Suchergebnisse

Abstract
There is a small but growing literature on the staffs working in national parliaments. These are mostly single-country studies studying one role that staff can play or one principal that they serve. Our contribution provides a comprehensive measurement instrument of the role of parliamentary staff, which takes into account organisational diversity within and between parliaments. We recognise four types of staff that may be present to a greater or lesser extent in different parliaments, which have different principals (PPG staff, personal staff, plenary or committee staff). These different staffs can play different roles (information broker, advisor, ghostwriter, compromise facilitator and marketeer). We apply this typology to the Dutch lower house and find out how different types of staff combine multiple roles in practice.

Les études sur la prise de décision suggèrent l'existence d'une tension entre la transparence et l'efficacité de la prise de décision. On part du principe qu'une plus grande transparence entraîne une baisse de l'efficacité des processus décisionnels ; toutefois, cette hypothèse n'a pas été testée empiriquement. Cette étude fournit un point de départ pour étudier la relation complexe entre la transparence et l'efficacité sur un ensemble de 244 processus législatifs de l'Union européenne entre 2014 et 2019. Elle constate que la transparence n'accélère ni ne ralentit les processus décisionnels, et que l'efficacité du processus législatif dépend de la complexité politique. Nos résultats appellent à de nouvelles recherches systématiques sur les causes et les conséquences de la transparence dans le processus décisionnel. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Dans les processus décisionnels, la transparence est largement considérée à la fois comme une bénédiction et comme une malédiction. D'une part, elle est considérée comme une vertu qui favorise la légitimité et la participation ; d'autre part, on dit qu'elle réduit l'efficacité décisionnelle. Cependant, notre étude de 244 processus législatifs de l'Union européenne montre que la transparence n'a aucun effet sur leur durée. Il convient donc de réévaluer les effets de la transparence dans les processus décisionnels.

AbstractRapporteurs in the European Parliament are influential figures, drafting reports, preparing and collecting amendments and negotiating files on behalf of Parliament as a whole. Previous studies have shown a persistent under‐representation of MEPs from the post‐2004 accession states among rapporteurs. In this study, we demonstrate the evolution of this disparity. Although it no longer exists at the surface, MEPs from accession states are still very much under‐represented in the allocation of files that are negotiated with the Council using trilogues – leaving them mostly with prime responsibility for short and relatively uncomplicated files. This shows that unequal representation has taken on a more subtle guise than before, with 'west‐European' MEPs still firmly in the driving seat.

Studies into decision-making suggest the existence of a tension between transparent and efficient decision-making. It is assumed that an increase in transparency leads to a decline in the efficiency of decision-making processes; however, this assumption has not been tested empirically. This study provides a starting point for investigating the complex relationship between transparency and efficiency on a set of 244 European Union legislative processes between 2014 and 2019. It finds that transparency neither speeds up nor slows down decision-making processes, and that the efficiency of the lawmaking process depends on political complexity. Our results call for further systematic research into the causes and consequences of decision-making transparency. Points for practitioners In decision-making processes, transparency is widely seen as both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, it is seen as a virtue that fosters legitimacy and participation; on the other hand, it is said to reduce decisional efficiency. However, our study of 244 European Union legislative processes shows that transparency has no effect on their duration. This calls for a re-appreciation of the effects of transparency in decision-making processes.

Existing typologies of the European administrative space locate decision‐making powers with the European Commission, member state governments, and EU and national agencies, sometimes aided through regulatory networks. This article argues that those typologies are incomplete because they do not take into account the existence of transnational executive bodies. These are public authorities that are responsible for administering and implementing EU policies across multiple member states, that are part of neither domestic nor EU institutions and whose decisions are legally binding. They represent a potentially highly prevalent form of governance in a previously uncharted area of the European administrative space. We document their workings by presenting a case study of the Rhine‐Alpine Corridor organization, a transnational executive body implementing parts of the EU rail freight policy.

AbstractThe Lisbon Treaty changed the system of delegating executive powers to the European Commission: it introduced the delegated acts system as an alternative to comitology, which continues to exist in parallel. This new system allocates veto power to the European Parliament and the Council, in which Member State expert groups are consulted without having a formal vote. The Council fears that the absence of formal voting will tempt the Commission to ignore Member State input in the expert groups. This article investigates to what degree this fear is justified. To what degree do formal voting rights affect the consultation of Member State experts? On the basis of interviews with Member State experts who participate both in expert groups as well as in comitology committees, we demonstrate how consultation patterns differ between the two settings.

The European Union, the United States, and Germany are characterised by what political scientists call strong bicameralism. These systems feature two legislative bodies (houses or chambers) of relative equality of standing and lack of political congruence, owing to their dissimilar political composition. In all three systems, laws cannot be passed unless they are approved by both chambers in identical form. Strong bicameralism invites discord between the chambers while making it necessary for them to accommodate their differences to exert power. These tensions make negotiations between the chambers (inter-cameral negotiations) an integral feature of legislative politics. Beyond these similarities, the three political systems display important differences in the specific legislative procedures and the composition of the chambers. In addition, they are embedded in very different political contexts. One basic contextual difference is that the European Union, unlike the United States and Germany, is not a state; and that EU Member States have retained more power than the US States and the German Länder. With this comparison, we hope to contribute to a broader and ongoing reflection about what is unique and not so unique about the EU, and what insights can be learned from other political systems. The United States and Germany were indeed a source of inspiration for drawing up the legislative procedure of the EU. We proceed case by case, starting briefly with the EU before turning our attention to the United States and Germany.2 For each case, we outline (1) the basic law-making institutions, (2) the process of inter-cameral conflict resolution, and (3),the political and public pressures for change.