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The psychology of individual hope has been well articulated through the work of Seligman & Snyder, but scholars have done little to extend this model to understand how individuals engage in collective hope. This article develops a model of the collective hope process that emphasizes the importance of principles of social inclusion, open contestation of goals, arid transparent pathways to give certainty to the belief that the public is important to the process, even if the same public is uncertain & divided about the outcomes. The study is based on a survey of 2,040 Australians who shared their hopes, fears, & actions in relation to the Australian taxation system in 2000. 5 Tables, 1 Appendix, 30 References. [Copyright 2004 Sage Publications, Inc.]

Data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey are used to examine how pervasive the view is that the more privileged in society are failing to pay their fair share of tax, to understand the beliefs that underpin such perceptions, and the reforms that are needed to open dialogue with the Australian public about the issue. Support is found for five hypotheses. Economic self-interest provides a partial explanation for perceptions of vertical inequity, but more important are disillusionment with the Australian democracy and perceptions of insufficient procedural justice from the Tax Office. Values about how Australian society should develop also play a part. Those looking for a more equal, caring and compassionate Australia perceive there to be a high level of vertical inequity. Such perceptions are not shared by those aspiring to an Australia that pursues competitive advantage either economically or politically.

Data from the Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey are used to examine how pervasive the view is that the more privileged in society are failing to pay their fair share of tax, to understand the beliefs that underpin such perceptions, and the reforms that are needed to open dialogue with the Australian public about the issue. Support is found for five hypotheses. Economic self‐interest provides a partial explanation for perceptions of vertical inequity, but more important are disillusionment with the Australian democracy and perceptions of insufficient procedural justice from the tax office. Values about how Australian society should develop also play a part. Those looking for a more equal, caring and compassionate Australia perceive there to be a high level of vertical inequity. Such perceptions are not shared by those aspiring to an Australia that pursues competitive advantage either economically or politically.Tax authorities are brokers for social order and harmony in democracies. They can not determine the policies that are supposed to deliver these goals, nor the rules by which individuals are expected to contribute to the government coffers. But they carry responsibility for making it all happen — collecting taxes and providing government with revenue. As such, their integrity is pivotal to smooth democratic functioning.Integrity for a tax authority involves having purposeful and sound goals, appropriate and ethical procedures for pursuing such goals, and processes allowing reflection and evolution of their operation in response to the democratic will (Braithwaite 2003). This paper is a contribution to the process of reflection on how the tax system is working for its citizens. Its purpose is to investigate the extent to which the Australian community believes that their tax authority is pursuing one of its goals, collecting revenue, in a sound and purposeful way. Three questions are addressed: (a) Are different social groups in our society paying their fair share of tax? (b) What are the experiences and aspirations lying behind public perceptions that some groups do not pay their fair share? and (c) Do perceptions of fairness shape the direction in which Australians want to see tax reform progress?

This paper seeks to advance understanding of compliance through identifying the constituent elements of four empirically derived postures of regulatees: resistance and disengagement (associated with non‐compliance), and managerial accommodation and capture (associated with compliance) (V. Braith‐waite et al. 1994). The nature of these postures is investigated through two theoretical frameworks, Meidinger's (1987) notion of regulatory culture (and the construct of social bonds) and Merton's (1968) modes of adaptation (and the construct of commitments to institutional goals and means). Social bonds and commitments to goals and means are important for explaining resistance, disengagement and managerial accommodation. In the case of capture of the regulatees, social bonds are more important than commitments to goals and means. The findings counsel regulatory agencies to establish trust and respect in the regulatee‐regulator relationship.

Data from the Affirmative Action Agency Public Reports and the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey were used to review progress in the implementation of the Australian Government's Affirmative Action legislation and to examine the relationship between following mandatory procedures and achieving outcomes that impact positively on women's workforce experiences. The data suggest that while a relationship exists at the bivariate level, it becomes considerably weaker when organizational and workforce characteristics are controlled. The variables that emerged from the analyses as strong predictors of both procedural compliance and the adoption of accommodating practices for women centered around human resource management. Where companies were committed to human resource management, both procedural compliance and accommodating practices tended to be high. These data demonstrate the importance of linking legislation for social change with workplace functions, particularly when resistance to the legislation is high and capacity to enforce is low.

Trust and Governance asks several important questions: Is trust really essential to good governance, or are strong laws more important? What leads people either to trust or to distrust government, and what makes officials decide to be trustworthy? Can too much trust render the public vulnerable to government corruption, and if so what safeguards are necessary? In approaching these questions, the contributors draw upon an abundance of resources to offer different perspectives on the role of trust in government. Enriched by perspectives from political science, sociology, psychology, economics, history, and philosophy, Trust and Governance opens a new dialogue on the role of trust in the vital relationship between citizenry and government

The regulatory welfare state illuminates path dependencies and tendencies to mutual growth in markets, welfare, and regulation. This article uses two specific welfare-to-work programs, one in Korea and one in Australia, to illustrate the institutional interconnections that are in play within the regulatory welfare state. Governance of these programs is hampered by lack of discursive capacity to identify where problems exist and how they can be fixed. When faced with new programs, implementers look to higher authorities to make sense of and to solve the problems on the ground, but authorities are blinded by old institutional categories that pit market mentalities against welfare mentalities with regulation as an ideological tool, rather than an integral part of solutions. Transparency and cross-boundary listening are necessary to create the bridging capital to make these programs work and reconnect democratically elected governments with their citizens.

Aggressive tax planning is found to be a cyclical phenomenon in Australia and the United States. While people strongly disapprove of it, mass participation in aggressive tax planning occurs during cyclical upswings, probably at a level involving well over 100,000 Australians in illegal schemes during the late 1990s. We analyse these cycles as a market in the vice of tax scheme promotion that is countered by widespread virtuous sentiments in the democracy. Community attitudes to tax cheating are therefore not seen as the problem, but as crucial to its solution. There is a democratic demand for tax system integrity. This demand creates a market for honest tax advice professionalism. Sophisticated regulators can use these community attitudes as the crucial resource for flipping markets in vice to markets in virtue. Cycles occur because markets in virtue and vice dominate at different periods of history.