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This essay studies the rise, decline, and rebirth of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its transformation into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It first examines AQI's distinctive vision and its defiance of al Qaeda central. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's anti-Shiite jihadist perspective, dramatized by AQI's use of social media, attracted thousands of foreign fighters to Iraq. The Jordanian's struggle against Shiite apostates and 2006 martyrdom in a US airstrike continues to dazzle young militants. Second, the essay analyzes AQI's regeneration and metamorphosis into ISIS and its challenge to al Qaeda's central command. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's refusal to recognize the authority of al Qaeda's Ayman al Zawahiri and Baghdadi's violent resistance to reconciliation measures has sparked destabilizing intrajihadist warfare. Third, the essay examines ISIS's position as it resists attacks by Iraqi regime forces, rebel groups, Kurdish militants, and US-led coalition air strikes. The essay's concluding observations analyze the parallels and differences between the Armed Islamic Group's campaign in Algeria in the 1990s and ISIS's position in Iraq and Syria in 2015.

The Barack Obama administration's May 2013 assessment of al Qaeda's weakness and fracturing in the post-bin Laden era has been greeted with indignation by both liberals and conservatives. They believe al Qaeda is stronger than ever in the wake of the Arab Spring. These critics, however, misunderstand the network's dysfunctional direction. Al Qaeda's "resurgence" is likely to lead to its failure. The argument proceeds on four levels: (1) the dramatic growth of the al Qaeda network masks its internal weakness and organizational splintering; (2) the Arab Spring has led to a burst of al Qaeda activism that is likely to undermine its jihadist cause; (3) al Qaeda's fragmentation and its multiple trajectories in the post-9/11 era violate bin Laden's original intent and are beyond al Qaeda Central's direction; and (4) the dysfunctional nature of al Qaeda's ideology and its excessive reliance on takfiri violence is paradoxically a source of both persistence and failure.

The political transformations under way in the Arab world and the killing of Osama bin Laden raise serious questions about al Qaeda's long-term viability. The secular-liberal Arab Spring protest movement appears to be winning the war of ideas over al Qaeda's violent religious fundamentalism. Civil disobedience campaigns in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in forcing regime change in ways that a decade of al Qaeda terror attacks failed to accomplish. While it is too soon to write al Qaeda's obituary, its erosion came well before the death of its historic leader. This essay examines al Qaeda's post–9/11 evolution, its strategy, and its steady fragmentation. Since the destruction of its Taliban Afghan sanctuary, al Qaeda has been through many mutations, none of which, over time, has been successful. This essay argues that al Qaeda's failures in Iraq contributed substantially to the organization's decline.