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THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE EXTENT AND STRENGTH OF COATTAIL VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THIS METHOD ALLOWS THE AUTHORS TO ESTIMATE THE MAGNITUDE OF COATTAIL VOTING AND THEN TO DECOMPOSE THIS ESTIMATE INTO MORE "BASIC" ELEMENTS. ESTIMATES ARE GIVEN FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BEGINNING WITH 1956. THE DETERMINATION OF THE COATTAIL VOTE AND ITS DECOMPOSITION DEPEND ON THE THEORY OF THE VOTING DECISION THAT IS ASSUMED. IN THIS ARTICLE WE PRESENT A MODEL OF VOTE DETERMINATION THAT IS SIMILAR IN MOST RESPECTS TO THE TRADITIONAL SRC MODEL; THE VOTE FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR IS DETERMINED JOINTLY BY PARTISAN AFFILIATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AND LOCAL FORCES UNIQUE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RACE (SUCH AS MAY BE CAPTURED BY AN INCUMBENCY VARIABLE). THIS MODEL PERMITS THE SEPARATE ESTIMATION OF THE STRENGTH OF SHORT-TERM FORCES AND OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO SURVEY DATA SINCE 1956 INDICATES THAT EFFICIENCY OF PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS HAS DECLINED DURING THIS PERIOD. FURTHERMORE, THE 1980 ELECTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS TREND. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY PARTICULAR TREND IN THE STRENGTH OF SHORT-TERM FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD; INSTEAD EVENTS PECULIAR TO THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC ELECTION GENERATE SHORTTERM FORCES AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE FORCES ARE CARRIED OVER TO LOCAL RAPY: 1983

Attempts to reign‐in runaway regulatory bureaucracy fail because the bureaucracy has all the important resources. The bureaucracy also holds the upper hand in policy‐making because Congress has neither the time nor inclination to effect legislative control and oversight. The authors examine the travails of the Federal Trade Commission during the 1970s to show the blurred distinction between bureaucratic autonomy and legislative control.

We develop and explicate a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements. A significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes. The model is used to formalize certain aspects of the "theory of hegemonic stability." It shows that the "dilemma" or "limits" of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved, unifying both "benevolent" and "coercive" strands of hegemony theory. An example, drawn from recent developments in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries, shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction. We conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information.