Suchergebnisse

In order to strengthen the constitutional process of appointment of judges in Superior Courts, Bangladesh established a Supreme Judicial Commission in 2008 by promulgating an Ordinance. This Ordinance was neither promulgated in pursuance of any provisions of the Constitution nor by introducing any amendment to the provisions of the Constitution. The recommendations of the Commission were not given binding force on the executive. The power of the executive to accept or reject the candidates recommended by the Supreme Judicial Commission at his pleasure defeated the very objective of establishing the Commission for appointing the most competent and suitable persons as judges of the superior courts in Bangladesh. However, following the general elections held on 29 December 2008, the newly elected Government of Bangladesh Awami League dispensed with the Supreme Judicial Commission by not placing the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance before the parliament for its approval. This resulted in restoring the previous system of appointing judges on the satisfaction of the executive, which has resulted in patronage appointments. Thus, the establishment of an independent judicial commission in Bangladesh is an imperative necessity for strengthening the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

1. Human Rights in South Asia during the COVID-19 Pandemic: An Overview -- Part I The COVID-19 Emergency and the Executive Response: Reinforcing the Necessity of Institutional Reforms -- 2. The Executive Response to the COVID-19 Emergency and the Issue of Protecting Rights: The Same Old South Asian Story -- 3. Oversight and Monitoring of Executive Actions in India during the Pandemic: A Case of Absentee Parliament -- 4. Evaluation of the Functioning of the National Human Rights Commissions of India and of Other South Asian Nations during the COVID-19 Pandemic -- 5. Looking beyond Constitutional Institutions during an Emergency: Exploring the Role of the Civil Society in Protecting Rights -- Part II The Adverse Impact of the Pandemic Response on Fundamental Rights -- 6. Criminalisation of Media Reporting on the Government Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh: Freedom of Press in Peril -- 7. Protecting Free Speech and Curbing the Spread of Disinformation in the Age of COVID-19: Did the South Asian Nations Get the Balance Right? -- 8. Right to Health during the Pandemic: A South Asian Perspective -- Part III The Adverse Impact of the Pandemic Response on Socio-Economic Rights -- 9. COVID-19 and the Indian Migrant Workers: Citizens of State or Citizens of Nation -- 10. The Right to Health: Cinderella among the Fundamental Rights and Lessons from COVID-19.

1. Introduction -- 2. General Issues Concerning the Power of Preventive Detention and the Evaluation of this Power under the Federal Constitution of Malaysia -- 3. The Quest for a Standard Preventive Detention Framework -- 4. Preventive Detention Laws in Malaysia & Their Use -- 5. Conclusions and Recommendations.

Introduction -- Challenges of Muslims in Contemporary India -- Demographic Profile of Muslims -- Economic Status of Muslims -- Conditions of Muslims: Findings of a Primary Survey -- Occupational Opportunities in Muslim Neighbourhoods of Hyderabad City -- Educational Condition of Muslims -- Health and Nutrition: Malnutrition and Anaemia -- Health and Nutritional Status: The Context of Muslims -- Migration and Impact of Remittances on Health. .

It is a fundamental feature of parliamentary democracies for parliament to act as a bulwark against executive power so as to ensure the maintenance of the rule of law. In order for parliament to perform its oversight functions, it is imperative that members of parliament enjoy independence from the stranglehold of their political parties while scrutinizing the actions of the executive and deliberating about national issues facing the electorate. In Bangladesh, the founding fathers, in order to avoid the troubling experiences of unprincipled defections of MPs during the past union with Pakistan, which adversely affected the stability of governments, incorporated an anti-defection provision in Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. However, the anti-defection provision contained in the Constitution in endeavoring to curb unprincipled defections has adversely impacted the independence of MPs by compelling them to blindly comply with the directives of their parties in the Parliament, thereby impeding its competence to act as a check on the powers of the executive. Consequently, the current government of Bangladesh Awami League by dint of Article 70 has persuaded the Parliament to incorporate far-reaching amendments in the Constitution, which in turn have enabled the regime to essentially substitute the rule of law with rule of man in violation of the guarantees contained in the Preamble of the Constitution. Thus, the presence of the anti-defection provision in the Constitution has impeded the institutionalization of the Parliament. Accordingly, this Article puts forward concrete recommendations for liberalizing the anti-defection provision contained in Article 70 in order to ensure the maintenance of an appropriate balance between ensuring the stability of the political system against unprincipled defection and of simultaneously safeguarding the independence of MPs to ensure the accountability of the executive branch of government.