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AbstractThe Covid 19 pandemic has put the issue of public trust at the centre of political analysis. This article inquires into the level of public trust in Sweden concerning current crisis management as well as preparedness for future crises. The empirical basis for this study consists of unique data generated through two surveys on the Covid 19 virus conducted during 2020 in Sweden. Respondents were asked to assess their trust in different actors' crisis management. In addition, the first survey asked about how the actions of different actors impact on the forward‐oriented trust held in Swedish emergency preparedness for a future severe crisis. Four key findings stand out. First, the results display rather weak levels of interpersonal trust. Second, a surprisingly high level of institutional trust can be found during the initial phase of the pandemic. Simultaneously we see somewhat decreasing levels of trust later during the pandemic. The results include interesting variations across age, gender and education. Third, relating the results to earlier research on trust in Sweden, the results contain indications of stable trust levels despite the all but stable contextual conditions. Fourth, the analysis shows important variations in trust levels among different institutions and layers of government.

In 2017, the Swedish government took the initiative to conduct a country­wide information campaign with the aim of informing the citizens on what to do in the event of a serious crisis or war. In this article the effects of this information campaign are studied through a unique panel survey with identical surveys sent out immediately prior to the campaign and two weeks after the campaign. Concerning the effect, the level of responsibility for civil preparedness ascribed to different actors increased after the campaign, including the responsibility of the citizens. This effect is significant. However, the study reveals no significant effect on the lev­ els of trust with the trust in different authorities and their civil preparedness remaining on a mid­level before as well as after the campaign. Moreover, we do not see any general proof of higher risk perceptions or higher fear of threats as a result of the campaign, with the im­ portant exceptions of fear of measures to destabilise democracy and severe power cuts. In the article it is argued that despite current trends of strong individualisation with effects on media consumption and respect for authorities, the Swedish campaign illustrates that it is still possible to reach the greater part of the population with vital information and also, to at least some extent, affect attitudes.

This article utilizes role theory for analysing the role(s) of the European Union (EU) in global politics. Specifically addressing the interplay of the EU's own role perception and the role expectations held by other actors, the article contributes two case studies of the role(s) of the EU in relation to two important but different actor groupings-Eastern Europe including Russia and the ACP countries in the developing world, respectively. The analysis points to the tensions that exist between self-perceptions and the perceptions of the EU's counterparts in Eastern Europe and the developing world, and how these tensions influences the interaction between the actors. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
This article investigates the defence policies of the Nordic and Baltic countries from the perspective of shared security culture. To that end, the article analyses conceptualisations of total defence and resilience in a comparative perspective and inquires into existing and prospective regional cooperation in this area, in order to determine to what degree there exists a common security culture based on shared norms and identities and manifested in practices of security cooperation. The study, which draws on 19 interviews with civil servants from the eight states of the region, shows that while there is fertile ground for a shared security culture to emerge, thus far, due to variations in conceptualisations, threat perceptions, and interaction preferences, only three Nordic states show clear signs of a shared security culture. The study contributes to existing research by situating the concept of resilience in (total) defence discourses; by expanding the theoretical work on security culture to an international context; and by offering a unique empirical account of the process of (re)building total defence policies in a region crucial to European security.

How did the three Nordic European Union member states approach their periods as holders of the European Union (EU) Council Presidency? Two radically different predictions about the impact of the Presidency on member state behaviour can be found in the literature. Some maintain that the position functions as an amplifier, strengthening the already existing tendency to propagate national concerns. Others argue that the Presidency functions as a silencer, subordinating national material interests to the benefit of common European concerns. In this article we analyse the ways in which Finland, Sweden and Denmark actually performed the Presidency role. Which of the competing interpretations is most appropriate? Was the Presidency role performed differently by the three countries? Our main finding is that the Presidency generally functioned as an amplifier during the Nordic presidencies. There are, however, interesting differences between the three states, Denmark being the least constrained in using the Presidency to further national interests whereas Finland was most anxious not to violate norms of impartiality and neutrality, even in cases where such behaviour ran contrary to national interests.