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This paper provides an analysis of the effectiveness of climate policies by focusing on the link between policy options on the one hand, and structure of the agreements and of the international regimes on the other hand. In particular, the paper analyses whether there are the conditions for an agreement on climate change to be signed by all or almost all world countries; and whether some countries can play a strategic role, with respect to the goal of achieving the largest possible agreement, by proposing strategies, measures, institutions that help to expand the number of countries which commit to control their emissions. In this way, the paper also analyses which strategies can be proposed to reduce the costs of mitigation policies, where the cost reduction is achieved by increasing the number of signatories and by dividing more equitably the burden of emission control.

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.

Game theory can be used to deal with complex economic and policy problems. It is therefore natural to adopt game theory as one of the analytical instruments that can enhance our understanding of the interrelations between the economy and the environment and that can also provide practical suggestions for policy interventions

I: Introduction to Control Theory: Methods and Algorithms -- 1. Developments of Control Theory in Macroeconomics -- 2. Linear Controllability: Results and Open Questions -- 3. A System Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Economic Policy -- 4. Software for Economic Optimal Control Models -- II: Recent Developments of Control Theory: Objective Function Specification -- 5. Interactive Vector Optimization as a Complement to Optimal Control in Econometric Decision Models -- 6. Risk Reduction and the Robustness of Economic Policies -- 7. Optimal Economic Policies under a Crawling-Peg Exchange -- 8. Some Remarks on Forward Programming -- 9. Utility and Uncertainty in Intertemporal Choice -- 10. Gradient Methods for FIML Estimation of Econometric Models -- III: Recent Developments of Control Theory: A Game Theoretic Approach -- 11. Methods for the Simultaneous Use of Multiple Models in Optimal Policy Design -- 12. Optimal Policy Design in Interdependent Economies -- 13. Hierarchical Games for Macroeconomic Policy Analysis -- 14. A Dynamic and Stochastic Model of Price Leadership -- 15. Quality and Reputation Policies of Duopolists under Asymmetric Information -- IV: Economic and Econometric Analysis By Control Methods -- 16. A System Approach to Insurance Company Management -- 17. Capital Theoretics, Business Cycles and Feedback Policy: An Experiment in Macroeconomic Control -- 18. Exogeneity and Control.

AbstractThis paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China generated by the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH. A Business-as-Usual scenario is compared with five scenarios in which greenhouse gases emissions are taxed, at different levels. The elasticity of China's emissions is estimated by pooling observations from all scenarios and comparing them with the elasticity of emissions in OECD countries. China has a higher elasticity than the OECD for a carbon tax lower than US$50 per ton of CO2-eq. For higher taxes, emissions in OECD economies are more elastic than in China. Our best guess indicates that China would need to introduce a tax equal to about US$750 per ton of CO2-eq in 2050 to achieve the Major Economies Forum goal set for mid-century. In our preferred estimates, the discounted cost of following the 2°C trajectory is equal to 5.4 per cent and to 2.7 per cent of GDP in China and the OECD, respectively.