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Public perceptions are well established as a key factor in support for climate change mitigation policies, and they tend to vary both within and between countries. Based on data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (N = 44,387), we examined the role of climate change beliefs and political orientation in explaining worry about climate change across 23 countries. We show that belief in anthropogenic climate change, followed by expectations of negative impacts from climate change, are the strongest predictors of worry about climate change. While the strength of the association between political orientation and worry about climate change varies across countries, self-positioning further to the right of the political spectrum is associated with lower levels of worry in most of the countries included in the analysis. We further show that political orientation moderates the relationship between climate change beliefs and worry. While increased confidence in the anthropogenic nature of climate change and expectations of negative impacts are both associated with increased worry across the political spectrum, the relationship is weaker among right-leaning as compared to left-leaning individuals. Notably, the main effect of political orientation on worry about climate change is no longer statistically significant when the interaction terms are present. Finally, a relatively small amount of the explained variance in worry is attributable to differences between countries. The findings might inform strategies for climate change communication in a European context.

There is now an extensive literature on the question of how individual-level factors affect climate change perceptions, showing that socio-political variables, notably values, worldviews and political orientation, are key factors alongside demographic variables. Yet little is known about cross-national differences in these effects, as most studies have been conducted in a single or small number of countries and cross-study comparisons are difficult due to different conceptualisations of key climate change dimensions. Using data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (n = 44,387), we examine how key socio-political and demographic factors are associated with climate change perception across 22 European countries and Israel. We show that human values and political orientation are important predictors of climate change beliefs and concern, as are the demographics of gender, age, and education. Certain associations with climate change perceptions, such as the ones for the self-transcendence versus self-enhancement value dimension, political orientation, and education, are more consistent across countries than for gender and age. However, even if the direction of the associations are to a large extent consistent, the sizes of the effects are not. We demonstrate that the sizes of the effects are generally smaller in Central and Eastern European countries, and that some demographic effects are larger in Northern European as compared to Western European countries. This suggests that findings from one country do not always generalize to other national contexts.

Do voters for different parties have distinct climate attitudes because of their positions on other issues? With European Social Survey (ESS) data, we find that in Western (but not Central and Eastern) Europe there is a linkage between left-right self-placement and climate attitudes that cannot be accounted for by economic egalitarianism or liberal cultural attitudes. That linkage partly but not fully accounts for why voters for different party families have different beliefs and worries about climate change. Green party voters are more climate conscious than other voters with similar left-wing identities and political values. Not only Populist-Right but also mainstream Conservative party-family voters are less worried about climate change than their left-right orientations and other political values suggest. While Western European countries nearly all follow the same pattern, there is no consistent structure in Central and Eastern European countries. Across Europe non-voters are less worried about climate change than voters.

Using survey data, the authors developed an architecture of climate change beliefs in Norway and their correlation with support for policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. A strong majority of respondents believe that anthropogenic climate change is occurring and identify carbon dioxide emissions as a cause. Regression analysis shows that respondents recognize the effectiveness of direct actions that require difficult trade-offs, such as imposing a carbon tax. Yet, their voting intentions suggest a preference for policies that have at best an indirect effect on reducing climate change. Most respondents favor policy options that are generally good for the environment and cause no personal hardship. The disconnection between perceptions about the effectiveness of direct actions and support for less effective mitigation approaches may reflect the respondents' collective distancing from the problem of climate change. This could be an important consideration in the design of communication strategies that promote emission abatement policies.

There are differences across Europe in elements of climate citizenship, including climate concern, perceived responsibility, and willingness to support and take climate action. This paper examines how individual-level climate perceptions correspond to a country's contribution to climate change and its ability to develop climate policies. Data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (23 European countries, n = 44,387) was used to explore how national-level factors (affluence as per capita GDP, carbon emissions as per capita CO2 emissions, and democracy as electoral democracy index) are related to individual-level climate perceptions (climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and personal climate action). The analysis shows that the studied individual-level perceptions are all linked, and that perceived climate responsibility is a factor that helps in understanding how individual-level climate views are connected. Further, national-level affluence and democracy are connected to stronger individual-level perceptions both directly and through mediating their connections. Our results suggest that achieving ambitious climate policy targets in Europe could benefit from focusing on the role of perceived climate responsibility in boosting policy support and action. Moreover, the connection between national-level (democratic and economic) factors and public climate perceptions emphasises the need to place climate policies in a wider context. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

