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Labelling the 'other' is one of the most relevant aspects in an armed conflict context. Summarising what the opponent is in one single expression is a strong rhetorical tool in any belligerent discourse. The use of the 'terrorist' label assumes a particularly powerful role in such a construction. Employing Ole Wæver's layered discursive structure, this article aims to study the discursive practices and political consequences associated with the use of such labels. The political implications of using the 'terrorist' label in regards to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkish politics will be analysed as an illustrative case study. The period under analysis extends from April 2007 to January 2008, corresponding to the escalation of a security discourse that led to the (brief) Turkish military incursion in northern Iraq in the winter of 2007–2008. The political exposure and intense usage of the 'terrorist' label in this period makes it particularly ripe for understanding the political discursive context that shapes Turkey's policies towards this protracted conflict. The focus on this period also sheds light on the political reasons underlying the intractability of this conflict.

Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 the European Union has been an increasingly important actor in the field of security and defence. However, the defence industries sector has largely been kept away from Brussels. This has usually been justified by the role that national defence industries have traditionally played as fundamental pillars for the survival of the European nation-states, thus making them reluctant to share this "sovereign tool" with the European Union. Nonetheless, recent steps in both the economic (large number of mergers and acquisitions within the European defence industry sector) and the political (security and defence integration measures within the European Union) arenas have contributed to changes in the political discourse on defence industries within the European space. This article aims to explore how the national discourse on defence industries has become interrelated with a European discourse on the topic—a European discourse that mixes some of the old national arguments with particular aspects related to the constant evolution of the European Union towards an ever more coherent regional polity and international actorness. Also analysed is the extent to which this political move puts at risk the European Union's ambitions to promote a better world, based on an alternative understanding of international politics.

Recensão crítica a: Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the Politics by Andrew W. Neal. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. 150 p., ISBN 978-0-415-45675-3 ; Talking to Terrorists. Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country by John Bew, Martyn Frampton and Inigo Gurruchaga. London: Hurst & Co., 2009. 259 p., ISBN 978-1-85065-967-9.

If the majority of Iraq has become a quagmire for Washington, the stable and prosperous North has become a regional problem, especially for Turkey-US relations. Turkey sees the possibility of an independent Kurdish region as a threat to its own territorial integrity and a haven for the PKK militants. The US sees Northern Iraq as the only island of stability in a chaotic context, and the Kurds as their main allies in the country. As both Ankara and Washington assess Northern Iraq within a regional security context it seems appropriate to make use of the Copenhagen School's Regional Security Complex Theory, which underlines the importance of the regional level in security analysis, as well as of its Securitisation theory, which highlights the discourse component in the definition of security threats. With these theories as a background, this paper will focus on the discourses from both Turkey and the United States in order to see how the two securitising processes regarding Northern Iraq developed, how they interplayed and how they were influenced by the regional factor. Due to space and time constrains, the analyses will be limited to a 12-month period (April 2006-2007).

Among all the European Union (EU) peace promotion mechanisms, the enlargement process seem to present the best results. This is due to the way it links non-member states to the possibility of EU membership, which, in hindsight, is the biggest benefit that an unstable, poorly developed state, on the EU borders can have. As peace and stability are compulsory requisites to join the 'club,' any conflict evolving in that country will have the tendency to be solved, at least in theory. This chapter analyses the degree of influence that the enlargement process has been having in the KurdishTurkish conflict, especially up to the re-escalation of the fighting during 2004. It will explain the evolution of the enlargement process, the concrete analysis of the Turkish relation with the EU, and Turkey's Kurdish problem, including its characterization and relation to Turkish security.

It is becoming widely accepted that we have transitioned, or are now transitioning, from an international liberal order to a different reality. Whether that reality is different solely in terms of power dynamics, or also in terms of values and institutions, is up for discussion. The growing body of literature on 'post-liberalism' is used as an entry-point for this article, which aims to explore how the post-liberal transition applies to cyberspace. We explore how power dynamics are evolving in cyberspace, as well as how established norms, values and institutions are contested. The article then looks at the emergence of cyber diplomacy as a consequence and response to the post-liberal transition. As it will be argued, if cyberspace was a creation of the liberal order, cyber-diplomacy is a post-liberal world practice. What role it plays in shaping a new order or building bridges between different political visions, and what it means for the future of cyberspace, will constitute key points of discussion.

AbstractThe last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security actor. The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identified by the EU have led to progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These concerns have often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, however, indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically operationalized, leading to a fragmented security field. This article has two main aims: To devise a framework for the analysis of the EU's coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the cybersecurity field. By focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field or whether this policy is being implemented according to different and unco‐ordinated rationales.

The last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security actor. The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identified by the EU have led to progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These concerns have often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, however, indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically operationalized, leading to a fragmented security field. This article has two main aims: To devise a framework for the analysis of the EU's coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the cybersecurity field. By focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field or whether this policy is being implemented according to different and unco-ordinated rationales.

The last three decades have seen the development of the European Union (EU) as a security actor. The transnational character of the security threats and the challenges identified by the EU have led to progressive integration between internal and external security concerns. These concerns have often led to calls for greater coherence within EU security policies. The literature, however, indicates that this need for coherence has, so far, not been systematically operationalized, leading to a fragmented security field. This article has two main aims: To devise a framework for the analysis of the EU's coherence as a security actor, and to apply it to the cybersecurity field. By focusing on EU cybersecurity policy, this article will explore whether the EU can be considered a coherent actor in this field or whether this policy is being implemented according to different and unco-ordinated rationales.