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This book brings together contributions from leading scholars around the world on the most relevant and pressing economic themes surrounding the UK-EU relationship. With contributions spanning from the UK's accession to the bloc to the aftermath of its decision to leave, the book explores key themes in UK economic growth and EU membership, international trade, foreign direct investment, financial markets and migration. Chapters interrogate the history of the relationship, the depth of foreign direct investment, and responses to the financial crisis. Considering both the history and future of UK and EU relations, the book is a relevant and timely volume that gives welcome context to a fast-changing relationship.

Although firms use various strategies to try to influence government policy, with lobbying and corruption chiefly among them, and political institutions play an important role in determining policy choices, very little research has been devoted to these topics. This paper tries to fill this gap. Using cross-country enterprise-level data, it investigates (1) the effect of a key political institution, namely electoral rules, on the probability that a firm engages in lobbying activities and (2) the impact of lobbying on influence, accounting for corruption and political institutions. The main conclusion is that lobbying is a significantly more effective way of generating political influence than corruption, and that electoral rules are a key mediating political institution. Our baseline estimate is that the probability of influencing government policy is 16% higher for firms that are members of lobbying groups than for those firms that are not.

What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a fundamental role in the reform's implementation phase.

What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a fundamental role in the reform's implementation phase.

What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a fundamental role in the reform's implementation phase.

What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a fundamental role in the reform's implementation phase.

"The UK-EU economic relationship has never been more important but also more uncertain. For anyone seeking perspective, this book is the essential guide." Barry Eichengreen, George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee, Professor of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley "Brexit is an earthquake for the UK and EU. This timely book helps us understand how the economic plates will shift" John Van Reenen, Professor at MIT Economics Department and Sloan Management School "UK-EU relations were never calm but even so Brexit is a big shock. The authors of this splendid book explain how the relationship has evolved and how Brexit will change it, potentially radically." André Sapir, University Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles and former Economic Advisor to the President of the European Commission. This book brings together contributions from leading scholars around the world on the most relevant and pressing economic themes surrounding the UK-EU relationship. With contributions spanning from the UK's accession to the bloc to the aftermath of its decision to leave, the book explores key themes in UK economic growth and EU membership, international trade, foreign direct investment, financial markets and migration. Chapters interrogate the history of the relationship, the depth of foreign direct investment, and responses to the financial crisis. Considering both the history and future of UK and EU relations, the book is a relevant and timely volume that gives welcome context to a fast-changing relationship.--

This paper investigates the role of structural reforms -financial reforms, trade liberalization, and privatization- as determinants of FDI inflows based on newly constructed dataset on structural reforms for 19 Latin American and 25 Eastern European countries between 1989 and 2004. Our main finding is a strong empirical relationship from reforms to FDI, in particular, from financial liberalization and privatization. These results are robust to different measures of reforms, split samples, and potential endogeneity and omitted variables biases

Despite numerous studies about core-periphery in monetary unions, few focus on their dynamics. This paper (i) presents new theory-based, continuous and dynamic measures of the probability of a country being classified as core or periphery; (ii) estimates the determinants of the changes in this probability over time and across countries; and (iii) uses the Phillips-Sul convergence panel framework to investigate the behaviour of core and periphery groups over time. Our main results indicate that the post-EMU decrease of the core-periphery gap that we document was mainly driven by the adoption of the euro and by increasing competition (lower mark-ups).

We investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels to guide our analysis. Each of these corresponds to a series of mechanisms in three distinct institutional arenas: judiciary, bureaucracy and competition policy. To test our framework, we introduce a new panel of institutional reform measures that allow us to investigate how changes in these three arenas interact with each other and what sequence of changes yields increases in state capacity. The yearly data set covers all the 17 candidate countries to join the European Union (EU) after the 1995 enlargement. Deep integration, we find, can induce broad institutional change by providing incentives for simultaneous change in core state institutions. Bureaucratic independence and judicial capacity seem to be the key engine of the process engendered by the prospect of EU membership. Yet early and abrupt removal of external anchors might generate significant backsliding, or reversals, in domestic institutional change.

Published online 10 October 2018 ; We investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels to guide our analysis. Each of these corresponds to a series of mechanisms in three distinct institutional arenas: judiciary, bureaucracy and competition policy. To test our framework, we introduce a new panel of institutional reform measures that allow us to investigate how changes in these three arenas interact with each other and what sequence of changes yields increases in state capacity. The yearly data set covers all the 17 candidate countries to join the European Union (EU) after the 1995 enlargement. Deep integration, we find, can induce broad institutional change by providing incentives for simultaneous change in core state institutions. Bureaucratic independence and judicial capacity seem to be the key engine of the process engendered by the prospect of EU membership. Yet early and abrupt removal of external anchors might generate significant backsliding, or reversals, in domestic institutional change. ; EU's Seventh Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and DemonstrationEuropean Union (EU)

AbstractWe investigate whether and how economic integration increases state capacity. This important relationship has not been studied in detail so far. We put together a conceptual framework that highlights what we call the Montesquieu, Weber and Smith channels to guide our analysis. Each of these corresponds to a series of mechanisms in three distinct institutional arenas: judiciary, bureaucracy and competition policy. To test our framework, we introduce a new panel of institutional reform measures that allow us to investigate how changes in these three arenas interact with each other and what sequence of changes yields increases in state capacity. The yearly data set covers all the 17 candidate countries to join the European Union (EU) after the 1995 enlargement. Deep integration, we find, can induce broad institutional change by providing incentives for simultaneous change in core state institutions. Bureaucratic independence and judicial capacity seem to be the key engine of the process engendered by the prospect of EU membership. Yet early and abrupt removal of external anchors might generate significant backsliding, or reversals, in domestic institutional change.