Suchergebnisse

NUCLEAR ARMS NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE SUCCESSFUL ONLY IF BOTH SIDES AGREE NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE ONE USE ONLY: TO DETER THEIR USE BY OTHERS. BUT US DEFENCE GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS TELL ANOTHER STORY, DISCUSSING THE GOAL OF PREVAILING IN A NUCLEAR WAR, AND SPECULATING ON A TERMINATION FAVOURABLE TO THE US. BOTH SIDES ALSO BELIEVE THAT MILITARY SUPERIORTY BRINGS GREAT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE: A VIEW WHICH IS VERY DANGEROUS.

AS BOTH SIDES BUILD UP ARMS THEY BEGIN TO THINK IN TERMS OTHER THAN THOSE OF BASIC DETERRENCE: THEY LOOK FOR SOME ADDITIONAL RETURN FOR THEIR INVESTMENTS IN THE WEAPONS. THUS THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY TO SEEK PREPONDERACE WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. THOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT EITHER SIDE WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, BECAUSE OF SUPERIORITY IN ARMS, BUT THE IDEA PERSISTS. ARMS BUILDUPS OFTEN GIVE RISE TO THE DOCTRINES WHICH JUSTIFY THEM.

THIS SECTION DISCUSSES THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH SIPRI HAS IN COMING UP WITH INFORMATION AND STATISTICS ON THE WORLD ARMS TRADE. INFORMATION ON ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENTS ARE FOUND TO ORIGINATE FROM THE SUPPLYING FIRMS, THE SUPPLYING GOVERNMENTS, THE RECEIVING GOVERNMENTS, AND VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS. THE MAIN THEME OF THIS EFFORT STILL MUST BE THE INADEQUACY OF ANY STATISTICAL PICTURE OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE WORLD'S MILITARY SECTOR.

THIS SECTION EXAMINES THE BASIC CONFLICT OF SECURITY INTERESTED BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE WHICH CONTINUES TO CAUSE FRICTION IN THE NATO ALLIANCE. NO TECHNOLOGICAL FIX CAN RESTORE THE COUPLING BETWEEN NATO AND US FORCES. THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPIANCY BETWEEN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF NATO AND ITS FORCE POSTURE GIVES CAUSE TO FEAR RESORT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE COMMINGLING OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES ALSO MAKES THE EARLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MORE LIKELY.

THIS SECTION ARGUES THAT IF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD IS CROSSED A SELECTIVE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS WILL BE HARD TO IMAGINE. NATO HAS NEVER AGREED ON GUIDELINES FOR A FOLLOW-ON ACTION IN CASE OF INITIAL USE, AND UNDER THE STRESS OF WAR THE US MAY OVERRULE EUROPEAN ANXIETIES AND RESORT TO NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING. THE STRONGER THE BELIEF THAT A NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE LIMITED, THE GREATER THE LIKELIHOOD THAT IT WILL BE INITIATED.

THIS SECTION EXAMINES THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED LEGAL ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A NATION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND COUNTERARGUMENTS BY SOME INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS THAT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PER SE VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS THE RULE EMBODIED IN THE 1907 HAGUE CONVENTION ON LAND WARFARE THAT THE RIGHT OF BELLIGERENTS TO INJURE THE ENEMEY IS NOT UNLIMITED. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF CONSIDERATIONS FOLLOWING FROM THIS POINT IS THAT NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE INITIATED WITH OBEDIENCE TO THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SHOULD ANY NATION EVER CONSIDER THAT IT HAS THE RIGHT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS? MORE SPECIFICALLY, SHOULD NATO CHANGE ITS EXISTING STRATEGY OF 'FLEXIBLE RESPONSE', WHICH ALLOWS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF RESPONDING TO A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS? THE DEBATE ON THESE ISSUES IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS. A FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS COME UNDER CHALLENGE FROM MANY DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS: FROM CHURCH SYNODS, FROM INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS, IN DEBATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND FROM STRATEGIC THINKERS.

Few industries can have had such a reversal of expectations in so short a time as the coal industry. In April 1956 the National Coal Board, looking at the prospects for the next ten years, could say confidently: 'Even in the longer term, the problem of over-production for the coal industry can scarcely arise'. Over the next four years, total coal production fell 7 per cent, and coal stocks more than doubled.