Suchergebnisse

AbstractUntil the 1980s, financial crises were caused by governments. But thereafter the private sector became the main culprit. The reforms introduced after the Asian crisis of the late 1990s were not properly implemented. Responsibility for financial stability became fragmented and the normal practices of economic diplomacy were abandoned. The crisis of 2007 thus caught governments unawares and obliged them to adopt extreme measures to avoid catastrophe. The decision-making that was associated with these measures gave more power to emerging markets through the G20. It ended the fragmentation of authority and achieved reasonable consistency of national, European and international financial reforms. It introduced stringent new rules in place of regulatory capture. But this progress was fragile: G7 members still tried to control the G20; the new reforms depended on national enforcement; and governments still needed too much from the banks to be able to discipline them completely. This crisis might be over, but it has left the seeds of the next one.

Behind the media hype, what should we expect from the Gleneagles G8 summit? & how far will it answer the critics who say it is an expensive waste of effort? There may be less value in dramatic new initiatives, soon neglected, & more in political encouragement to existing projects, which bear fruit later. Adapted from the source document.