Suchergebnisse

Russian government commitment to the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, with its limits on missile defenses, and opposition to weapons in space. Opposition to US Strategic Defense Initiative.

Rationale, cost, effectiveness and necessity of a scaled back SDI program known as the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS).

Based on a chapter of the book, "Foundation for the future: the ABM Treaty and national security." New US and Soviet ABM-related technologies and arms control. Partial contents: Resolving the LPAR issue; Air defense/ATBM upgrade; Space-based ABM interceptors; Space nuclear reactors.

Overview of publicly conducted SDI experiments, 1983 through Feb. 1988, and planned experiments through the mid-1990s.

The likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack depends in part on the ability of terrorist groups to acquire, construct, and detonate a nuclear device. This article attempts to determine the difficulty of such an endeavor by examining the underlying physical facts about nuclear fission, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons design. The facts bear out a simple conclusion: while the danger should not be exaggerated, a nuclear terrorist attack is potentially within the capabilities of a well-organized and sophisticated terrorist group. A nuclear attack might be one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try, but if a highly capable group acquired a stolen nuclear bomb or enough nuclear material to make one, there can be few grounds for confidence that they would be unable to use it.