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Introduction -- A conceptual framework -- Empirical contextualisation -- Linguistic claims in Spain : education, public space signalisation and audio-visual media -- Comparative analysis across issues and territories -- The European Union : framing linguistic conflicts in Spain? -- Conclusions.

This article discusses how the extension of network governance influences the de facto independence of regulatory agencies. Assuming that agencies gain de facto independence vis-à-vis the government when they experience a substantive increase in their reputation, we argue that agency participation in international governance networks contributes to strengthened agency domestic positions due to organizational learning and the expansion of expert knowledge involved in such interactions. Based on a case study of the Spanish nuclear regulatory agency (Nuclear Safety Council [CSN]), the article highlights how its involvement in international governance networks promoted the agency's de facto independence during the 2000s.

This paper focuses on the significance of regulatory governance at the regional level. In doing so, it analyzes to what extent and how North-South negotiations give rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in the developing world. To what extent do these forms vary across policy areas? Which elements account for the observed differences and similarities? Empirically, the paper explores the negotiation process between the European Union (EU) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which aims to promote trade liberalization on the one hand, and the harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the other. The focus is on the trade and cooperative agendas involved in trade facilitation and education. Findings suggest that the negotiation of North-South agreements impacts on the ways in which different forms of regulatory governance are expressed, but this varies among particular policy issues. Both the type of norm promoted and the capacity building mechanisms envisaged create a particular ideational and material context, all of which in turn affects the actor constellation – type of actor, specific role and network configuration – hence leading to different regulatory governance regimes among policy areas, yet within the same trade negotiation.

This article discusses how the extension of network governance influences the de facto independence of regulatory agencies. Assuming that agencies gain de facto independence vis-à-vis the government when they experience a substantive increase in their reputation, we argue that agency participation in international governance networks contributes to strengthened agency domestic positions due to organizational learning and the expansion of expert knowledge involved in such interactions. Based on a case study of the Spanish nuclear regulatory agency (Nuclear Safety Council [CSN]), the article highlights how its involvement in international governance networks promoted the agency's de facto independence during the 2000s. ; The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Research for this article was funded by a grant from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2012-39693) in the context of the project "The Political Economy of Regulatory Agencies: Accountability, Transparency and Effectiveness (AccountReg) (2013–2015)."

This collection improves our understanding of the problems associated to accountability in regulatory governance, focusing on audiences, controls and responsibilities in the politics of regulation and through a systematic exploration of the various mechanisms through which accountability in regulatory governance. Through a systematic exploration of accountability in regulatory governance, this collection makes a significant contribution to the existing literature on the subject. Chapters authored by a selection of the most influential figures in the field of regulatory governance address how to introduce political and policy accountability to the actors and institutions involved in the policy process, a key issue in relation to regulatory policy legitimacy. Beyond conventional accountability procedures within the political system, the volume discusses the extent to which more specific accountability tools to communicate with more diverse audiences have emerged. The first section introduces a quantitative approach to measure the actual dimensions of accountability instruments already in place within regulatory agencies, while the second utilises comparative approaches, case studies and theoretical discussions which focus on the diverse problems actors and institutions face to make their activities and procedures more accountable to their constituencies and to society as a whole. The final contributions explore the implications that accountability challenges pose to democratic procedures and global governance processes and discuss how accountability, regulatory governance and democracy are related

AbstractState structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies in 115 countries and 17 policy sectors. The dataset contains variables from their institutional profiles, covering a broad range of formal characteristics. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. We also use factor and cluster analyses to assess their various forms, and suggest a typology of agency institutional models to facilitate more precise studies on the regulatory state. Results confirm that the regulatory state shows greater variety than usually expected.

AbstractAre the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability.

Includes supplemental online material: appendix ; Are the board members of regulatory agencies (regulators), taken as a particular cluster within the public sphere, independent of elected politicians and tenured bureaucrats? How can we assess their independence in practice, beyond formal rules? To address these questions, this paper delves into two key dimensions: board members' social connections and their security of tenure in office. Firstly, we focus on regulators' identity as policy adjudicators and examine their political and administrative relations. In doing so, we expect to understand better how regulators' social and political situations may influence their behavior. Secondly, we assess their political vulnerability through political cycles in order to measure their de facto independence over time. Additionally, variations in these two dimensions are compared with respect to the effect of different de jure appointment rules. We contrast these expectations with the empirical evaluation of board members of regulatory agencies in Spain (1979–2010). Thus, we confirm that regulators who have an administrative profile are more vulnerable to political changes than those with political ties, while appointment rules have an influence on their political vulnerability. ; This study was funded by a research grant of the Escola d'Administració Pública de Catalunya (GAP/2944/2010). Support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2009/11053) is acknowledged.

