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Theorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinct from the apparatus of the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation. Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the anonymous "public conversation" of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited conception of the public sphere. For Rawls, public reason, which establishes norms for democratic discourse, applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres. I argue that Rawls's more limited "liberal" conception better guarantees the heterogeneity of associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his own principles by partially collapsing the public-nonpublic distinction with potentially illiberal consequences.

Theorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinct from the apparatus of the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation. Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the anonymous "public conversation" of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited conception of the public sphere. For Rawls, public reason, which establishes norms for democratic discourse, applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres. I argue that Rawls's more limited "liberal" conception better guarantees the heterogeneity of associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his own principles by partially collapsing the public-nonpublic distinction with potentially illiberal consequences. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

In an earlier article we challenged the findings of Fowler and Dawes (FD) that two genes predict voter turnout as part of a more general critique of "genopolitics." FD now acknowledge that their finding of a "significant" direct association between MAOA and voting was incorrect, but claim to have replicated their finding of an "indirect" association between 5HTT, self-reported church attendance, and self-reported voting. We show that this finding is likely driven by population stratification and omitted variable bias. We then explain why, from the standpoints of genetics, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology, genopolitics is a fundamentally misguided undertaking; we also respond to FD's charge that some of our previous statements concerning genetics are "highly misleading," "extremely disingenuous," and "even incorrect." We show that their criticisms demonstrate a lack of awareness of some basic principles in genetics and of discoveries in molecular genetics over the past 50 years.

Political scientists are making increasing use of the methodologies of behavior genetics in an attempt to uncover whether or not political behavior is heritable, as well as the specific genotypes that might act as predisposing factors for—or predictors of—political "phenotypes." Noteworthy among the latter are a series of candidate gene association studies in which researchers claim to have discovered one or two common genetic variants that predict such behaviors as voting and political orientation. We critically examine the candidate gene association study methodology by considering, as a representative example, the recent study by Fowler and Dawes according to which "two genes predict voter turnout." In addition to demonstrating, on the basis of the data set employed by Fowler and Dawes, that two genes do not predict voter turnout, we consider a number of difficulties, both methodological and genetic, that beset the use of gene association studies, both candidate and genome-wide, in the social and behavioral sciences.

Daniel Bell (1998) argues that it is wrong for Western cultures to simply impose their view of "universal human rights" on non-Western societies. He contends that a justification for universal human rights should instead be found within a country's own cultural traditions. Here, it is argued that Bell's approach is inadequate. Fundamental human rights must depend on a nonparochial approach. Further, all people are entitled to human rights based simply on their humanity. What Bell describes as "Western" moral principles are, in fact, nothing more than human moral principles. It is contended that history has proven the impossibility of reforming a country's approach to human rights while demeaning cultural traditions remain. Bell claims that the leaders of the Tiananmen Square uprising were rebelling within the confines of their own cultural traditions; he is incorrect in this assumption. Instead, Chinese dissidents were utilizing the ideals of Western liberalism to press for their own freedoms. Adapted from the source document.

From Generation to Generation explores what we know about the development of white, black, Hispanic, and Asian children and youth from numerous countries of origin. Describing the status of immigrant children and youth as "severely understudied," this work both draws on and supplements existing research to characterize the current status and outlook for immigrant children. The book discusses the many factors - acculturation, conditions in their receiving communities, parent employment and income, fluency in English, delivery of health and social services, and public policies - that shape the lives of these children and youth. The committee makes recommendations for improved research and data collection designed to advance knowledge about these children and, as a result, their visibility in current policy debates