Suchergebnisse

The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions' organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could – and should – be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?

The creation of the Banking Union is likely to come with substantial implications for the governance of Eurozone banks. The European Central Bank, in its capacity as supervisory authority for systemically important banks, as well as the Single Resolution Board, under the EU Regulations establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, have been provided with a broad mandate and corresponding powers that allow for far-reaching interference with the relevant institutions' organisational and business decisions. Starting with an overview of the relevant powers, the present paper explores how these could - and should - be exercised against the backdrop of the fundamental policy objectives of the Banking Union. The relevant aspects directly relate to a fundamental question associated with the reallocation of the supervisory landscape, namely: Will the centralisation of supervisory powers, over time, also lead to the streamlining of business models, corporate and group structures of banks across the Eurozone?

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, both resolution planning, i.e. contingency planning by both regulated institutions and public authorities in order to prepare their actions in financial crisis, and concepts for structural bank reform have been identified as possible solutions to ending "Too Big To Fail" and foster market discipline among bank owners, bank managers and investors in bank debt. Both concepts thus complement the global quest for reliable procedures and tools for bank resolution that would minimise systemic implications once large and complex financial institutions have reached the stage of insolvency. Given the complex task of orchestrating swift and effective resolution actions, especially with regard to cross-border banking groups and financial conglomerates, planning ahead in good times has since been widely recognised as crucial for enhancing resolvability. At least part of the impediments to resolution will be found in organisational, financial and legal complexity that has evolved in banks and groups over time. To remove these impediments, interference with existing corporate and group structures is all but inevitable. However, in both international standard setting and at the European Union level, issues related to resolution planning (within the context of bank resolution reform) and structural banking reforms to date have been discussed rather separately. This lack of consistency is questionable, given the obvious need to reconcile both approaches in order to facilitate effective implementation and enforcement especially with regard to large, complex banking groups. Based on an analysis both of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM Regulation, this paper explores how these problems could be dealt with within the context of the European Banking Union.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, both resolution planning, i.e. contingency planning by both regulated institutions and public authorities in order to prepare their actions in financial crisis, and concepts for structural bank reform have been identified as possible solutions to ending 'Too Big To Fail' and foster market discipline among bank owners, bank managers and investors in bank debt. Both concepts thus complement the global quest for reliable procedures and tools for bank resolution that would minimise systemic implications once large and complex financial institutions have reached the stage of insolvency. Given the complex task of orchestrating swift and effective resolution actions, especially with regard to cross-border banking groups and financial conglomerates, planning ahead in good times has since been widely recognised as crucial for enhancing resolvability. At least part of the impediments to resolution will be found in organisational, financial and legal complexity that has evolved in banks and groups over time. To remove these impediments, interference with existing corporate and group structures is all but inevitable. However, in both international standard setting and at the European Union level, issues related to resolution planning (within the context of bank resolution reform) and structural banking reforms to date have been discussed rather separately. This lack of consistency is questionable, given the obvious need to reconcile both approaches in order to facilitate effective implementation and enforcement especially with regard to large, complex banking groups. Based on an analysis both of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the SRM Regulation, this paper explores how these problems could be dealt with within the context of the European Banking Union.

Zusammenfassung
Die aufsichtsseitig erzwungene Übertragung von Vermögenswerten und Verbindlichkeiten von insolventen Banken auf privatwirtschaftliche Erwerber oder sog. Brückenbanken hat sich weltweit schon vor der globalen Finanzkrise als funktionale Alternative zu traditionellen Insolvenzverfahren etabliert. In Auseinandersetzung mit den Lehren der Krise ist das Instrument in zahlreichen Rechtsordnungen und auf der Ebene der internationalen Standardsetzung geradezu als "best practice" anerkannt worden und ist auch Bestandteil der geplanten EU-Richtlinie über die Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Wertpapierfirmen. Der vorliegende Beitrag unterzieht derartige Übertragungsinstrumente einer kritischen Würdigung und geht der Frage nach, ob sie - im Unterschied zu traditionellen Formen der Insolvenzbewältigung - auch bei systemrelevanten Banken die Haftung von Anteilseignern, Geschäftsleitern und Gläubigern und damit ein anreizkompatibles Regime sicherstellen können, das den Funktionen des klassischen Insolvenzrechts gerecht wird. Er gelangt zu dem Ergebnis, dass dies angesichts zahlreicher technischer und konzeptioneller Schwierigkeiten allenfalls im Zusammenwirken mit anderen Mechanismen, z.B. einer zwangsweisen Rekapitalisierung im Wege eines "bail-in" von Gläubigerforderungen, gelingen kann.