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AbstractWithin Latin America, Chile is distinguished by its stable trade policies and rapid negotiation of trade agreements with countries and regions all over the world. Explanations for these phenomena often point to the stable pro-free trade coalition established in the aftermath of the shock-therapy pursued in the 1970s, and Chile's professional government bureaucracy. Although both of these elements are important, this article shows how the rapid integration of Chile into the world economy has also depended on the existence of business associations with expertise on trade issues. Through the process of integration, a close policy network has evolved between key public officials and business representatives. This is premised on the mutual recognition of expertise in the public and private sectors, and is held together by close personal networks of loyalty and trust across the public-private divide. However, while the development of such a policy network has been highly favourable to the process of negotiating trade agreements, it has also contributed to the de-facto exclusion of societal actors that have less to contribute to trade negotiations than business sectors.

AbstractIt is currently widely recognized that trade liberalization leads not only to deregulation but also to re‐regulation. However, it is less well understood how trade agreements and trade liberalization affect domestic regulatory institutions. This article aims to contribute to such an understanding through a case study of Chile. Since 1990, Chile has pursued a strategy of economic integration through bilateral, regional, and multilateral agreements. The study shows how this strategy has led to the partial implementation of a patchwork of competing regulatory institutions, many of which can trace their roots to the domestically preferred institutions of Chile's major trading partners.

Latin America is currently characterised by the rise of a number of strong social movements and the election of governments that have their support. This has given rise to hopes for the emergence of more inclusive political systems, and stable democracies. However, many of the new regimes either show limited ability to create significant change in policies or practices for ensuring social inclusion, or have produced new forms of fragmentation and social conflicts. What are the long-term prospects of democratic inclusion of the social movements? This article approaches this question through a comparison of three current social movements in Latin America -- the Landless Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil, the coca growers (cocaleros) movement in Bolivia and the movement of the unemployed (piqueteros) in Argentina with the experience of the Norwegian labour movement in the early 20th century. It argues that the inclusion of social movements depends on their own internal structure and strategies as well as the state's institutional capacity and the global politic-economic context. Adapted from the source document.

During the 1990s, the telecommunication sectors in most Latin American countries were privatized, liberalized and deregulated. In the literature, this shift has been accounted for by pointing to technological transformations, changing political coalitions or the pressure from international financial institutions (IFIs). This article argues that a centerpiece in the explanation of the general shift towards opening the telecommunication sector, and of the specific forms that this took in the different countries, is the ideas and strategies of local economic groups. The article traces the processes of attempted and implemented telecommunication reforms in three Central American countries - Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras - and argues that it was the local private sectors in shifting alliances with transnational corporations that were the main forces behind reforms. The IFIs had primarily an indirect role, through squeezing the budgets of the state owned telecommunication companies contributing to their deteriorating quality, and through supporting the political organization of the local private sector. The article also analyzes the regulatory regimes resulting from the reforms and the extent to which they benefit the local economic groups, the consumers, the state and/or transnational companies.