular on explanatory factors pertaining to media characteristics and the political elites. Results show that national elites play an important role for the coverage of EU matters during EP election campaigns. The more strongly national parties are divided about the EU in combination with overall more negative positions towards the EU, the more visible the news. Also, increases in EU news visibility from one election to the next and the Europeanness of the news are determined by a country's elite positions. The findings are discussed in light of the EU's alleged communication deficit.
In: Journal of political marketing: political campaigns in the new millennium, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 8-28
ISSN: 1537-7865
In: Journal of political marketing: political campaigns in the new millennium, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 100-120
ISSN: 1537-7865