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This paper discusses a number of questions with regard to Sweden's economic and political development: How did Sweden become rich? What explains Sweden's high level of income equality? What were the causes of Sweden's problems from 1970 to 1995? How is it possible that Sweden, since the crisis of the early 1990s, is growing faster than most EU countries despite its high taxes and generous welfare state? These questions are analyzed using recent insights from institutional economics, as well as studies of inequality and economic growth. The main conclusion is that there is little, if any, Swedish exceptionalism: Sweden became rich because of well-functioning capitalist institutions, and inequality was low before the expansion of the welfare state. The recent favorable growth record of Sweden, including the period of financial stress (2008–2010), is a likely outcome of a number of far-reaching structural reforms implemented in the 1980s and 90s.

This article analyses why the concept of quality has become such a central theme in Swedish education policy, and what quality or qualities successive governments have pursued between 1990 and 2010. The analysis is based on a close reading of a collection of policy texts from the late 1980s onwards. With a linguistic and historical perspective, the theoretical approach is inspired by Quentin Skinner (1988a, 1988b) and speech act theory. The study shows that certain "criteria of application" long associated with education have gradually been challenged and partly marginalised by criteria highlighting results and relating to market and system needs. As a consequence it can be argued, with support from speech act theory, that use of the concept of quality has led to an acceptance of new social perceptions in education.

This article analyses why the concept of quality has become such a central theme in Swedish education policy, and what quality or qualities successive governments have pursued between 1990 and 2010. The analysis is based on a close reading of a collection of policy texts from the late 1980s onwards. With a linguistic and historical perspective, the theoretical approach is inspired by Quentin Skinner (1988a, 1988b) and speech act theory. The study shows that certain "criteria of application" long associated with education have gradually been challenged and partly marginalised by criteria highlighting results and relating to market and system needs. As a consequence it can be argued, with support from speech act theory, that use of the concept of quality has led to an acceptance of new social perceptions in education.

Two problems with the method typically used to quantify & evaluate welfare state redistribution -- ie, comparison of income distribution before & after taxes & transfers -- are examined: (1) it cannot account for behavioral responses to welfare programs, & (2) it cannot detect how political mechanisms bias the welfare state in favor of the middle class. These problem are illustrated using the example of Sweden, focusing on middle-class biases in two major components of the welfare state: higher education (through vouchers & public financing) & labor market policies (including pensions, the sickness & unemployment benefits, employment protection laws, work incentives, & taxes). Tables, Figures, References. K. Hyatt Stewart

Objective. The redistributive effect of the welfare state is traditionally measured by comparing the gross and net distribution of annual income among adults. This standard approach does not account for the fact that a large share of the taxes paid by adults are paid back to the very same individuals later in life. The objective of this article is to examine the factors that determine the difference between redistribution according to the standard approach and redistribution of lifetime incomes. I also discuss under what circumstances intra‐individual redistribution is beneficial for low‐income earners.Methods. A formal model of a simple welfare state in a society with low‐ and high‐income earners is used to describe inequality of gross and net income among adults and for complete lifetime incomes. The model is calibrated with data describing the Swedish welfare state.Results. Theoretically, the redistribution of lifetime income can be bigger or smaller than the redistribution indicated by the standard approach. Swedish data suggest that most welfare states are more redistributive when a lifetime perspective is used compared to the standard approach.Conclusions. Most of the redistribution carried out by modern welfare states is so‐called intra‐individual redistribution. Compared to the situation that would arise without the welfare state, intra‐individual redistribution is likely to be favorable for low‐income earners because it compensates for inequalities in the distribution of assets and access to capital markets.

Objective. The redistributive effect of the welfare state is traditionally measured by comparing the gross & net distribution of annual income among adults. This standard approach does not account for the fact that a large share of the taxes paid by adults are paid back to the very same individuals later in life. The objective of this article is to examine the factors that determine the difference between redistribution according to the standard approach & redistribution of lifetime incomes. I also discuss under what circumstances intra-individual redistribution is beneficial for low-income earners. Methods. A formal model of a simple welfare state in a society with low- & high-income earners is used to describe inequality of gross & net income among adults & for complete lifetime incomes. The model is calibrated with data describing the Swedish welfare state. Results. Theoretically, the redistribution of lifetime income can be bigger or smaller than the redistribution indicated by the standard approach. Swedish data suggest that most welfare states are more redistributive when a lifetime perspective is used compared to the standard approach. Conclusions. Most of the redistribution carried out by modern welfare states is so-called intra-individual redistribution. Compared to the situation that would arise without the welfare state, intra-individual redistribution is likely to be favorable for low-income earners because it compensates for inequalities in the distribution of assets & access to capital markets. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

In the existing literature on welfare state typologies, the concept of the universal welfare state is not defined precisely enough to allow for comparisons of universality over time and between countries. In this paper, I discuss some problems with the way the term 'the universal welfare state' has been used and I suggest possible solutions. Among other things, I propose that the term 'universality' be used to describe the provision of a specific welfare benefit independently of individual income and/or other individual characteristics. It should also be used to describe the coverage of welfare benefits rather than their size. Based on the theoretical discussion, a number of possible indicators of universality are applied to the case of Sweden in the 1990s. The conclusion is that, despite its economic crisis, universality in Sweden did not decrease.

AbstractObjectivesThis article aims to find country‐level factors that explain the rise of populist parties in European democracies. While populism is often connected to inequality, we not that right‐wing populist parties tend to thrive on fear, including fear of job loss. If flexible labor markets mean that unemployment is dedramatized because finding a new job is easier, labor market flexibility could dampen populism and inequality may be less important.MethodsWe run country‐level fixed effects regressions on populist party vote shares in 26 European countries from 1980 to 2018. We use two different classifications of right‐wing and left‐wing populist parties and control for employment protection strictness as measured by OECD, Gini coefficients of disposable income, and a large set of control variables.ResultsUnemployment is positively associated with left‐wing populism. Strict employment protection is positively associated with right‐wing populism. Gini inequality of income is unrelated to (both types of) populism.ConclusionStrong employment protection and low‐income inequality may not be the most efficient way to combat right‐wing populism. A strategy that promotes flexible labor markets, and job upgrading may be an alternative. More research on the link between labor market institutions and (in particular, right‐wing) populism is needed.

The large increase in economic inequality and the dismantling of the welfare state in Western democracies has been connected to the rise of populist parties. If populist voting is explained by fear and labor market insecurity and if people care more about procedural fairness than inequality of economic outcomes, national income inequality should be less important than other factors in explaining vote shares of populist parties. Using election results from 33 European countries over the 1980-2018 period, two different classifications of populist parties and three different measures of government/welfare state size, we find no relationship between country-level economic inequality, as measured by the disposable income Gini, and either right-wing or leftwing populism. An alternative hypothesis that right-wing populism is dampened by labor market flexibility and social spending is developed and shown to have empirical support.