There are differences across Europe in elements of climate citizenship, including climate concern, perceived responsibility, and willingness to support and take climate action. This paper examines how individual-level climate perceptions correspond to a country's contribution to climate change and its ability to develop climate policies. Data from the European Social Survey Round 8 (23 European countries, n = 44,387) was used to explore how national-level factors (affluence as per capita GDP, carbon emissions as per capita CO2 emissions, and democracy as electoral democracy index) are related to individual-level climate perceptions (climate concern, perceived climate responsibility, climate policy support, and personal climate action). The analysis shows that the studied individual-level perceptions are all linked, and that perceived climate responsibility is a factor that helps in understanding how individual-level climate views are connected. Further, national-level affluence and democracy are connected to stronger individual-level perceptions both directly and through mediating their connections. Our results suggest that achieving ambitious climate policy targets in Europe could benefit from focusing on the role of perceived climate responsibility in boosting policy support and action. Moreover, the connection between national-level (democratic and economic) factors and public climate perceptions emphasises the need to place climate policies in a wider context.

International audience ; Energy systems across the world must undergo a fundamental transformation towards the use of low-carbon energy sources and technologies in order to reduce global CO2 emissions. While nuclear energy has historically been highly controversial, especially among people concerned about the environment, some voices have begun to suggest that nuclear energy should be reconsidered as an energy source, to help mitigate climate change.In this study we explore the relationship between climate change concern and public perceptions of nuclear energy, using representative survey data (n = 4048) from four key energy-producing European countries (France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom). After constructing a climate-change concern index and applying multiple linear regression models, we find that climate change concern is associated with more negative perceptions of nuclear energy in all four countries. These negative associations remain when we control for political orientation, gender, age, and education. Thus, a stable pattern of disapproval of nuclear energy among people concerned about climate change seems to exist independently of national contexts. This result casts into doubt the prospect that broad public support could rapidly emerge for the use (or the increasing use) of nuclear energy as a means to ensure reduced carbon emissions.

International audience ; Energy systems across the world must undergo a fundamental transformation towards the use of low-carbon energy sources and technologies in order to reduce global CO2 emissions. While nuclear energy has historically been highly controversial, especially among people concerned about the environment, some voices have begun to suggest that nuclear energy should be reconsidered as an energy source, to help mitigate climate change.In this study we explore the relationship between climate change concern and public perceptions of nuclear energy, using representative survey data (n = 4048) from four key energy-producing European countries (France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom). After constructing a climate-change concern index and applying multiple linear regression models, we find that climate change concern is associated with more negative perceptions of nuclear energy in all four countries. These negative associations remain when we control for political orientation, gender, age, and education. Thus, a stable pattern of disapproval of nuclear energy among people concerned about climate change seems to exist independently of national contexts. This result casts into doubt the prospect that broad public support could rapidly emerge for the use (or the increasing use) of nuclear energy as a means to ensure reduced carbon emissions.

International audience ; Energy systems across the world must undergo a fundamental transformation towards the use of low-carbon energy sources and technologies in order to reduce global CO2 emissions. While nuclear energy has historically been highly controversial, especially among people concerned about the environment, some voices have begun to suggest that nuclear energy should be reconsidered as an energy source, to help mitigate climate change.In this study we explore the relationship between climate change concern and public perceptions of nuclear energy, using representative survey data (n = 4048) from four key energy-producing European countries (France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom). After constructing a climate-change concern index and applying multiple linear regression models, we find that climate change concern is associated with more negative perceptions of nuclear energy in all four countries. These negative associations remain when we control for political orientation, gender, age, and education. Thus, a stable pattern of disapproval of nuclear energy among people concerned about climate change seems to exist independently of national contexts. This result casts into doubt the prospect that broad public support could rapidly emerge for the use (or the increasing use) of nuclear energy as a means to ensure reduced carbon emissions.

Emergent properties of global political culture were examined using data from the World History Survey (WHS) involving 6,902 university students in 37 countries evaluating 40 figures from world history. Multidimensional scaling and factor analysis techniques found only limited forms of universality in evaluations across Western, Catholic/Orthodox, Muslim, and Asian country clusters. The highest consensus across cultures involved scientific innovators, with Einstein having the most positive evaluation overall. Peaceful humanitarians like Mother Theresa and Gandhi followed. There was much less cross-cultural consistency in the evaluation of negative figures, led by Hitler, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein. After more traditional empirical methods (e.g., factor analysis) failed to identify meaningful cross-cultural patterns, Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) was used to identify four global representational profiles: Secular and Religious Idealists were overwhelmingly prevalent in Christian countries, and Political Realists were common in Muslim and Asian countries. We discuss possible consequences and interpretations of these different representational profiles. ; This research was supported by grant RG016-P-10 from the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (http://www.cckf.org.tw/). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the ...