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How does leader age affect international politics? Challenging the existing literature's focus on chronological age, we argue that leaders do not age the same in the eyes of their beholders. Combining insights from gerontology on age-related stereotypes and studies of face-to-face diplomacy, we show that judgments about age informed by high-level personal encounters have profound consequences for how elderly leaders are appraised and treated by their counterparts. A leader who betrays indicators of "senility" during face-to-face encounters will elicit harsh judgments by activating negative stereotypes about aging. Older leaders can also surprise their interlocutors: those long thought to be senile may show themselves as mentally and physically fit. Perceptions of age, in turn, shape how observers understand a leader's agency and shape decisions to "engage" or "bypass" the leader in the context of interstate cooperation. We draw on declassified primary documents to compare American views of three elderly leaders in Cold War Asia—Syngman Rhee, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai—and how such views informed Washington's approach to these leaders, finding powerful support for our arguments. Our findings suggest new insights for the IR research program on leaders as well as lessons for statecraft in an era of aging decision makers.

Although the statistical literature on conflict studies has generated strong and consistent findings on the relationship of political irrelevance and dyadic democracy to conflict, scholars have paid scant attention to the interesting theoretical issue of how they matter. The authors argue that additive controls and dropping irrelevant dyads constitute misspecifications of their effects. There are theoretical reasons to believe that the impact of distance on conflict is not sufficiently severe to justify the practice of simply dropping irrelevant dyads. Moreover, they argue that political irrelevance and dyadic democracy, rather than subtracting some constant quantity, interact to impose an upper bound on the probability of conflict initiation. They find both of these arguments to be supported in a reanalysis of a prominent study of dispute initiation.