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"Foreign Policy Change" published on by Oxford University Press.

High issue salience and controversy negatively affect the probability of success of multilateral negotiations. In such a context, Chairpersons acquire an important role in agenda management and brokerage among the bargaining partners. If they perform these functions neutrally and impartially, Chairs increase their effectiveness and emerge as key determinants of negotiation success. However, Chairs as agents often seek some degree of autonomy to pursue their own interests. We expect high issue salience and controversy to create a non-conducive environment for Chairs to follow their own agenda, due to greater principals' sensitivity, thus leading any such autonomy-seeking attempt to failure. We discuss four case studies of negotiations taken from the un setting, in which Chairs sought autonomy in a highly polarized and controversial bargaining environment. Whereas in the first two cases, the Chairs' attempts ended in failure confirming our basic hypothesis, in the latter two cases the Chairs were successful.

High issue salience and controversy negatively affect the probability of success of multilateral negotiations. In such a context, Chairpersons acquire an important role in agenda management and brokerage among the bargaining partners. If they perform these functions neutrally and impartially, Chairs increase their effectiveness and emerge as key determinants of negotiation success. However, Chairs as agents often seek some degree of autonomy to pursue their own interests. We expect high issue salience and controversy to create a non-conducive environment for Chairs to follow their own agenda, due to greater principals' sensitivity, thus leading any such autonomy-seeking attempt to failure. We discuss four case studies of negotiations taken from the un setting, in which Chairs sought autonomy in a highly polarized and controversial bargaining environment. Whereas in the first two cases, the Chairs' attempts ended in failure confirming our basic hypothesis, in the latter two cases the Chairs were successful. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines foreign policy change, identifying structural parameters of domestic and international origins that bring about major foreign policy shifts. Domestic structural parameters comprise the politico-institutional setting and advocacy groups in support of alternative foreign policy options. International structural parameters refer on the one hand to systemic changes that may bring about foreign policy realignment and, on the other hand, to the country's role in the international system and its interactions with other countries that may activate foreign policy changes. We posit that this eclectic approach is necessary to account for major, multi-dimensional and complex, foreign policy decisions. We use this analytical framework to examine the Israeli re-orientation that enabled the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreement in the early 1990s.

The UNSC presidency functions under the twin assumptions of neutrality and impartiality. However, chairing multilateral negotiations in institutionalised bargaining fora always offers substantial opportunities to the country in office to pursue its own national interests. An important constraint for the presidency is the very short duration of the period in office, which does not allow chairs to capitalise on the existing informational asymmetries and use them to their own advantage. Can this institutional constraint be overcome? We address this issue by examining the British one-month presidency in January 1992. In a highly turbulent period, with mounting pressures for the UNSC to become more representative, the presidency secured the transition from the Soviet to the Russian UNSC seat without opening the Pandora's box of UNSC reform, in line with British preferences. Adapted from the source document.

The UNSC presidency functions under the twin assumptions of neutrality and impartiality. However, chairing multilateral negotiations in institutionalised bargaining fora always offers substantial opportunities to the country in office to pursue its own national interests. An important constraint for the presidency is the very short duration of the period in office, which does not allow chairs to capitalise on the existing informational asymmetries and use them to their own advantage. Can this institutional constraint be overcome? We address this issue by examining the British one-month presidency in January 1992. In a highly turbulent period, with mounting pressures for the UNSC to become more representative, the presidency secured the transition from the Soviet to the Russian UNSC seat without opening the Pandora's box of UNSC reform, in line with British preferences.

AbstractBesides systemic changes that lead to the re-prioritization of foreign policy objectives, foreign policy change is also a result of domestic policy entrepreneurs' pursuit of a political return. Their potential to orchestrate change depends on the existing entry barriers that emanate from the political and institutional features of the domestic policy-making process. It is accentuated by system-wide developments and security crises that illustrate old policy failure. This article discusses the role of policy entrepreneurs in foreign policy change by reference to the Greek–Turkish rapprochement in the late 1990s that resulted in Turkey receiving the status of EU candidate country in 1999.