Social Incentives in Organizations
In: Annual Review of Economics, Band 10, S. 439-463
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In: Annual Review of Economics, Band 10, S. 439-463
SSRN
In: American economic review, Band 107, Heft 5, S. 70-75
ISSN: 1944-7981
To understand altruistic behavior, we must understand the process through which altruism develops and is shaped by the agents' own choices and exogenous factors. We introduce the concept of altruistic capital, which grows with effort devoted to altruistic acts and facilitates future altruism. We illustrate its potential use in the context of banking and conclude by showing that returns to altruistic effort shape the agent's choices and are shaped by external events such as the financial crisis.
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 116, Heft 514, S. 869-902
ISSN: 1468-0297
SSRN
Working paper
In: Revista brasileira de politica internacional, Band 43, Heft 2, S. 150-169
ISSN: 0034-7329
In: The Journal of social psychology, Band 85, Heft 2, S. 219-224
ISSN: 1940-1183
In: Journal of international economics, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 197-215
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Journal of development economics, Band 77, Heft 2, S. 341-366
ISSN: 0304-3878
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 102, S. 23-47
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 120, Heft 549, S. 1365-1398
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 4, S. 1278-1308
ISSN: 1944-7981
We propose a distinction between active and passive waste as determinants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public decision maker, whereas passive waste does not. We analyze purchases of standardized goods by Italian public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national procurement agency. We find that: (i) some public bodies pay systematically more than others for equivalent goods; (ii) differences are correlated with governance structure; (iii) the variation in prices is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste; and (iv) passive waste accounts for 83 percent of total estimated waste. (JEL H11, H57, H83)
In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Band 6, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1682
We document the establishment and evolution of a cooperative norm among workers using evidence from a natural field experiment on a leading UK farm. Workers are paid according to a relative incentive scheme under which increasing individual effort raises a worker's own pay but imposes a negative externality on the pay of all co-workers, thus creating a rationale for cooperation. As a counterfactual, we analyze worker behavior when workers are paid piece rates and thus have no incentive to cooperate.We find that workers cooperate more as their exposure to the relative incentive scheme increases. We also find that individual and group exposure are substitutes, namely workers who work alongside colleagues with higher exposure cooperate more. Shocks to the workforce in the form of new worker arrivals disrupt cooperation in the short term but are then quickly integrated into the norm. Individual exposure, group exposure, and the arrival of new workers have no effect on productivity when workers and paid piece rates and there is no incentive to cooperate.
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 2062
SSRN