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Some twenty years ago, Richard F. Fenno, Jr. published The Senate Through the Looking Glass a particularly illuminating and trenchant assessment of the state of the Senate. Listening to senators debate whether to allow television cameras into the chamber, Fenno concluded that the Senate was still capable of thoughtful deliberation and consensual decision-making. In this article, I take a Fenno-inspired peek through the looking glass at the contemporary Senate, using a recent parliamentary dispute to probe senators views about their institution. The view is unusually dark. Two decades after Fennos assessment, rising partisanship has made the Senate nearly ungovernable leaving a chamber that struggles to fulfill its most basic constitutional duties. Adapted from the source document.

Chiou and Rothenberg raise important questions about how to measure key concepts in the study of legislative stalemate in the U.S. Congress. In challenging my choice of measures to capture bicameral differences, Chiou and Rothenberg argue that my findings are the artifact of measurement error. In this reply, I review the hurdles involved in measuring policy views over time and across institutions and suggest that the preferred measure of Chiou and Rothenberg falls short for measuring bicameral differences. Second, I assess the extent to which measurement choices affect the robustness of my findings about the determinants of gridlock. Drawing on new measures and model specifications, I show that my results are robust to alternative specifications. I conclude with an assessment of the broader challenges posed by how we measure critical concepts in the study of congressional performance.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Senate's practice of advice and consent today is the deference accorded home state senators in reviewing presidential appointments to the federal bench. Although the Constitution calls for the advice and consent of the Senate body, informal norms of the Senate provide home state senators with a potential veto of nominations to fill federal judgeships within their states. One norm—senatorial courtesy—historically ensured that senators would defer to the views of the home state senator from the president's party. Another practice—the Senate "blue slip"—allocates special procedural rights to both home state senators regardless of political party. A single objection from a home state senator from either party has historically been considered sufficient to defeat confirmation of a nominee. The blue slip also allows home state senators to influence the course of nominations prospectively—encouraging presidents to heed the preferences of home state senators in selecting new federal judges.

Explores the origins of the "blue slip" which is sent to senators of nominees for federal judgeships within their state to elicit opinions about the candidate. An objection from a home-state senator has traditionally been enough to defeat a nominee's confirmation. It has been suggested that the blue slip was introduced as a "power play" by senators seeking political advantage; a way to reduce electoral uncertainty; a form of intra-party competition; &/or a mechanism to better predict a nominee's confirmation prospects. A comparison of these competing accounts with senate archival records leads to the conclusion that there is little evidence so support the idea that the blue slip was originally intended to intentionally undermine the influence of either the president's party or the composition of the judiciary. Rather, it seems that the power of the blue slip evolved as an unintended consequence of an effort to decrease uncertainty about the confirmation prospects of judicial appointments. The implications for understandings of how political institutions evolve are discussed. Figures. J. Lindroth

Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median‐voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median‐voter model may be time‐bound to the twentieth century—after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.

A contribution to a symposium, "Ten Years from Now," predicts that the Republican government is unlikely to last uninterrupted over the next decade in spite of the South's transformation from "blue" to "red," redistricting that has favored Republicans, & a decline in ticket-splitting districts. The consistent gains made by Congressional Republicans since the 1994 midterm elections are examined, along with the implications of the extremely narrow Republican presidential margins; & the possibility that overreaching on the part of slim majorities could cost Republicans control of the House or Senate. The decrease in centrist Republicans is bound to produce more ideologically polarized outcomes that do not reflect the preferences of most constituents. Procedural tactics like using multiple reconciliation bills to prevent Democratic filibusters or threatening to ban filibusters on judicial nominations in spite of a disapproving public have the potential to cost Republicans control of Congress. It is concluded that moderate publics are unlikely to sustain unified Republican rule over the next decade. Adapted from the source document.