Includes supplemental online material: appendix ; State structures have experienced significant transformation with the spread of globalization. This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. It remains unclear how their configurations vary across countries and sectors, and what can be learned from these variations. To better identify these agencies worldwide, we introduce a new dataset on the institutional features of 799 agencies in 115 countries and 17 policy sectors. The dataset contains variables from their institutional profiles, covering a broad range of formal characteristics. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. We also use factor and cluster analyses to assess their various forms, and suggest a typology of agency institutional models to facilitate more precise studies on the regulatory state. Results confirm that the regulatory state shows greater variety than usually expected.

El sistema internacional atraviesa una etapa de transición, marcada por el debilitamiento del multilateralismo, la contestación del orden liberal y la consolidación de nuevos liderazgos globales; además, distintas crisis transfronterizas, como la pandemia de la COVID-19, han profundizado los efectos de estos cambios a nivel regional. En este contexto, ¿cuál es el espacio para la cooperación regional en América Latina? En tanto herramienta de concertación regional y de integración en los flujos y dinámicas internacionales, el regionalismo evidencia logros y retos pendientes. En términos analíticos, el artículo plantea una aproximación que permite examinar el conjunto de intereses, ideas e instituciones en juego a nivel regional en América Latina. El argumento central es que la dinámica cambiante del regionalismo resulta del modo en que los intereses de los estados interactúan con las ideas sobre la región en un entorno institucional específico a lo largo del tiempo.

Cover; Contents; List of Figures and Tables; Notes on Contributors; List of Abbreviations and Acronyms; 1 Regional Organizations and Social Policy: The Missing Link; Part I: Contextualizing Social Policy in Regional Governance: Trade and Investment Agreements, Structural Funds and Development Banks; 2 How Parallel Lines Intersect: Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Regional Social Policies; 3 Funding Social Policy at the Regional Level: The Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) and Social Policy in Bolivia; Part II: Regional Norms and Policies in the Area of Social Protection 4 Mercosur and the Struggle against Poverty5 Regulating Social Policy in the EU and Mercosur: Patterns and Developments in Social Security and Related Areas; 6 Regional and Domestic Responses to the Unemployment Problem in Europe: Reconfiguring the Architectures of Welfare States; 7 Work and Employment in Mercosur from a Gender Perspective: Challenges and Public Policies; Part III: Regional Norms and Policies in the Area of Education; 8 Policy Diffusion and Higher Education Reforms: Between Market and State Regulation --. - Where Does Mercosur Stand? 9 Mercosur's Regional Policies in Higher Education: The Diffusion of Accreditation and Quality Assurance Policies10 The EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in Education Policy: An Analysis of the Diffusion of European Ideas and Policies; Part IV: Regional Norms and Policies in the Area of Health; 11 Conditions for Effective Regional Social (Health) Policies: The EU and Unasur Compared; 12 Regional Integration and Health Policies: Regulatory Governance Challenges in Mercosur; 13 Regionalism and Health Policy in South America: Tackling Germs, Brokering Norms and Contesting Power

This paper focuses on the significance of regulatory governance at the regional level. In doing so, it analyzes to what extent and how North-South negotiations give rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in the developing world. To what extent do these forms vary across policy areas? Which elements account for the observed differences and similarities? Empirically, the paper explores the negotiation process between the European Union (EU) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which aims to promote trade
liberalization on the one hand, and the harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the other. The focus is on the trade and cooperative agendas involved in trade facilitation and education. Findings suggest that the negotiation of North-South agreements impacts on the ways in which different forms of regulatory
governance are expressed, but this varies among particular policy issues. Both the type of norm promoted and the capacity building mechanisms envisaged create a particular ideational and material context, all of which in turn affects the actor constellation – type of actor, specific role and network configuration – hence leading to different regulatory governance regimes among policy areas, yet within the same tradenegotiation.