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AbstractInter‐municipal cooperation is often regarded as an alternative to privatizing local public services. But cooperation and privatization can also be combined into a dual reform package in which several municipalities jointly issue contracts relating to multiple jurisdictions. Evaluation of these mixed cooperation‐privatization reforms rests on disentangling the separate and combined effects of each strategy. This we undertake for the case of solid waste collection in Catalonia, using environmental protection as our focal performance standard. Drawing on two waves of data (for 2000 and 2019) for 186 municipalities that together use all four combinations of public, private, single and cooperative service delivery, we show that superior environmental performance was initially confined to conventional cooperations involving only public production. But latterly, any form of cooperation, using public or private production, resulted in significant gains. This reinforces the need for evaluators to isolate the "active ingredient" in composite reforms.

Inter-municipal cooperation in public service delivery has attracted the interest of local authorities seeking to reform public service provision. Cost saving, together with better quality and coordination, has been among the most important drivers of such cooperation. However, the empirical results on inter-municipal cooperation and its associated costs offer divergent outcomes. By conducting a meta-regression analysis, we seek to explain this discrepancy. We formulate several hypotheses regarding scale economies, transaction costs, and governance of cooperation. While we find no clear indications of the role played by transaction costs in the relationship between cooperation and service delivery costs, we find strong evidence that population size and governance are significant in explaining the relationship. Specifically, small populations and delegation to a higher tier of government seem to offer cost advantages to cooperating municipalities. As an extension of our model, we seek to disentangle service-related transaction costs based on asset specificity and ease of measurability of the service.

Several countries have experienced lengthy periods of government formation deadlock in recent years, as they have sought to form a new government. This study examines whether government formation deadlocks damage a country's economy. To do so, we analyze the case of Belgium, which took a record 541 days to create a post‐election government, following the June 2010 federal elections. Employing the synthetic control method, our results show that the Belgium economy did not suffer an economic toll; on the contrary, gross domestic product per capita growth was higher than would have otherwise been expected. As such, our evidence contradicts frequent claims that long periods of government formation deadlock negatively affect an economy.

AbstractAcademics and policymakers are increasingly shifting the debate concerning the best form of public service provision beyond the traditional dilemma between pure public and pure private delivery modes, because, among other reasons, there is a growing body of evidence that casts doubt on the existence of systematic cost savings from privatization, while any competition seems to be eroded over time. In this paper, we compare the relative merits of public and private delivery within a mixed delivery system. We study the role played by ownership, transaction costs, and competition on local public service delivery within the same jurisdiction. Using a stochastic cost frontier, we analyze the public‐private urban bus system in the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. We find that private firms have higher delivery costs than those incurred by the public firm, especially when transaction costs are taken into account. Furthermore, tenders tend to decrease delivery costs.